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The thesis analyses Dag Hammarskjöld’s political role as UN Secretary-General and 
the efforts he made to justify such a role. It is the first attempt to give a 
comprehensive account of the political role Hammarskjöld played from “both sides”, 
based on the now available sources from both national and UN archives. The thesis 
also deals with the problems of a political role for the UN Secretary-General.  
The conventional picture of Hammarskjöld as a “neutral and impartial” international 
civil servant is challenged and the figure that emerges is the one of an astute politician 
– a ”Machiavelli of Peace”.  
 
As a civil servant in Sweden, Hammarskjöld played a political role although he 
viewed himself as an expert and civil servant and not a politician. He argued that he 
could play a political role based on ”neutrality and impartiality” and he transferred 
this concept to the international arena as Secretary-General. 
Hammarskjöld managed to play an important political role because he offered a 
solution to the American dilemma of how to deal with the Cold War in the Third-
World without choosing between their Western European allies and the newly 
independent countries. This at the precise time when the Americans were losing 
control of the General Assembly due to the influx of newly independent countries that 
put decolonisation on the agenda.  
In the Congo Crisis the political role of the Secretary-General reached its zenith 
during the initial period where Hammarskjöld played an interventionist role. 
Hammarskjöld’s policies were based on clearly defined Cold War objectives – shared 
by the Western permanent members of the Security Council – and on a wish to 
enlarge the political role of the Secretary-General. The weak base for 
Hammarskjöld’s political role forced him to radically change his policies in the 
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“Through ambiguities resolved, through margins skilfully used, the office of the 
Secretary-General had grown in stature and authority far beyond what the framers of 
the Charter seem to have envisaged at San Francisco. This was quite widely 
recognized; someone, I know not who, had even jested that the motto of the Secretary-
General ought to be Per ambigua ad astra. To most good ‘United Nations people’, like 
myself, this growth seemed healthy. The strengthening of the office was also the 
strengthening of the international community, the strengthening of the defences of 
peace. As for Mr Hammarskjold himself, we had complete confidence in him as being – 
I quote the words used about him, in private, by a Russian member of the Secretariat – 
‘an integritous man’. We even, I think, found something slightly intoxicating in the 
paradox of equivocation being used in the service of virtue, the thought of a 
disinterested Talleyrand, a Machiavelli of peace.” Connor Cruise O’Brien1 
 
 
In the introduction to the standard study of the office of the UN Secretary-General, 
Dag Hammarskjöld is referred to as “the most dynamic and influential Secretary-
General the United Nations has seen”.2 The status of Hammarskjöld in the UN today 
is almost that of a patron saint. Kofi Annan said that “There can be no better rule of 
thumb for a Secretary-General, as he approaches each new challenge or crisis, then to 
ask himself, ‘how would Hammarskjöld have handled this?’”.3 Deputy Secretary-
General Jan Eliasson refers to Hammarskjöld as “a role model” and to “the relevance 
of his ideas for the United Nations and the practices of global cooperation”.4 In recent 
years critics of the current UN leadership have routinely referred to the visionary 
leadership of Hammarskjöld as a model to be followed and the disillusionment with 
the UN today is related to how far it is perceived to have fallen short of the ideal of an 
active political role that Hammarskjöld embodied.5 Academic studies have referred to 																																																								
1 O’Brien, Conor Cruise, To Katanga and Back (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1962), p. 47. 
2 Chesterman, Simon (ed.), Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 6.  
3 Annan, Kofi, Fourth Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, 6 September 2001 (Uppsala: Eklundshofs Grafiska, 
Uppsala, 2001). 
4 Eliasson, Jan, “Foreword” in Stahn, Carsten and Melber, Henning (eds.), Peace Diplomacy, Global 
Justice and International Agency: Rethinking Human Security and  Ethics in the Spirit of Dag 
Hammarskjöld (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. xii-xiii. 
5 See e.g. Op-Ed in the New York Times on 16 September 2011 by Sir Brian Urquhart entitled 
“Learning from Hammarskjöld” and the End of Assignment Report of Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Under-
Secretary-General for Oversight Services, 14 July 2010. 
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Hammarskjöld as “a beacon and legend for men who are seeking the road to 
international peace and security” and a “’moral compass’ for international civil 
service”.6 Even a realist and critic of international organisation like Hans Morgenthau 
conceded that “the late Mr. Hammarskjöld’s tenure of office shows impressively how 
dependent the peace-promoting functions of the Secretary-General are upon the 
intellectual and moral qualities of the holder of that office. Only a man of 
Hammarskjöld’s personality could have tried to do what he did in this respect, and 
have achieved what he achieved”.7  
 
This thesis deals with what kind of impact an individual agent like Hammarskjöld can 
have on an international organisation like the UN and on history. It asks whether 
Hammarskjöld had an independent political role and examines the efforts he made to 
justify such a role for the Secretary-General and the UN.  
 
The conventional picture equates Hammarskjöld with idealism, a philosophy that 
seeks universal peace through international law. The standard Hammarskjöld 
biography, by Urquhart, concludes that Hammarskjöld “stood up for principle against 
even the greatest powers and in doing so he might sometimes have an influence on 
important events”.8 This summarises the two main elements in the conventional 
interpretation of Hammarskjöld’s political role. First, that he had an influence and 
made the Secretary-General and the UN a relevant actor, and, secondly, that his 
actions were guided by ideals, principles and a strong set of ethics. The majority of 
scholarly studies on Hammarskjöld are devoted to his political ethics “and how they 
influenced his actions”.9 This was also stressed by Hammarskjöld himself in many 
public speeches: 
 
“Politics and diplomacy are no play of will and skill where results are 
independent of the character of those engaging in the game.  Results are 																																																								
6 Zacher, Mark, Dag Hammarskjöld’s United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 
p. 254; Melber, Henning, ”Human Security and ethics in the spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld: an 
introduction” in Stahn/Melber (eds.), p. 9. 
7 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations – The Struggle for Peace and Power, (New York: 
Knopf, 1973, 5th edition), p. 486. 
8	Urquhart, Brian, Hammarskjöld (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 596. 
9	The most detailed is Fröhlich, Manuel, Dag Hammarskjöld und die Verinten Nationen : Die politische 
Etik des UNO-Generalsekretärs (Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2002); for a recent example 
see Dionigi, Filippo, “Dag Hammarskjöld’s Religiosity and Norms Entrepreneurship: A Post-secular 
Perspective”, in Politics and Religion Vol 9 March 2016, pp. 162-186. 
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determined not by superficial ability but by the consistency of the actors in their 
efforts and by the validity of their ideals.  Contrary to what seems to be popular 
belief there is no intellectual activity which more ruthlessly tests the solidity of a 
man than politics. Apparently easy successes with the public are possible for a 
juggler, but lasting results are achieved only by the patient builder… Those who 
are called to be teachers or leaders may profit from intelligence but can only 
justify their position by integrity.”10 
 
Hammarskjöld was the Secretary-General who devoted most time to the theoretical 
formulation and implementation of his own vision of the UN and, to this day, he is the 
only Secretary-General to explicitly invoke Article 99 of the UN Charter to bring an 
international crisis to the Security Council.  
 
There is a vast outpouring of books and articles on Hammarskjöld and the last years 
have seen major new biographies, scholarly volumes and international conferences 
dedicated to his person and his legacy, but none of these challenge the conventional 
description. Indeed, most of these studies focus on Hammarskjöld as a symbol and 
use him for other purposes (the title of one recent book is symptomatic in this respect: 
“Peace Diplomacy, Global Justice and International Agency – Rethinking Human 
Security and Ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld”). In a eulogy after 
Hammarskjöld’s death that ring prophetic, Gunnar Myrdal said: 
 
“He will live on as a myth and a symbol. He will continue to serve as he always did, 
but henceforth unable to influence what interests he will serve and to what practical 
purposes he will be used. […] Eventually historical research will force its way 
through the mythmaking, even if it may take a long time before all facts are 
elucidated in such a complex matter where such strong interests are involved. But it 
can be foreseen that much will then appear in a new light and that a lot of what is 
now said in different quarters will show itself to be the product of shallow and 
interest-guided prejudices”.11  
 
																																																								
10 Cordier, Andrew W. and Foote, Wilder, Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United 
Nations Volume III (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 67. 
11 Myrdal’s speech on Hammarskjöld to the university students of Stockholm, ”Myt för en ny tids 
människor” (Myth for men/women of a new time), quoted from Appelqvist, Örjan, ”A hidden duel 
Gunnar Myrdal and Dag Hammarskjöld” in Economics and International Politics 1935-1955 in 
Stockholm Papers in Economic History No 2, 2008. 
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Yet remarkably, there is still no full-fledged account of Hammarskjöld and his 
political role based on the now available source material, in particular national 
archives that allow us to understand the relation between the Secretary-General and 
the Member States and how they viewed and related to Hammarskjöld’s attempts to 
develop a political role for the Secretary-General. All biographies of Hammarskjöld 
follow the interpretation of Urquhart and use mainly the same one-sided archival 
sources. Urquhart’s Hammarskjöld biography has also been called “the most 
influential book ever written about the UN”.12 The most recent full-scale biography of 
Hammarskjöld even goes as far as saying that Urquhart’s biography, published in 
1972, is “the best biography we shall ever have”.13 But Urquhart himself never 
intended it to be a definitive study. On the contrary, he wrote in the preface that 
“[m]ore detailed and more scholarly studies will obviously be required in order to 
explore, when other source materials become available, the depth and the full detail of 
the various episodes concerned”.14 This thesis is an attempt at such a study.  
 
Already in 1969 Robert Cox discussed executive leadership in international 
organizations in an essay that defined as a future research topic the question: Can 
international leadership transform an international organisation such as the UN from a 
forum of multilateral diplomacy into something that is more than the sum of its 
inputs, and thereby make the UN into a partly autonomous actor?15 Cox also used 
Hammarskjöld as an example to be studied and Fröhlich and others have used this as 
their starting point in studies of Hammarskjöld.16 This thesis, however, argues the 
opposite of the conventional interpretation, i.e. that Hammarskjöld managed to play a 
role precisely because he did not base his policies on principles, and that his success 
relied on his ability to redefine the political role of the Secretary-General and the UN 
according to the situation. This thesis argues that, after trials and errors, 
Hammarskjöld managed to find a political role for the UN in the Third-World at the 
interface of the Cold War and decolonisation that would be defining for the future of 
the UN. Furthermore, I will argue that Hammarskjöld was neither neutral nor 																																																								
12 Gilmour, Andrew, ”Dag Hammarskjöld: Statesman of the Century” in The Nation, 9 September 
2013. 
13 Lipsey, Roger, Hammarskjöld A Life, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013).  
14 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, xiii.  
15 Cox, Robert W., “The Executive Head An Essay on Leadership in International Organization” in 
International Organization 23 (1969), p. 207. 
16 Fröhlich, p. 24-25. 
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impartial, but his policies were based mainly on clearly defined Cold War objectives 
– shared by the Western permanent members of the Security Council – and on a wish 
to enlarge the political role of the Secretary-General and the UN. This thesis argues 
that Hammarskjöld’s tenure led to both the highpoint and the collapse of the political 
role of the Secretary-General and this thesis will show that his legacy is much more 
complicated than has been acknowledged previously. In a sense, the thesis is also a 
genealogy of many of the core UN principles of both peacekeeping and assistance to 
the developing world, both core aspects of the UN today that were developed by 
Hammarskjöld. The thesis argues that many of the principles that have guided the UN 
were created to serve certain Cold War objectives rather than being based on 
neutrality and impartiality. 
 
This thesis is the first attempt to give a comprehensive portrait of Hammarskjöld’s 
tenure as Secretary-General from both sides, utilising the national archives of 
Member States as well as UN archives. The large Hammarskjöld literature is mainly 
based on Hammarskjöld’s speeches and his personal papers and does not engage with 
the relevant historical literature on the Cold War and American, British and French 
foreign policy or archival sources from these countries. The focus will be on 
Hammarskjöld’s relations with the three Western permanent members of the Security 
Council and how his attempts to play a political role related to their respective 
policies. The picture that emerges is that of an astute realist, rather than a principled 
idealist. The conclusion will argue why “Machiavelli of peace” is a particularly apt 
title to describe Hammarskjöld and his development of the political role of the 
Secretary-General.  
 
This also leads to a normative question: should the UN and its Secretary-General have 
a political role? Hammarskjöld believed that it should and he worked hard to develop 
it. The concept of neutrality and impartiality was the theoretical basis for 
Hammarskjöld’s notion of an independent political role for the Secretary-General and 
must be central to its evaluation. Hammarskjöld stressed this and phrased a central 
question on this theme in a speech entitled “The International Civil Servant in Law 
and Fact”. Delivered in Oxford on 30 May 1961 at the height of the Congo crisis the 
speech represents Hammarskjöld’s most developed exposition of the political role of 
the Secretary-General. It is written as a response to Khrushchev’s statement (aimed at 
	 13	
Hammarskjöld) “while there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men”.  
Hammarskjöld phrased the question in the following way: 
 
“In fact, it [Khrushchev’s statement] challenges basic tenets in the philosophy of both 
the League of Nations and the United Nations, as one of the essential points on which 
these experiments in international cooperation represent an advance beyond 
traditional ‘conference diplomacy’ is the introduction on the international arena of 
joint permanent organs, employing a neutral civil service, and the use of such organs 
for executive purposes on behalf of all members of the organizations. Were it to be 
considered that the experience shows that this radical innovation in international life 
rests on a false assumption, because ‘no man can be neutral’, then we would be 
thrown back to 1919, and a searching re-appraisal would become necessary.” 
 
In the conclusion we will return to Hammarskjöld’s question and argue that “a 
searching reappraisal” is indeed necessary.  
 
The concept of neutrality and impartiality is central not just to a study of 
Hammarskjöld but also to the office of the Secretary-General in general. As has been 
pointed out elsewhere, a discussion about the future role of the UN rests on an 
understanding of its past.17 As Gross put it: “It has been said that a page of history is 
worth a volume of logic. Appraisal of a fully functioning United Nations executive 
may be aided by a glimpse behind the scenes of one or two significant moments of its 
history.”18  
  
A Note on the Primary Sources and Literature Review 
 
One feature of the source material deserves particular mention. Hammarskjöld wrote 
an enormous amount of memoranda for his own use, from summaries of 
conversations, or the facts of a situation to interpretations of important agreements. 
This is evident from the Dag Hammarskjöld Papers, but is also attested to by his 
contemporaries. The American diplomat Ernest Gross, whom Hammarskjöld hired as 
a consultant from time to time, described Hammarskjöld as:  
 																																																								
17 Mazower, Mark, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 4. 
18 Gross, The United Nations: Structure for Peace (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 30. 
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“one of the most remarkable self-documenting people in history, if I may use that 
phrase. Not only did he have a genius for doing his own work, drafting, but he also, for 
example, made elaborate aide-memoirs, memoranda of conversations with officials, 
delegates. I’ve had the opportunity from time to time – in fact, he did me the honor 
frequently of showing me some, particularly in matters in which he happened to be 
engaged, in which he wanted to just think aloud with me. So I’m personally aware of the 
enormous volume of meticulously prepared aide-memoires and conversations.”19  
 
While these aide-mémoires give a fascinating insight into many events, they must also 
be treated with great caution, as they represent Hammarskjöld’s personal 
interpretation only. As Fröhlich already remarked, the Hammarskjöld papers were 
ordered in a very conspicuous way by Hammarskjöld himself.20 Not only neatly kept, 
the section covering the Suez crisis was specifically collected by Hammarskjöld and 
entitled “The Suez Story”. It might well have been Hammarskjöld’s idea to write a 
book based on these materials. Any book based only on these papers – not any 
random papers found in Hammarskjöld’s office, but carefully selected files arranged 
by him – would therefore quite likely be Hammarskjöld’s version of the story. 
Urquhart, Fröhlich and Lipsey, all mainly based on the Hammarskjöld papers, also 
turn out to be, for all their other respective merits, largely the story from 
Hammarskjöld’s perspective. Urquhart even states in the foreword that ”This book is 
written mainly from Hammarskjold’s point of view”.21  
 
The Hammarskjöld Papers contain documents in English, French, Swedish, and 
occasionally in German. This reflects the use of sources in this thesis, which is based 
on English, French and Swedish primary sources and literature and the occasional 
study in German. For the UN side of the story I have relied mainly on the 
Hammarskjöld Papers at the National Library of Sweden in Stockholm, the UN 
Archives in New York and the Andrew W. Cordier papers at Columbia University in 
New York. In addition I have also used private papers of many of Hammarskjöld’s 
friends and collaborators located in Oxford, New York and Princeton. To study 
Hammarskjöld’s relations with the Member States of the UN from the “other side” 
and how they reacted to his attempts to play a political role I have mainly used the 
national archives of the three Western permanent members of the Security Council in 																																																								
19 Oral History Gross, p. 72. 
20 Fröhlich, p. 148.  
21 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, xiii. 
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London, Paris and Washington. The focus has been on the reports from the permanent 
missions in New York and policy documents and instructions regarding UN affairs in 
capitals. I have also used the papers of several key individuals such as John Foster 
Dulles in Princeton and Couve de Murville and Henri Hoppenot in Paris.   
 
I have also conducted interviews with Hammarskjöld’s friend and chef-de-cabinet in 
Sweden Sverker Åström, his personal aid between 1958-1961 Wilhelm Wachtmeister, 
his French colleague from the Secretariat Claude de Kémoularia, and his nephew 
Knut Hammarskjöld. In addition I have used the many oral histories and memoirs of 
the different actors that throw further light on the topic. In particular the Oral History 
Transcripts of James Barco, which run to more than one thousand pages but have not 
been used in any study as far as I am aware, is a gold mine for the student of 
American foreign policy towards the UN. Barco was a member of the US permanent 
mission to the UN from 1949 to 1961 and eventually became deputy Permanent 
Representative. The fact that the interviews with Barco were recorded in 1963, 
directly after the events, makes them extra valuable. 
 
There are two distinct strands in the literature on Hammarskjöld. The first consists of 
the works related to Dag Hammarskjöld and the UN (the Hammarskjöld literature) 
and the second is composed of works of international history relating to the Cold War, 
American, British and French foreign policy and studies of specific crises (the 
historical literature). The latter deal with Hammarskjöld and the UN in a more cursory 
way when not ignoring them.22 These two strands are quite distinct. Not only do they 
rely on different sources and methods, but they also do not communicate. The 
Hammarskjöld literature tends to rely mainly on the Hammarskjöld papers in the 
National Library of Sweden in Stockholm and the UN archives in New York. Most of 
these studies are written by UN enthusiasts and/or political scientists and take a 
distinctly positive view of Hammarskjöld, sometimes verging on the hagiographic. 
The historical literature, on the other hand, tends to be written by professional 
historians and relies mainly on national archives; the UN takes a marginal role. As an 																																																								
22 On the Suez crisis there exist a few articles based on UK archives that deal specifically with 
Hammarskjöld’s role, see e.g. Edward Johnson, "‘The Umpire on Whom the Sun Never Sets’: Dag 
Hammarskjold's Political Role and the British at Suez" in Diplomacy & Statecraft 8, no. 1 (1997); and 
Louis, Wm Roger “The United Nations and the Suez Crisis: British Ambivalence towards the Pope on 
the East River” in Louis, Wm Roger, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and 
Decolonization: Collected Essays (London, I.B. Tauris, 2006).  
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illustration Kalb23, Kent24 and Namikas25 cover the Congo crisis mainly based on US 
archives (and some Soviet archives in the case of Namikas) and James26 based mainly 
on British archives (although James also uses UN archives and the JFK presidential 
library to some extent). While these works do not focus on Hammarskjöld’s political 
role they reveal enough to suggest that large pieces are missing from the 
Hammarskjöld literature. The general literature on the UN27 and the Secretary-
General28 does not deal with these events in any detail.  
 
Urquhart’s Hammarskjöld biography from 1972 is still the most comprehensive study 
of the political role of the Secretary-General. 29  Among more recent books on 
Hammarskjöld, one strange aspect is that not only do they mainly rely on Urquhart for 
the facts, adding little or no new sources, but there is no engagement with the 
historical literature to assess Hammarskjöld’s role in its context. This is all the more 																																																								
23 Kalb, Madeleine G., The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New 
York: Macmillan, 1982).  
24 Kent, John, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (London: 
Routledge, 2010). 
25 Namikas, Lise A., Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960-1965 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013). 
26 James, Alan, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63 (New York: Macmillan, 1996). 
27 Berridge, Geoff and Jenning, Anthony (eds.), Diplomacy at the UN (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1985); Claude, Inis L., Swords into plowshares: the problems and progress of international 
organization, 4th Ed. (New York: Random House, 1971); Cunliffe, Philip, Legions of Peace: UN 
Peacekeepers from the Global South (London: Hurst, 2013); Findlay, Trevor, The Use of Force in UN 
Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Goodrich, Leland M. and Kay, David A., 
The Process of International Organization (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1973); James, Alan, Peacekeeping and International Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); 
MacQueen, Norrie, The United Nations, Peace Operations and the Cold War (New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2011); MacQueen, Norrie, Peacekeeping and the International System (New York: 
Routledge, 2006); MacQueen, Norrie, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960 (New York: 
Pearson Education, 2002); Mazower, No Enchanted Palace; Mazower, Mark, Governing the World 
The History of an Idea (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Meisler, Stanley, United Nations: The First Fifty 
Years (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995); Nicholas, H.G., The United Nations as a Political 
Institution (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); Robert, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict (eds.), 
United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Role in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993); Simons, Geoff, The United Nations, A Chronology of Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 
1994); Thakur, Ramesh, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); White, Nigel D., Keeping 
the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997); Wood, Robert S. (ed.), The Process of International Organization 
(New York: Random House, 1971). 
28 Chesterman, Simon (ed.), Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gordenker, Leon, The UN Secretary General and 
Secretariat (London: Routledge, 2010); Gordenker, Leon and Rivlin, Benjamin, (eds.), The 
Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General Making “The Most Impossible in the World” Possible 
(Westport: Praeger, 1993); Newman, Edward, The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the 
New Era: A Global Peace and Security Mandate (London: Houndmills, 1998); Rovine, Arthur W., The 
First Fifty Years of the Secretary-General in World Politics: 1920-1970 (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1970). For a 
more detailed list see the bibliography in Chesterman. 
29 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld. 
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odd as even a cursory glance at Kalb, in print since 1982, or James, published in 
1996, would have provided enough material to seriously question the conventional 
portrayal of Hammarskjöld that is contained in such recent works as Stahn/Melber30, 
Lipsey31, Williams32 (published in 2014, 2013 and 2011 respectively) or Fröhlich33 
(first published in 2002, a revised English version came out in 2008). Nor would an 
enormous task of archival research have been necessary to follow up on these points 
as the printed collections of American documents in e.g. the FRUS volumes on the 
Congo Crisis are quite sufficient to give a much more complex and darker view of 
Hammarskjöld’s role in the Congo than conventional accounts suggest. The recent 
Swedish studies on Hammarskjöld’s career before he was elected Secretary-General 
in 1953, such as Appelqvist and Landberg, are an exception.34 These studies add 
important new archival sources and contribute to a new interpretation of 
Hammarskjöld, indicating that “behind the picture of a strict civil servant looms the 
image of an exceptionally resolute power politician”.35 
 
A special word might be appropriate on Urquhart’s Hammarskjöld biography as it is 
still the golden standard that most Hammarskjöld biographies tend to refer back to for 
the facts. As an example, the arguably most read standard work on the history of the 
United Nations – Kennedy’s Parliament of Man – relies exclusively on Urquhart for 
the Hammarskjöld years, including the Suez crisis and the Congo crisis.36 Many have 
portrayed Urquhart as part of Hammarskjöld’s closest circle, which adds legitimacy to 
his description of many events, especially those that are not referenced with a source. 
But Urquhart was never part of Hammarskjöld’s closest circle as he himself has stated 
on many occasions.37 As always, it is important to consider the background of the 
																																																								
30 Melber/Stahn (eds.). 
31 Lipsey.  
32 Williams, Susan A., Who Killed Hammarskjöld?: The UN, the Cold War, and White Supremacy in 
Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).  
33 Fröhlich. 
34 Appelqvist, and Landberg, Hans, På väg Dag Hammarskjöld som svensk ämbetsman (Stockholm: 
Atlantis, 2012), further works are cited in chapter 1.  
35 Appelqvist, Örjan, “Civil servant or politician? Dag Hammarskjöld’s role in Swedish government 
policy in the Forties” in Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2005:3, p. 49. 
36 Kennedy, Paul M., The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations 
(New York: Random House, 2006).  
37 E.g. in his memoirs, Urquhart, Brian, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Row, 1987); 
but also in Columbia Oral History Urquhart.  
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writer.38 When Urquhart’s Hammarskjöld biography was published in 1972 Urquhart 
had just been appointed Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs in 
charge of peacekeeping operations. A firm believer in the UN all his life, Urquhart 
had a strong interest in portraying Hammarskjöld, and the birth of peacekeeping 
operations, as positively as possible. Urquhart has also made comments in other 
books and interviews that are far more critical of Hammarskjöld than anything in his 




The first part of my thesis is entitled “looking for a role” and describes 
Hammarskjöld’s life-long quest for a mission that he eventually found in the office of 
the Secretary-General of the UN. The first chapter focuses on Hammarskjöld’s 
character and background as they are essential to understanding his future actions as 
Secretary-General. I argue that Hammarskjöld’s central concept of the neutral and 
impartial civil servant with a political role was largely based on a conservative 
outlook that was anything but apolitical as Hammarskjöld claimed.  The chapter also 
explores Hammarskjöld’s work with Western integration and the Marshall Plan, two 
formative experiences that he would also draw on as Secretary-General. The second 
chapter deals with Hammarskjöld’s first years at the UN and how he reorganized the 
Secretariat by centralizing all political functions into his own hands as a necessary 
prerequisite for the role he intended to play. The chapter also outlines 
Hammarskjöld’s early ideas of a political role for the Secretary-General. The third 
chapter analyses Hammarskjöld’s first attempts to put these ideas into action. I 
challenge the view that these early attempts at mediation were “extraordinary 
successful” and “made most of the Members enthusiastic supporters of an active 
mediator in the office of the Secretary-General”.40 
 
The second part is called “finding a role” and explores how Hammarskjöld found a 
political role to fill at the interface of the Cold War and decolonisation. In the fourth 
chapter I attempt to show how the Suez crisis became a catalyst for a much more 																																																								
38 A point made with great verve in for example Carr, Edward Hallett, What is History? (London: 
Macmillan, 1961).  
39 See e.g. Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, pp. 141-142. 
40 See Zacher, p. 250; Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 596.  
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ambitious political role for the Secretary-General. It then describes how 
Hammarskjöld embraced this new role and elaborated it into a full theory (the 
“vacuum theory”) of an interventionist Secretary-General after his reelection in 1957. 
I argue that the acceptance of this new political role was premised on the fact 
Hammarskjöld managed to persuade the Americans and the British that he would 
wield it in their favour at a time when they were loosing control over the General 
Assembly due to the influx of newly independent countries. I also challenge the view 
that Hammarskjöld “saw the UN as the protector and helper of small and new 
states”. 41  The chapter then explores how Hammarskjöld’s vacuum theory was 
expanded with a geographical component as Hammarskjöld devised a new and 
ambitious role for the UN in Africa and how this was perceived in Washington, 
London and Paris.  
 
The third part deals with “the problems with the role” and is dedicated to 
Hammarskjöld’s handling of the Congo crisis. I argue that his policies in the Congo 
are best analysed as three quite distinct periods that correspond to the three chapters 
in this part. The relation between the three periods resemble those of a thesis, anti-
thesis and synthesis as Hammarskjöld’s policy in the second period represents a 180 
degree turn from the policy he pursued in the first period and the third is a 
combination of the first and the second. This division also corresponds to the periods 
when the Congo crisis was handled in the Security Council (the first period), the 
General Assembly (the second period), and in both organs (the third period). The 
three periods illustrate the very different problems this created for Hammarskjöld and 
how his attempts to solve this and gather support for his policies influenced and 
changed his policies to the extent that, I will argue, he became a prisoner of his own 
organisation and based policies on what was best for the UN and not what was best 
for the Congo.  
The fifth chapter argues that Hammarskjöld saw the Congo as an opportunity to 
implement the ideas of a UN presence in Africa discussed in chapter six going as far 
as suggesting to turn the Congo into a de facto UN trusteeship. This led 
Hammarskjöld to ignore the Congolese government to pursue his two main policy 
goals of keeping the Soviet Union out of the Congo and ensuring that aid to the 
Congo would be exclusively multilateral (i.e. channelled via the UN). I argue that 																																																								
41 Urquhart, p. 595-596. 
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Prime Minister Lumumba’s resistance to these ideas led Hammarskjöld to actively 
undercut him and eventually support a coup against him. In the sixth chapter I argue 
that Hammarskjöld did a volte-face and changed his policy completely from an 
extreme interventionism to that of an extreme non-interventionism in an attempt to 
keep the support of the Afro-Asian bloc in the General Assembly while avoiding 
measures that could help Lumumba. The seventh chapter argues that the new 
Kennedy administration gave Hammarskjöld a second chance in the Congo as it 
allowed him to follow a policy that could get support from the Afro-Asians while 
achieving Cold War objectives. Contrary to previous accounts that blame 
Hammarskjöld’s lieutenants in the Congo for the much criticised decision to use force 
in Katanga (operation Morthor), I argue that Hammarskjöld was not only aware, but 
had ordered it in what was a risky gamble driven by the need to produce a success 





Part I: Finding a Role 
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Chapter 1: “Hammarskjöld as a way of life” 
 
“L’huître la plus charmante du monde”42 – “The most charming oyster in the world”. 
With these words the correspondent of Le Monde introduced the newly elected 
Secretary-General of the UN to his readers in 1953. The first interviews only added to 
the mystique surrounding the Secretary-General’s persona by focussing on his two 
perceived favourite hobbies: the poetry of T.S. Eliot and mountaineering.43 The New 
York Times was quick to satirise him as declaring lines from the Waste Land from a 
mountaintop.44 In his first meeting with the international press on arrival at the airport 
in New York, Hammarskjöld told the assembled reporters that “In my new official 
capacity the private man should disappear and the international public servant take his 
place”.45 But the private man Hammarskjöld is key to understanding the international 
public servant and how he developed the political role of the Secretary-General.  
 
 
A. “The Great Technocrat” 
A.1 Upbringing and Education 
Dag Hammarskjöld’s background and upbringing instilled in him a “markedly 
conservative feature” that he acknowledged on several occasions.46 In an appearance 
on Edward R. Murrow’s radio show “This I believe” in 1954 Hammarskjöld said that: 
“The world in which I grew up was dominated by principles and ideals of a time far 
from ours […] I now recognize and endorse, unreservedly, those very beliefs which 
were once handed down to me”.47 
 
Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld was born in 1905 into an illustrious Swedish 
family. The same year Dag’s father Hjalmar Hammarskjöld, then Minister of 
Education in a conservative government served as one of four members on the 																																																								
42 Meuty, Pierre, in Le Monde, 3 April 1953. 
43 Bowen, C., and McKelway, St. Clair, “Like a mirror” in New Yorker, 18 April 1953. 
44 Breit, Harvey, “In and out of books” in New York Times Book Review, 26 April 1953. 
45 Statement to the Press on Arrival at International Airport, New York, 9 April 1953, in Cordier, 
Andrew W. and Foote, Wilder (eds.), Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, 
Volume II, Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 29. 
46 Hammarskjöld, Dag, ”Statstjänstemannen och samhället”, in Tiden No. 43, 1951, p. 396.  
47 “Old Creeds in a New World” – written for Edward R. Murrow’s Radio Program “This I Believe” in 
Cordier and Foote (eds.) Public Papers, Vol II, p. 195.  
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Swedish delegation that negotiated the dissolution of the union between Sweden and 
Norway.48 In this manner Dag Hammarskjöld was born as Sweden got its final 
contours and lost the last vestiges of a past as a great power. The Hammarskjölds had 
been raised to nobility in 1610 for feats on the battlefield for King Charles IX of 
Sweden. The Hammarskjölds had continued to serve king and country, but as civil 
servants and administrators. Dag Hammarskjöld’s father Hjalmar Hammarskjöld 
continued this tradition. He made a career as a civil servant, judge and international 
legal scholar and even became Prime Minister during the troubled years 1914 to 1917. 
Hjalmar’s brother served as a conservative defence minister and two of his cousins 
also served as ministers. Dag Hammarskjöld grew up in Uppsala Castle, where his 
father resided as the Governor of Uppland. As an “independent conservative”49 
Hjalmar Hammarskjöld was not a member of any political party. His example and 
views on civil service in the higher interest of the state would strongly influence his 
youngest son Dag Hammarskjöld.50  
 
From his mother’s side Dag inherited a religious and mystical bent. Religion was 
important in Hammarskjöld’s life and his mother was a devout Christian and close 
friend of Nathan Söderblom, the Archbishop of Sweden, resident in Uppsala, and 
young Dag spent much time in the household of the Archbishop.51 Söderblom was 
one of the founders of the ecumenical movement and received the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1930. From an early age Hammarskjöld also developed a keen interest in the great 
mystics of the Christian tradition. For his sixteenth birthday he received a copy of 
Thomas a Kempis’ De imitatione Christi and later he was encouraged by the wife of 
Söderblom to read Blaise Pascal’s Pensées. 52  Hammarskjöld would quote both 
authors frequently in Markings, his posthumously published work written in the same 
mystical Christian tradition. Markings contains observations and poems by 
Hammarskjöld and is, in his own words “a kind of journal” and a “white-book 
concerning my negotiations with myself – and with God”.53 																																																								
48 Thelin, Bengt, Dag Hammarskjöld – Barnet Skolpojken Studenten (Falun: Carlssons, 2005), p. 28-
29. 
49 Söderberg, Sten, Hammarskjöld A Pictorial Biography (New York: Viking Press, 1962) p. 26. 
50 See discussion of Hammarskjölds speech on his father in the Swedish Academy 1954 below. 
51 Thelin, p. 48. 
52 See Little, Marie-Noëlle, The Knight and the Troubadour, (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 
2011) p. 22; and Kelen, Emery, Hammarskjöld (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1966), p. 36. 
53 At his death, when the manuscript of Markings was found, those who had known Hammarskjöld 
declared that they had no idea of his strong religious feelings as expressed in Markings. All references 
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Great things were expected from the Hammarskjöld children and their father assumed 
that they would work hard in order to live up to the great expectations. From an early 
age, Dag showed a propensity for hard work and he was one of the brightest students 
in his school. Literature and reading took pride of place among his interests and he 
preferred books to the more mundane pleasures that a student town like Uppsala could 
offer. For dancing and girls, he had little time or interest.54 Later on in life, many 
commented on his natural shyness and uneasiness with physical contact and his 
dislike of “cocktail-party talk”.55  
 
In 1923 Dag Hammarskjöld enrolled in Uppsala University where he first studied 
economics, philosophy and French. After a bachelor’s degree (filosofie kandidat) he 
proceeded to take a law degree (juris kandidat), then considered mandatory for the 
higher positions in the Swedish civil service, while continuing with economics.56  In 
1927 he also made a short study trip to Cambridge, where he studied for, among 
others, John Maynard Keynes.57  
 
As a young man, eager to understand his time and its phenomena, Hammarskjöld 
spent much of his time searching for answers. At the law faculty in Uppsala, he 
attended the lectures of Professor Axel Hägerström, the famous proponent of value 
nihilism. A theory that, in the words of Hammarskjöld’s university friend and later 
distinguished diplomat Gunnar Hägglöf, “could just as easily be used to defend 
Bolsheviks as fascists”.58 Very much à la mode, many people felt deeply concerned 
with the inherent emptiness of this philosophy. Such theories of value nihilism and 
the absurdity of the world led to many different responses in Europe, some atheist like 
the existentialist movement, some religious like the renouveau catholique in France. 
																																																																																																																																																														
are to the English translation of W.H. Auden and Leif Sjöberg in  Hammarskjöld, Dag, Markings 
(London: Faber and Faber,1964). 
54 Lash, Joseph P., Dag Hammarskjöld (London: Cassell, 1962) p. 21. 
55 See e.g. Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp. 27-28. 
56 Elder, Neil C.M., Government in Sweden The Executive at Work (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970) p. 
103. 
57 Landberg, Hans, “Time for choosing – Dag Hammarskjöld and the Riksbank in the Thirties” in 
Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2005:3, p. 22. Keynes supposedly said of Hammarskjöld that, 
while he was intelligent “I don’t think we can expect much from him”, see Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 
368. 
58 Hägglöf, Gunnar, Möte med Europa (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt, 1964), p. 24.  
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The renouveau catholique in France interested Hammarskjöld in particular.59 This 
was also echoed in the Anglo-Saxon world and two of Hammarskjöld’s favourite 
authors, T.S. Eliot and W.H. Auden, converted to Anglicanism and Catholicism 
respectively. Hammarskjöld was also impressed by the book Maria Cross, about a 
group of catholic writers.60 Later he would appoint the author of Maria Cross, Connor 
Cruise O’Brien, to a leading position in the UN intervention in Congo. In Sweden, 
this catholic renaissance had its self-proclaimed apostle in Sven Stolpe, a friend of 
Hammarskjöld from Uppsala who also converted to Catholicism and later wrote a 
book about Hammarskjöld.  
 
But Dag’s ambition was in the field of economics. Hjalmar Hammarskjöld retired 
from his post as Governor in 1930 and moved to Stockholm. Dag, who was still living 
at home, moved along. He continued studying economics at Stockholm University 
and was also appointed assistant secretary to a governmental committee on 
unemployment, a post that he occupied while at the same time working on his 
doctoral thesis in economics. One of the members of the Commission, Social 
Democrat Ernst Wigforss, would become Hammarskjöld’s benefactor as Finance 
Minister.61  
 
Hammarskjöld’s doctoral thesis was widely regarded as “exceedingly difficult to 
understand”.62 His opponent at the viva was the world-renowned economist Gunnar 
Myrdal. Myrdal was severe in his criticism. He censured Hammarskjöld for not 
explaining sufficiently the assumptions he was using which on many occasions left 
the reasoning arguments hanging in the air. This would in time become a typical 
feature of Hammarskjöld. While his arguments were always clear and rational to 
himself, they were often less so to his listeners, who maybe did not know, or did not 
share, the assumptions behind the reasoning. With a disappointing note on his thesis 
																																																								
59 Sven Stolpe, himself a convert to Catholicism, writes that Hammarskjöld was “the first Swede I ever 
met who had a sensitivity, not only for the religious struggle of the French elites, but who was also 
fully aware of the whole renouveau catholique”, see Stolpe, Sven, Dag Hammarskjölds andliga väg 
(Stockholm: Tiden, 1964), p. 25. 
60 Tingsten, Herbert, Mitt Liv Tio år 1953 – 1963 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1964) p. 111. See also 
Tingsten, Herbert, När skymningen faller (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1972) p. 130 ff. 
61 Landberg, “Time for choosing”, p. 13. 
62 Landberg, pp. 85-86. 
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the road to academia was closed and Dag Hammarskjöld instead followed his father 
and brothers into the Swedish civil service.63  
 
 
A.2 The Civil Servant 
During Christmas 1931 Hammarskjöld wrote a letter to his close friend from Uppsala 
Gudmund Björck that summarised how he viewed the new road he had embarked on 
in the capital. In the letter, he spoke of how he missed his university life and friends in 
Uppsala and the aversion, mixed with self-contempt, for his present employment as a 
civil servant in Stockholm and the world he was being drawn into. He confessed to 
Björck how he was defending himself against becoming a cynical careerist and 
climber while thinly disguising his feeling of superiority towards those around him. 
He was fighting with his loneliness, between bitterness and a feeling of being chosen. 
Hammarskjöld also spoke of how his loneliness could be purified into an inner 
loneliness that could release him from all bonds and prepare him for all sacrifices.64  
 
During his work with the committee on unemployment, Hammarskjöld viewed 
himself as a technocratic expert. In the words of Landberg, he tried to ”make the 
political and value charged committee work scientific”.65 Through his work in the 
committee Hammarskjöld managed to affirm himself as an efficient and hardworking 
bureaucrat. His doctoral thesis, although admittedly difficult to understand, had also 
allowed him into the circle of leading economists in Stockholm. Dag’s brother Bo 
wrote in a letter to their brother Åke that Dag was being heavily exploited, but that he 
also thereby gained ”a very practical polish of his far too theoretical disposition”.66 
Hammarskjöld’s aspiration that the committee’s work could be held on a scientific 
level, above politics, on such a contentious political topic as unemployment, quickly 
fell through. This did not, however, mean that he changed his views. On the contrary, 
he criticised this turn from the scientific to the political sphere in a letter: “The work 
[in the committee] has, for various reasons, become strongly politicised and in 
proportion thereto my own interest in it has diminished. Besides, it is dreary to have 
																																																								
63 Hammarskjöld’s three elder brothers had all at some point worked in the Swedish civil service. 
64 Landberg, p. 69.  
65 Landberg, p. 92. 
66 Landberg, p. 69. 
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to redo your work so it will rhyme with the views of others.”67 Hammarskjöld had no 
interest in changing his own “scientific” views to accommodate base “politics”. 
 
The greatest political question of the time was how the state should respond to 
economic cycles of depression and prosperity. In October 1935 Hammarskjöld 
presented the paper ”The role of central banks in today’s economic life”68, an early 
example of Hammarskjöld’s views on economy, as well as of his more general 
political views on the role of the government. In the paper Hammarskjöld rated 
technocrats above politicians and argued for the independence of the central bank. He 
also expressed a more general support for “independent state intervention”. 
Hammarskjöld argued that the macroeconomic demands on modern society inevitably 
led to an increase in state intervention. This led to the question how political action 
should be allocated between the government and the non-party political state 
agencies, such as the central bank. To Hammarskjöld, the answer was clear: “In 
principle it is preferable that the government, when new, intricate functions are 
imposed upon it by developments, is supported by institutions that, like central banks, 
are essentially removed from the direct influence of party politics.” Hammarskjöld 
was quite clear that this was not based on ideological, and certainly not socialist, 
ideas, but it rather represented a factual need for a larger role for the state.  
In order to deal with the cycles of prosperity and depression, the state needed to fight 
back against special interests. For this the state would have to rely on “non-party 
political organs” such as the central bank. In a rather idealistic view, Hammarskjöld 
believed that economists, through their social engineering skills, could serve the state 
as the efficient promoters of the common public interest, whereas politicians tended to 
represent special interests.69  
 
After dividing his time as a civil servant between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Swedish Central Bank (Riksbanken), it first seemed that Hammarskjöld would join 
the Central Bank permanently, when he was offered a post as Secretary there in 1935 
by Ivar Rooth, the Governor of the Central Bank. One year later, however, 
Hammarskjöld was rather sensationally appointed State Secretary in the Finance 																																																								
67 Landberg, p. 96. 
68 Hammarskjöld, Dag, ”Centralbankerna i nutidens ekonomiska liv, föredrag vid Svenska 
Bankföreningens årsmöte 1935” in Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Bankföreningen 61, 1935.  
69 Landberg, p. 114. 
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Ministry, second only to Finance Minister Ernst Wigforss. From 1941, Hammarskjöld 
divided his time between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, as he was 
made Chairman of the board of the Central Bank, in addition to his post as State 
Secretary.  
 
As State Secretary at the Ministry of Finance from 1936 to 1945, Hammarskjöld 
developed a close working relationship with the Finance Minister Wigforss. In terms 
of policy, he promoted a traditional line of a strictly balanced government budget, 
with limited scope for under-balancing and measures of labour market policy. As 
Chairman of the Central Bank, Hammarskjöld was also deeply involved with 
monetary policy. During and after the war, he increasingly dealt with issues regarding 
the financing of Sweden’s foreign trade and combating domestic price increases in the 
bleak post-war world economy. In his double role as State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Finance and Chairman of the Central Bank, Hammarskjöld played a central role for 
economic policy in Sweden. One study concludes that “[p]erhaps the most remarkable 
thing about Dag Hammarskjöld’s role as economist and public servant in Sweden 
from the mid-1930s to the early 1950s is that a non-political official could exert so 
much influence on central aspects of economic policy.”70 To some extent this was 
made possible by Hammarskjöld’s devotion to hard work and the long hours he spent 
in the office. His work habits, as well as the demands he put on his colleagues, soon 
became legendary in the Finance Ministry. Hammarskjöld was also a perfectionist 
and very few memoranda, if any, left the Finance Ministry without Hammarskjöld’s 
pen making revisions or complete redrafts.71 His tendency to micromanage would 
stay with him all his life. To some extent it was based on his high standards and 
perfectionism, but it was also part of his desire to be in control so that he could make 
sure the whole ministry was going exactly in the direction he wanted it to go. Several 
of the entries in Markings show Hammarskjöld’s attitude to colleagues and 
subordinates who were not up to his standards.72 
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Hammarskjöld’s work ethic was also a means of escape. As one entry in Markings 
puts it: “When all becomes silent around you, and you recoil in terror – see that your 
work has become a flight from suffering and responsibility, your unselfishness a 
thinly-disguised masochism; hear, throbbing within you, the spiteful cruel heart of the 
steppe-wolf – do not then anaesthetize yourself by once again calling up the shouts 
and horns of the hunt, but gaze steadfastly at the vision until you have plumbed into 
its depths.”73 In the entries in Markings from this period, Hammarskjöld accuses 
himself of cynical careerism.74 Hammarskjöld had a very high opinion of himself, 
masked behind a restrained and somewhat shy personality: “Praise nauseates you – 
but woe betide him who does not recognise your worth.” 75  Several of his 
contemporaries also noted these traits. Söderlund wrote of Hammarskjöld that he was 
“for all his intelligence, too power-hungry, self-sufficient and incapable of admitting 
any errors, a rather dangerous person at the head of a large and economic activity”.76 
 
“Hammarskjöld is a conservative of a bureaucratic background”, one of his 
contemporaries, Per Jacobsson, wrote. “He is really a ‘tory’ and as such is capable of 
allowing the guardianship of the state to extend quite far before he reacts. He seems to 
have a dislike for the very word ‘liberalism’, and ‘capitalism’ does not appeal to him 
either.”77 In his memoirs Ernst Wigforss, the long-time Social Democratic finance 
minister and Hammarskjöld’s boss, concluded that “Hammarskjöld did not fit into 
any of the existing political parties”. Wigforss described Hammarskjöld as a “tory”, 
noting that his view on the role of the state was coloured by an older conservatism 
where the state was a highly developed form of human coexistence and a guardian of 
the common interest against special interests. This also made it easy for 
Hammarskjöld, although no social democrat to place himself among the promoters of 
a planned economy.78 Hammarskjöld agreed with finance minister Wigforss and the 
economic policies as related to economic cycles and the, still relatively “liberal”, 
economic planning of the Social Democratic party.79 Hammarskjöld preferred to see 
himself as a non-political expert. In a debate with Gunnar Myrdal, Trade Minister at 																																																								
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the time, Hammarskjöld cautioned against what he called Myrdal’s “statism”. Instead, 
Hammarskjöld argued that the state should remain neutral. As Landberg points out 
Hammarskjöld’s neutrality of the state here meant guarding the status quo, a markedly 
conservative position.80 Later on, as Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld would again 
argue for the status quo in international relations, again a conservative position in a 
time when revolutionary movements were challenging the status quo.  
 
 
A.3 Criticism of Hammarskjöld’s Double Role 
In time, Hammarskjöld became more ambivalent about the independence of the 
Central Bank that he had embraced in his 1935 paper. After his employment as State 
Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, he started arguing that monetary and fiscal 
policies should be coordinated to a greater extent. From 1941, Hammarskjöld de facto 
united the monetary and economic policies in his dual role as State Secretary in the 
Ministry of Finance and Chairman of the Central Bank. Both leading conservatives 
and liberals criticised the fact that the State Secretary in the Finance Ministry was also 
the Chairman of the Central Bank as this would put the Central Bank’s independent 
status under undue influence from the Finance Ministry, a political institution. Yet 
Hammarskjöld did not see his work as State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance as 
politically tied to the Social Democratic party and regarded himself as “outside 
political life”. But this fine distinction was lost on Hammarskjöld’s critics, who saw 
him as the “stooge” of Finance Minister Wigforss.81 Eli Heckscher, who had been 
Hjalmar Hammarskjöld’s closest advisor on economic affairs, criticised 
Hammarskjöld in a letter, writing: “I think it is a mistake to always try and give a 
theoretical motivation for what must by its very nature to a great extent be pure 
political actions…”. Heckscher wanted Hammarskjöld to reconsider his dual role as 
the State Secretary in the Finance Ministry and his attempt to claim for himself, at the 
same time the role of the independent expert.82  
 
Hammarskjöld addressed the criticism in a meeting with the Board of Directors of the 
Central Bank where he said that the criticism was completely unfounded, but that he 																																																								
80 Landberg, pp. 240-241.  
81 Lash, p. 32. 
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would nonetheless offer his resignation as Chairman of the Board if there was a 
widely held view that his dual role was to the detriment of the Central Bank. But 
before taking such a step, Hammarskjöld wanted to hear how the members of the 
board viewed the criticism and its practical implications. He then added that he 
wanted his statement, as well as all comments thereon, added to the official protocol 
of the meeting.  
 
This move showed that during his years in the corridors of power Hammarskjöld had 
become an astute chess player. As Landberg has shown, Hammarskjöld’s purpose was 
to show that he was only serving the common good and would have been happy to 
step aside. But by offering to resign only after the members of the board had 
expressed their opinion, he cleverly put the onus on the members of the board, and 
made sure that any statements would be made public. If they censored Hammarskjöld 
and asked for his resignation, it would imply that they as the board had not been 
independent either. The members of the board were left with one option only and, to 
avoid admitting any possibility of partiality, they made a unanimous statement in 
which they described Hammarskjöld’s dual role as advantageous in many ways, 
rather than problematic, and strongly urged Hammarskjöld to remain in his position of 
chairman. 83  
 
Defeat had been turned into advantage for the moment. But the criticism did not 
cease. The press kept on criticizing Hammarskjöld, although now some of the attacks 
were also directed to the board that had, in the words of one paper, “ refrained from 
the use of its own reason in order to use that of Mr. Hammarskjöld all the more”. One 
newspaper wrote that Hammarskjöld represented “a bureaucracy that has succeeded 
in identifying itself with those in power to such a degree that it can no longer 
differentiate between its own opinions and those of the powers that be”.84 In a regular 
column of political satire Hammarskjöld was parodied as “Hammarspik” (a 
derogatory name once used for his ancestor the poet Lorenzo Hammarskjöld): 
“Hammarspik is the great technocrat. He sees problems exclusively as an expert. It is 
below his dignity to have political views on them.” 																																																								
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Still, Hammarskjöld’s work as State Secretary gave him a sense of mission. It 
accorded him the opportunity for fulfilment of his strong sense of a need to serve a 
higher purpose while allowing him to keep his integrity, as he claimed to be 
motivated by rational analysis rather than ideologically charged or political 
arguments.85 But he was looking for a larger and more fulfilling role. 
 
 
B “The most friendly and western-minded” 
B.1  Sweden’s Man in the West 
During the Second World War, Hammarskjöld travelled to London several times to 
discuss Sweden’s role in the economic future of Europe after the war and to negotiate 
an Anglo-Swedish payments agreement.86  As an expert on both economic and 
monetary issues, with his insights into the Central Bank as well as the Ministry of 
Finance and with the complete confidence of the government, Hammarskjöld had 
“now gained for himself considerable authority behind the scenes”, according to a 
British report that also noted that he was “very capable and pro-British”. 87 
Hammarskjöld’s negotiations with the British and the Americans during and 
immediately after the Second World War were seen as a success in Sweden, and the 
Foreign Ministry considered making him a special contact man with the USA in early 
1946.88 Both the British and the Americans also held Hammarskjöld in high regard 
from the beginning. This new role as Sweden’s main authority on international 
economic issues was made official when Hammarskjöld moved from the Ministry of 
Finance to the Foreign Ministry with the title of Envoy extraordinary and Minister 
plenipotentiary in 1945, although he remained as Chairman of the Central Bank until 
1948.89  
 
Hammarskjöld’s position brought him to the frontline of Sweden’s economic 
negotiations with the Americans regarding Sweden’s role in the new world economic 																																																								
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system.90 Hammarskjöld’s negotiations and Swedish foreign policy in general, were a 
tightrope act of balancing Sweden’s officially declared neutrality with the need to 
keep up imports and exports and finance Sweden’s international trade in the 
struggling post-war economy. 
 
Caught between Germany and the Allies in the war, Sweden now found itself trapped 
between Moscow and Washington. Sweden was dependent on imports of material and 
machinery from the US, but Swedish exports to the US did not match imports and this 
led to a significant dollar deficit. In 1947 this led to a crisis in Sweden and import 
restrictions were introduced. Hammarskjöld was sent to Washington to renegotiate the 
1935 US-Swedish Trade Treaty so that Sweden could check the unfavourable balance 
of trade and excessive imports of non-essential goods without falling foul of the 
obligations under the treaty.91 Import restrictions were, however, merely a short-term 
remedy and in the autumn of 1947 Hammarskjöld tried to negotiate a dollar loan from 
Washington without success. The Americans were already planning for European aid 
on a grander scheme. After Marshall’s famous speech on 5 June 1947 the 
coordination of the Marshall Plan started in Paris. Hammarskjöld was appointed the 
Swedish representative to the working party that would become the Committee on 
European Economic Cooperation (CEEC).92 The British were pushing for Sweden, 
and Hammarskjöld personally, to become more involved as they felt that both the 
country and its chosen representative were likely to be important and like-minded 
allies in negotiations with the French and other Continentals.93 When the work 
resulted in the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) on 16 April 1948, Hammarskjöld was appointed vice chairman of its 
Executive Committee. Again, this was to a large extent due to British machinations to 
tie Sweden closer to the European cooperation and make use of Hammarskjöld whom 
they viewed as competent and generally pro-British. 94  One British diplomat 
characterised Hammarskjöld as one of the leading members of the OEEC and as “one 
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of the most constructive, intelligent and high powered features of an otherwise rather 
arid landscape.”95  
 
Initially, Hammarskjöld tried to restrain the American influence on the OEEC.96 He 
tried to keep the negotiations in Paris strictly to the economic aid and was wary of the 
French, who were pushing for further political cooperation between the Western 
European states and the Americans. 97  In contrast, the relations between 
Hammarskjöld and the British delegation were very good. 98 During these negotiations 
Hammarskjöld also made many important personal contacts and built a network 
among diplomats and economists that would become of great use to him later on as 
UN Secretary-General, men such as the head of the European Cooperation 
Administration (ECA), Paul Hoffmann and the representative of State Department at 
ECA, Henri Labouisse.99 But also Sir Pierson Dixon and Hervé Alphand, who would 
go on to become the British and French Permanent Representatives at the UN, 
respectively. Hammarskjöld was aided by his fluency in English, French and German. 
Hammarskjöld’s English was “excellent”100, and his French was “good but not 
idiomatic”101. He had made literary translations from all three languages.102  
 
When Sweden was offered Marshall help, it was gracefully accepted, although it was 
clear that the cooperation would not be limited to economic issues. Hammarskjöld 
acknowledged this in a letter to the Swedish Foreign Ministry but regarded it as 
unavoidable, not only to get the Marshall Aid, but because of the need for Sweden to 
fit into the formal organisation of European reconstruction as a prerequisite for 
economic cooperation with Western Europe and the US. Hammarskjöld was an 
outspoken supporter of Western European economic integration and he did not let the 																																																								
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hesitations of the Swedish government rein him in. As the British reported 
“Hammarskjöld is one of its [OEEC] most ardent frequenters and supporters”.103  
 
By the end of 1947 the Cold War was making its presence felt in Stockholm. The 
Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén noted in his diary on 18 November 1947 that 
an American diplomat had explained that those who were not clearly on the side of 
the United States would be seen as part of the Eastern Bloc.104 Hammarskjöld noticed 
this in his negotiations when his American counterparts expressed their discontent 
over the trade agreement that Sweden had signed with the Soviet Union.105 This was a 
sign of things to come.  
 
With the arrival of Freeman Matthews as American ambassador to Stockholm at the 
end of 1947, a campaign against Sweden’s neutrality and unwillingness to take a 
stand against the Soviet bloc started.106 In a cable to the State Department Matthews 
singled out Hammarskjöld for his “great influence and authority […] in the Swedish 
Government” and urged his colleagues in Washington to have a “frank and emphatic 
talk” with Hammarskjöld regarding Swedish support for the European Recovery 
Program.107  After Hammarskjöld reported back to Foreign Minister Undén, the 
Swedes emphatically gave their support to the program.  
 
In his study of Sweden and the Western European integration between 1945 and 
1949, Malmborg concluded that Hammarskjöld ”more than anyone else shaped 
Sweden’s policy towards Europe during these early years”.108 Landberg agrees with 
this position and adds that ”no decisive decisions were made without asking for his 
analysis and opinion”. In June 1948 the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander wrote 
in his diary that ”the negotiations regarding the Marshall Plan signify a great personal 
success for Hammarskjöld, something which makes me very happy. He does not have 
an easy situation at present but what he has achieved for Sweden in the first hand, but 
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indirectly also for Europe, cannot be valued highly enough.”109 But the Americans 
would demand more from the Swedes.  
 
 
B.2 Flexible Neutrality or the Strange Case of Dr Undén and Mr Hammarskjöld 
Hammarskjöld had brought the negotiations regarding the Marshall Plan to a 
successful end and it was time to start to think about his next career move. 
Hammarskjöld was still looking for a role. In Markings there is an entry from this 
period:  
”At every moment you choose yourself. But do you choose your self? Body and soul 
contain a thousand possibilities out of which you can build many I’s. But in only one 
of them is there a congruence of the elector and the elected. Only one – which you will 
never find until you have excluded all those superficial and fleeting possibilities of 
being and doing with which you toy, out of curiosity or wonder or greed, and which 
hinder you from casting anchor in the experience of the mystery of life, and the 
consciousness of the talent entrusted to you which is your I.”110  
 
Despite all his successes as an international negotiator and trusted advisor of his 
government, Hammarskjöld still felt that he had not found his role where he would 
experience ”congruence of the elector and the elected”, the role that he was meant to 
play.  
 
For a long time Hammarskjöld’s dream appears to have been to follow in his father’s 
footsteps as Governor of Uppsala. Hammarskjöld lobbied for the position on several 
occasions at the end of 1948.111 At the beginning of 1949 there were discussions 
about appointing Hammarskjöld ambassador to London, which never materialised. 
Instead he was offered the ambassadorship to Copenhagen, which he turned down, 
but not before suggesting to Foreign Minister Östen Undén that the State Secretary in 
the Foreign Ministry, Beck-Friis, was the best candidate for Copenhagen. 
Hammarskjöld’s manipulation succeeded and Undén offered him the post as State 
Secretary a few days later, as Beck-Friis was sent to Copenhagen. One of the leading 
papers welcomed Hammarskjöld’s appointment, although it was seen as “original” as 																																																								
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his predecessors on the post had traditionally been career diplomats from the Foreign 
Ministry.112  
 
To Hammarskjöld, the position offered a good post to wait for the Governorship in 
Uppsala to open up.113 In the meantime, the Swedish foreign policy, based on 
neutrality, was a matter of political consensus between the government and the 
opposition so Hammarskjöld would be able to continue to claim his status as an 
independent civil servant only working in the best interest of Sweden. The Foreign 
Minister Undén was also an imposing personality that would protect Hammarskjöld 
just like Wigforss had in the Finance Ministry. Hammarskjöld would also be able to 
continue to devote his time mainly to questions of economic integration with Western 
Europe. In his work with Undén there was, as there had been with Wigforss, more of 
a division of labour than that of a deputy to his principal. Hammarskjöld dealt with 
international economic affairs that Undén knew less about, while Undén handled the 
more traditional aspects of foreign policy. 
 
At the Foreign Ministry, Hammarskjöld kept his routines from the Ministry of 
Finance and brought together a “small personal secretariat of outstanding young men” 
on whom he placed a heavy demand of high moral standards and through whom “he 
kept his finger on every lever”.114 This led to “raised eyebrows” and “some feeling in 
the department that he tended to keep the reins too tightly in his hands”.115 Later at the 
UN, Hammarskjöld’s reliance on a small number of intimates would lead to a “certain 
cliquishness”.116  
 
But Hammarskjöld’s views were not always in line with Undén’s rigid neutrality. The 
negotiations regarding a Nordic defence alliance was one of the first questions that 
tested Sweden’s neutrality in the Cold War. For Sweden it was a prerequisite that 
such a defence alliance would be neutral and not have any connections to other 
alliances. In the end negotiations broke down and Denmark and Norway in April 
1949 opted to join NATO instead. Despite this, the Swedish chiefs of staff were still 																																																								
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arguing strongly for limited defence cooperation with Denmark and Norway and 
imports of military equipment from the United States for this purpose. The head of the 
chiefs of staff, Nils Swedlund, who knew Undén’s categorical rejection of all things 
that smelled of Western alignment, contacted Hammarskjöld whom he found to be 
“loyal to the government, but sympathetic to the importance of cooperation with the 
West”. Hammarskjöld promised to support Swedlund and even advised him on how 
to deal with the government. After the issue of whether a limited technical 
cooperation could be allowed without giving up Sweden’s neutrality, Prime Minister 
Erlander replied that “it was not worth it to take such large risks for such small 
rewards”. Swedlund thought this was the end of the matter, but Hammarskjöld 
reassured him that the Prime Minister’s statement had only been for public 
consumption and promised to bring the matter up in Washington himself on his next 
visit in November 1949. “Towards the end of the discussion”, Swedlund noted in his 
diary, “Hammarskjöld made a didactic, highly complicated exposition about how one 
should view the moral dilemma that a civil servant could end up in when one was 
serving a government one did not like. Obviously Hammarskjöld intended to justify 
himself in my eyes!”. 117  But Prime Minister Erlander did not appreciate 
Hammarskjöld’s “babble in America” and referred to it as “bullshit that will raise 
expectations and suspicions about something much more far-reaching” 118 
Hammarskjöld had stepped out of line. But he had been partially right on the public 
statements being for public announcement only. Erlander would soon appreciate 
Hammarskjöld’s sympathy for Western cooperation as an important supplement to 
Undén’s more rigid version of neutrality. 
 
In the beginning of 1950 the Americans, in secret, instituted the so called 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) which met in 
conjunction with the OEEC. The role of CoCom was to coordinate a de facto trade 
embargo on the Soviet Bloc. The Americans were hoping to see Sweden join CoCom, 
but in view of its official neutrality, Sweden could not officially take part in US 
coordinated export restrictions directed against the Eastern block. To solve the matter 
informal discussions began in 1949, with Hammarskjöld representing Sweden. 
Already in 1966 Adler-Karlsson wrote that it has “repeatedly been stated by well-																																																								
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informed diplomats that [Hammarskjöld] concluded some kind of gentlemen’s 
agreement with the Cocom group” to the effect that Sweden gave a declaration of 
intent on rules they would apply in matters of export restrictions.119 The Americans 
were to provide Sweden with embargo lists as “information material”. As 
Hammarskjöld’s chef-de-cabinet from this time, Sverker Åström pointed out in his 
memoirs, it was Hammarskjöld who “held the pen” in drawing up the Swedish policy 
to deal with the American pressures to implement the Cocom strategies.120  
 
The key point for Hammarskjöld was that there must be no formal agreement and that 
Swedish policy had to appear autonomous. That Sweden was in fact complying with 
CoCom, was of less importance as long as the decision to do so was a unilateral 
Swedish decision, however fictive.121  Sweden then informed the Americans of the 
measures that Sweden had adopted “unilaterally”. In December 1949 Hammarskjöld 
wrote in a memorandum that the Americans thought “that the Swedish measures had 
served to bring about a more satisfactory practical result than that obtained in other 
countries that had been politically more forthcoming.”122 A British report on Sweden 
in 1950 confirms this view and explains that Swedish participation in the OEEC “was 
at times made difficult by her refusal to participate in the machinery set up for 
controlling strategic exports to the East, or to follow, even unofficially, the exact line 
taken by other Western Governments. She did, however, on several occasions give 
assurances to the effect that she herself possessed – and exercised – equally 
satisfactory methods of control”. 123  An American report mentioned that 
Hammarskjöld had “proved to be a valuable contact for Ambassador Butterworth in 
Stockholm in such matters as East-West trade, procurement of military equipment in 
the United States, and other sensitive matters”.124 
 
Although Hammarskjöld was responsible for these negotiations Undén, as the 
responsible minister, must have been informed. Undén must also have understood the 																																																								
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need for Sweden to have a good relation with the Americans and to have access to 
crucial American imports, not least for a strong defence, which was in itself a 
prerequisite for a meaningful neutrality.125 The problem with Swedish neutrality was 
that the only real threat came from the East, so help must be sought in the West. 
Sweden was also culturally aligned to Western Europe.  
 
To Undén the key was that Sweden’s decisions were autonomous and not dictated by 
others, however fictional that autonomy might have been. But Undén was most likely 
also happy to leave sordid dealings such as the CoCom to Hammarskjöld. In a sense, 
Hammarskjöld played the flexible Western-friendly Mr. Hyde to Undén’s rigidly 
neutral Dr. Jekyll. As alluded to by Landberg, Hammarskjöld’s dealings with CoCom 
were probably also conducted with the blessing of prime minister Erlander, who could 




B.3 Minister Hammarskjöld 
In 1950 Hammarskjöld was offered a position as minister without portfolio in the 
Social Democratic government. He had been asked earlier, probably already in 
1949127, but had then said no as he was not a member of the Social Democratic 
party.128 The elevation of Hammarskjöld was supposed to remedy the fact that neither 
the finance nor the trade ministry were conducting international negotiations and that 
a great burden was thus placed on Undén. As a minister, Hammarskjöld would also be 
able to represent the government at meetings on a ministerial level. The post would 
mean that Hammarskjöld remained in charge of international economic negotiations 
and European integration and become the junior minister for Foreign Affairs that he 
already was in everything but name.  
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Hammarskjöld made it a sine qua non for his acceptance that his condition to serve as 
a “non-political civil servant” was duly “understood, accepted and registered”. By 
registered Hammarskjöld meant that not only the government had to acknowledge 
such a condition but he insisted that he should be allowed to make his reservations 
directly to the king (in the theory the king was the head of the government, which was 
at the time still officially called his majesty’s government). This condition was only 
made after Hammarskjöld had consulted his father Hjalmar and prime minister 
Erlander asked himself if it was the old royalist Hjalmar Hammarskjöld who had put 
Dag up to it. 129  The problem was accentuated by the Swedish constitutional 
particularity that all ministers are responsible for decisions by the government 
collectively. After a long discussion with the Prime Minister Erlander, who was not 
impressed when Hammarskjöld explained that his reservation was a return to the old 
ways. (Erlander wondered in a note in his diary if Hammarskjöld also meant a 
subversion of the current parliamentary system.) This was solved by a reservation 
with the content that Hammarskjöld would only be collectively responsible for 
government decisions within his own sphere. Erlander summarised the reservations of 
Hammarskjöld after the discussion in his diary: 
 
“1. H-d does not belong to the party and has not found a reason to join. 
2. He regards his commitment as an expert summon. 
3. He does not fear any political contentions since he has followed our policy for so 
long and does not foresee any signs of positions that would force him to leave the 
government.”130 
 
Several members of the government were critical of Hammarskjöld’s appointment in 
general and his reservations in particular and even Erlander started to have second 
thoughts. At this point, however, Hammarskjöld changed tack and asked Erlander for 
the post.131  
 
In a letter to his old friend Gudmund Björck, who was a conservative, Hammarskjöld 
explained his decision to join a Social Democratic government in the following 
words:  																																																								
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“I do not serve any ‘persons or interests’ but a cause and a country. The situation for 
the one who wants to achieve something for the future of this country would be much 
facilitated if those who are now in the opposition – or others in their stead – would 
think a little more about the country and a little less about themselves in the 
formulation of their policy. I have, to the best of my ability as a follower of old 
traditions, no problem to cooperate with someone who wholeheartedly shares the 
same goal, regardless of potential differences over the methods. But very difficult to 
cooperate with others – regardless of their political profession.”132  
 
Hammarskjöld saw himself as the follower of an old tradition and it is interesting to 
note how he seems to be advocating a policy of putting the goals above the means.  
 
The reactions to Hammarskjöld’s appointment as Minister in the Foreign Office throw 
an interesting light on Hammarskjöld’s role in Swedish foreign policy. “Both the 
wisdom and, from the British point of view, the desirability of this change are 
questionable”, was scribbled on the report on the appointment in the Foreign Office. 
The British were worried, not about Hammarskjöld’s elevation, but about his 
successor as State Secretary in the Foreign Office, Arne Lundberg, a young member 
of the Social Democratic Party. The British were concerned that “a ‘social party man’, 
who may be expected dutifully to echo M. Undén’s narrow-minded ‘neutrality-at-all-
costs’ policy, is replacing a[s] principal advisor to the Foreign Minister a man who 
has shown some independence of mind and strength of character. So far as the 
prospects of cooperation with the West are concerned, this seems a [illegible word] 
stop”. 133  Another British diplomat added “on balance, we shall lose by M. 
Hammarskjöld’s elevation”.134 The praise for Hammarskjöld’s “independence of 
mind and strength of character” is testament to the fact that in Hammarskjöld the 
British had found someone they could do business with; someone who was not too 
rigid in the interpretation of the official Swedish neutrality; someone who was in 
favour of “cooperation with the West”. To the British ambassador in Stockholm, Sir 
Harold Farquhar, Hammarskjöld clearly played a political role in Sweden. In his 
report on the nomination of Hammarskjöld as minister, he wrote that 																																																								
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“Hammarskjöld’s transfer from the official to the political sphere will confirm a 
situation which has in fact existed for some time.”135 Hammarskjöld was also seen as 
“the leading Swedish authority on international affairs”.136 The British went to great 
lengths to accommodate him as “M. Hammarskjöld is the most friendly and western-
minded of the Swedish Ministers and merits all encouragement”.137 
 
Hammarskjöld was also a favourite of H. Freeman Matthews, the hawkish American 
ambassador in Stockholm who campaigned against Swedish neutrality on ideological 
and moral grounds.138 American reports described Hammarskjöld as “one of the most 
important and influential people in Sweden” and “definitely pro-western in 
outlook”.139 Freeman Matthews would come to play an important, if incidental, role in 
the election of Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General. 
 
Hammarskjöld remained in charge of the delicate CoCom discussions as a minister. 
After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 the Americans, the British and the 
French pressured Sweden further on exports of strategic materiel.140 Hammarskjöld 
refused formal meetings with the three countries and insisted on informal and secret 
bilateral meetings.141 The outcome of Hammarskjöld’s meetings with the Americans 
was, once again, that Sweden unilaterally decided on a policy that was acceptable to 
the Americans. The reward for this was that Sweden was now treated “almost as a 
NATO member” for US export license purposes.142  
 
At the end of 1951 Hammarskjöld published an article entitled “To Choose Europe” 
wherein he confessed an allegiance not only to the European heritage of “Jerusalem, 
Athens and Rome”, but more practically to European integration; contextually he 
highlighted the importance for Sweden to be part of this, although stopping short of a 																																																								
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NATO membership.143 In early 1952 Hammarskjöld discussed the article with Prime 
Minister Erlander. Hammarskjöld explained to Erlander that his relation to foreign 
minister Undén was coming under strain over the latter’s rigid neutrality position. 
Hammarskjöld told Erlander that the representatives of the Western powers in 
Stockholm – “and in particular US ambassador Butterworth” – understood 
Hammarskjöld’s position to be clearly Western-friendly but stopping short of active 
defence cooperation due to the official neutrality of the government.  Hammarskjöld 
asked Erlander directly if he had gone too far in his Western-friendly approach; if this 
was not the government’s position Hammarskjöld would be compromised in his 
contacts with the Western powers. Hammarskjöld was looking for more solid support 
than foreign minister Undén’s tacit approval for a position that was considerably more 
pro-Western than the official neutrality. Erlander confirmed that Hammarskjöld’s 
position was the correct one for Sweden.144 US President Eisenhower later defined 
neutrality as “a moral, spiritual, and, possibly, a political commitment to our side, but 
not necessarily a military commitment”. 145  Hammarskjöld was instrumental in 
making Swedish neutrality adhere to that definition.  
 
 
C The Ideal Civil Servant 
C.1 Hammarskjöld’s Theory of the Ideal Civil Servant 
Hammarskjöld’s promotion to membership of the government challenged his integrity 
as an independent civil servant. Although Hammarskjöld’s role was really political, 
he felt a strong need to rationalise his actions with his idiosyncratic philosophy of the 
neutral civil servant. Hammarskjöld was “passionately” interested in the role of the 
civil servant in the modern state. After his appointment as minister in the Social 
Democratic government, he published two articles in an attempt to explain his ideas. 
146 In these articles, Hammarskjöld emphasised that he was not a member of the 
Social Democratic party and argued that as a neutral civil servant he was outside party 
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politics, but could still play a political role as “the servant of society”.147 He wrote 
that the civil servant is allowed to introduce political policy objectives in his work, 
and indeed should do so, provided that he clearly indicates this and flags when he 
crosses the line between what can be done without political assumptions and where 
instead a political conviction is the basis of the analysis. Hammarskjöld wrote that 
“[the civil servant] has chosen the position as the servant of society, not the servant of 
the group” (as opposed to the party man one must assume).148  
 
In the same article Hammarskjöld defined his political creed as the “reverence for 
life”, a formula he borrowed from Albert Schweitzer, theologian and philosopher 
famous for his fieldwork running hospitals in Congo. Schweitzer, was a modern 
representative of an idea that sprung from deep roots in the European cultural 
tradition according to Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld then summed up the constitutive 
parts of the “reverence for life” formula as he interpreted it:  
 
“A first consequence of this basic outlook is a reverence for what is historically given 
as the result of generations’ striving and attempts at problem solving. This is a 
markedly conservative feature. A second consequence is that the political reactions 
will be governed by a respect for the individual, from which can be deduced on the one 
hand a demand for the largest possible freedom for the individual to form his life 
according to his own ideas, and on the other hand a demand for social justice in the 
form of equal rights and equal possibilities for all. In this later point liberal and social-
radical elements are mixed together. Finally, the ethics that Schweitzer exemplifies, is 
the subordination of personal interests under the collective whole, with a morally 
conditioned loyalty firstly towards society, as it appears in the nation, but secondly 
towards the larger view of society that is represented by internationalism.”149 
 
Herbert Tingsten, the editor of the leading paper Dagens Nyheter, criticised 
Hammarskjöld’s articles for saying simple things in a complicated way and referred 
to Hammarskjöld’s “ability to dress up as for a polar expedition to go to Uppsala”.150 
The American ambassador Butterworth mentioned Hammarskjöld’s articles in a 
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report to State Department but said that he did them a favour by not adding a 
translation as the articles were boring and obscure.151 
 
Hammarskjöld also outlined what he considered his own role as a civil servant outside 
party politics:  
 
“The modern democracy has as one of its fundamental prerequisites a healthy and 
strong party system, but this does not prevent that the democracy, also in a purely 
political respect, may have a need of groups and individuals, whose political interests 
find another outlet than adherence to a political party. It is, e.g. the case, that the 
person who in his political work has the individualists need of an unprejudiced trial of 
all questions and proposals ‘on the merits’ and without any interest bias whatsoever, 
tends towards finding an outlet for their public interests in public service rather than in 
party political activities.”  
 
This explains what Hammarskjöld thought that he was doing as a civil servant – 
giving all political questions an “unprejudiced trial ‘on the merits’ and without any 
bias whatsoever” – and he would use it again to justify his political role as  Secretary-
General later. Hammarskjöld argued as well that a democracy needs people who are 
not elected, to act as checks and balances on the elected politicians. To understand 
this element of Hammarskjöld’s views better we need to consider what he had 
referred to as his “conservative mark”. Hammarskjöld saw himself as a civil servant 
in a line of civil servants. Hammarskjöld’s direct link to this heritage was his father, 
Hjalmar Hammarskjöld.   
 
 
C.2 The Heritage of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld 
Dag Hammarskjöld’s ideas on civil service are further illustrated in a commemorative 
speech from 1954, on the occasion of the death of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld. Dag took 
over his father’s seat in the Swedish Academy, the first and only time a son has 
succeeded his father in that assembly. As was customary, the new incumbent gave a 
speech on his predecessor and Dag’s speech on his father sheds important light on his 
conception of the neutral civil servant. Dag’s father, Hjalmar, was a controversial 																																																								
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figure and had been heavily criticised as Prime Minister during World War I. On 
account of his refusing to sign a trade deal with the United Kingdom during World 
War I he was seen as friendly towards Germany and partly responsible for the hunger 
years that followed, an accusation which earned him the nickname “Hungerskjöld” 
(“Hungershield” in Swedish).  
 
In the speech, while ostentatiously portraying his father, Dag developed his own 
perception of civil service in the greater interest of the state.152 He even claimed that, 
while Prime Minister, his father had served only as an independent civil servant 
without taking political sides: “with his strong sense of the independence of public 
administration and with his feeling about the duties accompanying the responsibilities 
of officials, he could feel bound to form a cabinet without therefore taking sides 
concerning the principle involved in the current constitutional conflict, as represented 
by the opponents.”153 Hammarskjöld’s contemporaries noted with scepticism that “not 
many would have looked at old Hjalmar in that light.”154 Tingsten, wrote an editorial 
entitled “Hammarskjöld as a Way of Life”, which criticised Dag’s speech for glossing 
over Hjalmar’s “stance for the conservatives and the king, hostility towards 
democracy, the ambition and the extreme self-assuredness”, words that could apply 
also to his son.155 Tingsten also noted that Dag seemed to identify strongly with his 
father in the speech. 
 
Dag Hammarskjöld also made reference to the fact that his family had served Sweden 
as civil servants since before democracy and spoke of his father as “one of those who 
are firm in their roots and firm in their faith, those whose changing fates may well 
deepen the convictions and directions of their earlier years, but not change them […] 
What gave an inner unity to his life was that in the period of revolutionary 
development through which he lived, he remained faithful to his past, faithful also to 
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the past”.156 These words echo Hammarskjöld’s own ideals. Dag had also been 
criticised at times in Sweden for his self-sufficiency and another passage from the 
speech must have made his contemporary listeners think as much of the son as of the 
father: “A mature man is his own judge. In the end, his only firm support is being 
faithful to his own convictions. The advice of others may be welcome and valuable, 
but it does not free him from responsibility. Therefore, he may become very lonely. 
Therefore, too, he must run, with open eyes, the risk of being accused of obdurate 
self-sufficiency.”157 In Markings, Hammarskjöld noted “You are your own god – and 
are surprised that the wolf pack pursues you over the dark desolation of the wintry ice 
fields.”158 
 
C.3 The Religious Ideal of Servitude 
Hammarskjöld’s religion combined his Christian faith with his ideas of civil service 
via mystical doctrines of a life spent in servitude. Among contemporaries, 
Hammarskjöld found his creed best expressed by Albert Schweitzer, although he saw 
this as an old lineage of religious mysticism that expressed itself through deeds and 
service in the world in a straight line from the Gospels via various mystics such as 
Meister Eckhart, John of the Cross and Thomas a Kempis down to Albert Schweitzer. 
Hammarskjöld spoke of his religious inspiration quite openly on the Edward R. 
Murrow show in 1954 and mentioned that he drew inspiration from “those great 
medieval mystics”. 159  But no one of his friends or associates was aware that 
Hammarskjöld was himself a mystic, as the publication of Markings after his death 
would show. 
 
This mystic ideal can be summed up in the title of Thomas a Kempis De imitatio 
Christi – On the imitation of Christ, that is to follow Christ’s example with a life 
spent in service. Eckhart was the first of the mystics Hammarskjöld quoted, and he 
defined the highest form of mysticism and spirituality as action, via activa, as 
opposed to the via contemplativa, a life of meditation on the scriptures far away from 
the realities of the world, pursued by most monastic orders of Eckhart’s time. The link 
between mysticism and action in Eckhart’s thinking is that inner spirituality will lead 																																																								
156 Cordier/Foote (eds.), Public Papers Vol II, p. 409. 
157 Ibid., p. 411. 
158 Hammarskjöld, Dag, Vägmärken (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1963) p. 43. 
159 “Old Creeds in a New World”, Cordier/Foote (eds.), Public Papers Vol II, p. 195. 
	 49	
to an outward action, directed by god. This is an idea that Hammarskjöld reiterated 
again and again in Markings, both in quotes of Eckhart such as “der Täter unserer 
Taten” (“the doer of our deeds”) and in his own words “Not I, but God in me.” 
Eckhart’s idea of “gewöhntes Wollen” is central in Hammarskjöld’s thinking and he 
quotes it on several occasions in Markings.160 The idea, as presented by Eckhart, and 
as expounded upon by Hammarskjöld in Markings, is to empty the self so as to make 
it receptive to the will of God; or, in Hammarskjöld’s words, “to shift the boundary 
between subject and object in my being all the way to the point that the subject, even 
if it is still in me, is outside and above me – and my whole being is thus an instrument 
for that in me which is more than I.”  
 
In Albert Schweitzer, Hammarskjöld found the modern day expression of this old 
concept. While Schweitzer was also a strongly religious man, his ideas were more 
readily acceptable to modern humanism and was the one Hammarskjöld preferred to 
refer to. Schweitzer was, however, writing in the same mystic tradition, as 
Hammarskjöld. For Schweitzer rational philosophical speculation, if it went deep 
enough, led to irrational mysticism.  
 
Many of Hammarskjöld’s commentators do not seem at ease talking about these 
irrational aspects of Hammarskjöld. Maybe because they fail to see that the man could 
be at the same time a rational public official and a mystic. But many distinguished 
scientists were mystics. Perhaps the best way to look at Hammarskjöld is to compare 
him with two of his favourite authors Blaise Pascal and Carl Linnaeus. Both were 
famous scientists, whose rationality no one would question, but both were also deeply 
religious with a penchant for the mystical. Hammarskjöld wrote of Linnaeus in the 
following words: “A great naturalist guided the author, but a great poet permitted the 
scholar to peer into the secret Council Chamber of God.”161 The dichotomy of faith 
and reason is a modern one. Like one of his favourite authors, Sir Thomas Browne – 
who thought that reason was implanted in man by God, but disdained by the Fall so 
that it needed to be completed by faith – Hammarskjöld combined a strong 
rationalism and a strong religious faith.162 																																																								
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Hammarskjöld‘s religious ideas are a key to explaining several other aspects of his 
personality that have intrigued his biographers. Certainly, Hammarskjöld’s strong 
commitment to work and his self-imposed celibacy sprung from, or was reinforced 
by, his religious outlook on life. Lash spoke of a “secular priesthood” referring to 
Hammarskjöld’s view of the position of Secretary-General. For Hammarskjöld this 
image is very fitting. Hammarskjöld had decided to turn his back on such things as 
marriage to live his life in the imitatio Christi. For Hammarskjöld that road led to a 
life of action in public service, not to contemplation in a monastery, but the choice 
was the same. As Hammarskjöld put it in Markings: “’Upon my conditions’. To live 
under that sign is to purchase knowledge about the Way at the price of loneliness.”163  
 
The British Ambassador to Stockholm described Hammarskjöld in 1953 as 
“unmarried and a basically rather a lonely figure who consoles himself with a full 
range of interests and lives fully on two planes, the official and the personal and 
cultural.” Hammarskjöld still lived at home until he was 40, he moved out only in 
1945 and is not known to have had any intimate relation with women.164 Trygve Lie 
circulated rumours in New York that Hammarskjöld was homosexual; this might have 
been done in order to undercut his successor’s position.165 The main biographers and 
people who knew him all conclude that “sex played little if any part” in 
Hammarskjöld’s life and that the rumours were completely unfounded. 166  In 
Markings, Hammarskjöld noted on this subject that “Because it did not find a mate/ 
They called the unicorn / A pervert”. None of his biographers, however, draws the 
conclusion that Hammarskjöld lived in a self-imposed celibacy. Yet for someone 
aiming to follow in the tradition of imitatio Christi voluntary and complete chastity is 
the first step.167 Hammarskjöld joked that the UN Charter should include an article to 
the effect that “the Secretary-General of the UN should have an iron constitution and 
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should not be married”.168 But this was not merely a joke from Hammarskjöld’s side. 
In a letter to his friend the Swedish painter Bo Beskow, he wrote that he felt a “short 
pain” at missing out on the blessings of marriage, but concluded that “what must be, 
is right”.169 Instead Hammarskjöld chose to devote himself body and mind to his work 
as a civil servant.  
 
The striking aspect of Hammarskjöld’s role as a civil servant in Sweden was the lack 
of supervision and control. Normally, a civil servant is under the supervision and 
direct control of his superiors. As the chief official, first in the Ministry of Finance 
and then the Foreign Ministry, he was responsible only to his minister. In both cases, 
Hammarskjöld had the full trust and support of his ministers and was left mainly to 
his own devices regarding the issues that did not interest the ministers or which were 
outside their respective field of expertise. Hammarskjöld was much more than the 
executor of policy, more also than an influential actor, he was often the originator of 
policy. The picture of Hammarskjöld as a grey eminence – Hammarskjöld had been 
referred to as the Grey Eminence of the Swedish Government in a Swedish 
newspaper170 – springs to mind and like the original grey eminence, Père Joseph, as 
described by Aldous Huxley, Hammarskjöld was also a mystic with a taste for 
worldly power.171 But just what role was Hammarskjöld looking to fill? Prime 
Minister Erlander noted in his diary in 1952 that Hammarskjöld “had ambitions. But 
what is his aim?”.172 
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Chapter 2: “The most difficult job in the world” 
 
The preparatory commission on the UN Charter had noted that the Secretary-General 
“more than anyone else, will stand for the United Nations as a whole. In the eyes of 
the world, no less than in the eyes of his own staff, he must embody the principles and 
ideals of the Charter to which the Organization seeks to give effect.” 173 
Hammarskjöld had been a member of the Swedish delegation to the UN on several 
occasions but had given little thought to the principles and ideals of the Charter. 
Before his appointment as Secretary-General his view of the UN was that it “was a lot 
of talk and unnecessary resolutions”.174 Hammarskjöld’s friend, and chef-de-cabinet 
in Sweden, Sverker Åström, gives an interesting picture of Hammarskjöld at the press 
conference the day after his appointment as Secretary-General:  
 
“During the press conference […] the participants got the impression that he 
mastered the whole complex of the UN and that he was also a convinced and idealistic 
follower of the purposes and aims of the UN. You could have thought that he had 
spent the night going through a meter of literature on the UN, at the same time 
convincing himself that he had always thought that the UN was the central organ for 
international cooperation […] he realised that he had been allotted the role of his life, 
the task which he would, with time, come to see as a mission and a calling.”175 
 
With his appointment as Secretary-General of the UN Hammarskjöld had finally 
found the “role of his life”, the mission and the calling he had been searching for; but 
the role as Secretary-General of the UN was also, in the words of his predecessor 
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A. “A veto-ridden failure of an ideal” – The United Nations in 1953 
A.1 The Security Council: “An Alliance of Great Powers embedded in a universal 
organization”   
The United Nations grew out of the wartime coalition between the United States, 
Britain, the Soviet Union and their allies. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin all agreed 
that the new international organisation would have to contain a “high degree of Great 
Power control”.176 Roosevelt, despite his penchant for lofty talk of legalism and 
international law, never meant the United Nations to consist of equal members.177 
This was enshrined in the veto power of the permanent members of the Security 
Council. The British historian and diplomat Sir Charles Webster, a specialist on the 
Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh who had worked in the British delegations that 
drew up the charters of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, remarked 
in his diary that the United Nations was “an Alliance of Great Powers embedded in a 
universal organization”.178 But the UN never turned into the “international police 
power” that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had dreamt of. Already before the end of 
the war the great coalition that was the UN showed signs of breaking apart. The onset 
of the Cold War meant that the UN could never function as it was intended to as the 
required harmony among the permanent, veto-yielding, members of the Security 
Council was replaced by dissent.  
 
 
A.2 The General Assembly:  “The monkey house”  
The General Assembly turned into a talking-shop and already in 1946 Dean Acheson 
dismissed it as “the monkey house”.179 But the General Assembly could still be useful 
as the Americans, with their European and Latin American allies, commanded a 
majority in the General Assembly. The Americans could also publically isolate the 
Soviets in the Security Council by voting measures that the Soviets then had to veto. 
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The British thought that the Americans were treating the UN as an “anti-communist 
alliance”180. Without going that far, the British also wanted to use the UN in the Cold 
War and prioritised cooperation with the Americans to achieve their common aims as 
British Permanent Representative to the UN, Sir Pierson Dixon put it in 1953:  
 
“We in fact both of us want to use the United Nations in the cold war, but as is so often the 
case the difference between us is one of timing. Our belief is that the United Nations should 
be used to convince world opinion of the correctness of the policies pursued by the West so 
that in moments of crisis the weight of the United Nations will be thrown on our side and 
we shall be able to call in the event of war upon the manpower and material resources of 
the majority of the United Nations in support of any action taken by NATO or some other 
regional collective self-defence organisation. The Americans on the other hand rather tend 
to skip the persuasion and to try to bind the majority of the United Nations irrevocably to 
the military arrangements devised by the West to contain Communist aggression”.181 
 
Dixon’s report had started with the following declaration: “There is no doubt that, 
apart from the rather superficial criticisms, which are so often heard – that it is a 
waste of money, a mere talking shop or a veto-ridden failure of an ideal – the United 
Nations, as it is, has great disadvantages both for her Majesty’s Government, the 
United States Government and the free world generally.” But Dixon conceded that 
with these limits in mind, the UN could do much good and set out the British 
priorities in the following way: “Our overriding aim must be to use the United 
Nations first to help consolidate the free world and avoid total war and secondly to 
pursue this policy on a solid basis of Anglo-United States cooperation.”182 Dixon also 
discarded the “comatose” Security Council, and recommended that it be left 
undisturbed, as well as the General Assembly, which he did not consider an adequate 
substitute for the Security Council. In his 14-page report he made no reference to the 
office of the Secretary-General and yet his conclusions that the Security Council and 
the General Assembly were not viable ways forward pointed towards a possibility for 
the Secretary-General to find a role here.  
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A.3 The Potential Role of the Secretary-General: “A virgin field of influence”  
The Secretariat of the UN had not played a political role. In 1954 it was demoralising 
for the UN to host the Geneva Conference that addressed the two most pressing 
threats to world peace at the time – the Korean War and the war in Indo-China – 
without being allowed to sit at the table. As Adrian Pelt, director of the UN European 
Office in Geneva wrote to Hammarskjöld from the conference: “a situation is 
developing which reminds me very much of what a French ambassador once said to 
the plenipotentiaries of the Netherlands States General at the Peace Conference 
following the war of the Spanish succession: ‘Messieurs, nous sommes venus pour 
traiter chez vous, de vous et sans vous.’”183  
 
Hammarskjöld had an essentially realistic view of the UN. In 1953, on the upcoming 
revision of the UN Charter, he told his British interlocutors that the “Charter itself 
was not so unsatisfactory an instrument: it was the dissensions between the Powers 
which were responsible for United Nations failures, rather than inadequacies in the 
Charter itself.”184 After just a few weeks as Secretary-General Hammarskjöld wrote to 
his friend Labouisse: “already after a fortnight I find the job quite exciting. Some of 
the difficulties are close to the margin of the impossible, but with the excellent help of 
my collaborators and with the kind of confidence which I have already experienced 
from men like Averell Harriman, I am not worried”.185  
 
The powers of the Secretary-General, as delineated in the Charter, are largely those of 
an administrative officer (Article 97) whose responsibility it is to enable the various 
parts of the UN to work together. He therefore makes an annual report (Article 98) 
and he keeps the General Assembly informed of the actions taken by the Security 
Council (Article 12). The exception is Article 99, from which the real political power 
of the Secretary-General stems. It is one of the shortest articles in the UN Charter:  
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“The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security.” 
 
It leaves much room for the discretion of the Secretary-General, firstly it is the 
discretion to decide what “in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security” and secondly, the discretionary choice of whether to 
bring such a situation to the attention of the Security Council as he “may” do so, not 
“shall”. 
 
During the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks when the UN was set up several different 
proposals for the Secretary-General were discussed ranging from that of a “President” 
with a wide political mandate to a mere “Director-General” with a mainly 
administrative function to a combination of both. The drafts for the final version of 
the Secretary-General show that the idea was to create “an impartial watchdog, an 
agent who will bring to the attention of the organization threats to the peace which 
Member states, because of political considerations, will tend to be hesitant in 
raising”.186 These American drafts are travaux préparatoires with a very limited role 
for the legal interpretation of the Charter under International Law. However, they may 
well have inspired Hammarskjöld’s reading of his Charter role. Hammarskjöld 
showed an intense interest in the UN Charter and its interpretation under International 
Law. In the Swedish legal tradition the travaux préparatoires are also, unlike in 
International Law, considered a source of law in its own right and play an important 
role in the interpretation of a statute or law.  
 
The actual invocation of Article 99 is extremely rare and yet Article 99 could be said 
to be behind almost all political activities of the Secretary-General. The article is self-
operating and is the unmentioned legal source from which the political activities of 
the Secretary-General are derived. In this it can be said to provide the “specific legal 
authorization for that extensive, informal, behind-the-scenes political activity of the 
Secretary-General for which the propensities of his position, and the precedent of the 
League, provide a non-textual basis”.187 The role of the Secretary-General was left to 																																																								
186 Schwebel, Stephen M., “The Origins and Development of Article 99 of the Charter” in British 
Yearbook of International Law 28 (1951), p. 374. 
187 Ibid., p. 375. 
	 57	
be developed in practice. Summing up the development of Article 99 in 1951, 
international lawyer Schwebel noted that the use of Article 99 as the basis for more 
bold political participation of the Secretary-General was “largely a virgin field of 
influence which the Secretary-General might, if the need arises, find himself capable 
of exploiting”.188 An American report, written by the Carnegie Endowment for the 
State Department in 1950, also mentioned that “great potential power is vested in the 
Secretary-General and the very absence of confining detail permits the flexible 
evolution of these powers”.189 Hammarskjöld would exploit this virgin field and make 
full use of the flexible evolution of the great potential power vested in the Secretary-
General like no other Secretary-General before or after.  
 
 
B The Secretariat under Hammarskjöld 
B.1 Hammarskjöld’s Reorganisation of the Secretariat – Centralising Power in the 
Hands of the Secretary-General 
As soon as Hammarskjöld touched ground in New York he started working on 
reforming the Secretariat. The aim of his reorganisation was to promote the political 
role of the Secretariat, which in Hammarskjöld’s understanding of the UN Charter 
meant the Secretary-General himself. As Hammarskjöld told a reporter: “This is a 
political job. I am a political servant. Administration is just a tool at my command.”190 
Hammarskjöld’s reorganisation explicitly aimed at centralising most of the authority 
in the office of the Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld wanted to replace the previous 
two-tiered system of Assistant Secretary-Generals and Principal Directors with the 
single new position of Under-Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld wanted the new 
position of Under-Secretary to be “essentially administrative” and to undertake 
political responsibilities if delegated by the Secretary-General only. According to 
Hammarskjöld the “political responsibilities thus would clearly be exercised on the 
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personal responsibility of the Secretary-General”. 191 This would “clarify the lines of 
authority and facilitate[e] the formulation of over-all policy”.192 Hammarskjöld made 
it clear that the Secretary-General was “the only political officer of the United 
Nations”.193  
 
Following the so-called London understanding of 1946, five of the eight Assistant 
Secretaries General went to the five permanent Members of the Security Council. 
Trygve Lie had not cared much for the intricacies of administration and under his 
tenure the Secretariat had broken down into a feudal system where the Assistant 
Secretaries-General ruled over their own fiefdoms with little central organisation or 
direction. Hammarskjöld was determined to restore the independence of the Secretary 
by ridding it of the strong influence that the permanent members of the Security 
Council now held.  
 
The Soviet bloc was opposed to Hammarskjöld’s reforms as they were perceived as a 
dilution of Soviet influence in the Secretariat. The Soviet Assistant-Secretary-General 
had by tradition been head of the important Department for Political and Security 
Council Affairs. Hammarskjöld’s reorganisation meant that this department would 
cease to exist and instead he would have two Under-Secretaries without portfolio 
responsible for assisting the Secretary-General on an ad hoc basis with political 
affairs. These two positions were given to an American, Ralph Bunche, and a Soviet, 
Ilya Tchernychev.  
 
It was not just the Soviets who were critical of Hammarskjöld’s reorganisation. The 
French Assistant Secretary-General Guillaume Georges-Picot was opposed to the fact 
that the reorganisation would destroy the original idea of a cabinet of senior officials 
that represented the five permanent members of the Security Council, which was 
Hammarskjöld’s very intention.194 Hammarskjöld was also determined to replace 
Georges-Picot and firmly rejected several French attempts to put people that he 
deemed unqualified in the post. As long as the Assistant Secretaries-General were in 																																																								
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place, Hammarskjöld treated them with distance and Georges-Picot complained that 
he rarely had access to the new Secretary-General.195 Georges-Picot eventually left 
the UN, but not before telling Hammarskjöld that “he was surrounded by a group of 
people who were giving him only the kind of advice which they thought he wanted – 
“yes men” – [and] that his proposed reorganization was ill-conceived”.196 While parts 
of Georges-Picot’s criticism were motivated by personal animosity to Hammarskjöld 
and his idea to merge George-Picot’s Social Department with the Economic 
Department, the criticism of the centralisation of power in the Secretariat to the 
Secretary-General and the group surrounding him was shared by the French 
government. 
 
In Paris the main apprehension about Hammarskjöld’s reorganisation was that it 
would increase an already large American influence over the organisation. The 
French viewed Hammarskjöld as an administrator without vision, but feared the 
growing importance of his American advisors. A French report on the reorganisation 
noted that “in fact all decisions of any importance will be made by the Secretary-
General”. The French did not fear the increased power of the Secretary-General 
though, but worried that the Americans “would not give their consent without having 
been assured of the presence of an active and all-powerful agent in the Cabinet of the 
Secretary-General himself”.197 To the French the reorganisation was seen as a battle 
for power in the Secretariat between the Member states.  
 
It is possible that the all-powerful agent that the French were referring to was Andrew 
Cordier. Already in April 1953 the French tried to launch their own candidate to 
replace Cordier as Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld 
rebuffed this attempt by saying that he would not make any changes before he had 
completed his in-depth study of the Secretariat.198 To the British Hammarskjöld said 
that he wanted to keep Cordier “primarly because of his long association with the UN, 
																																																								
195 Smouts, Marie-Claude, Le secrétaire générale des nations unies (Paris: Armand Colin, 1971), p. 66.  
196 King, Jeff and Hobbins, A.J., “Hammarskjold and Human Rights: the Deflation of the UN Human 
Rights Programme 1953-1961” in Journal of the History of International Law 5 (2003), pp. 345-346. 
197 Note du 29 octobre 1953 a.s. Réorganisation du Secrétariat des Nations Unies, Archives MAE, AD, 
NUOI, 612. 
198 Lettre d’Henri Hoppenot à Georges Bidault du 23 avril 1953, Archives MAE, AD, Fonds Hoppenot, 
13. 
	 60	
which will enable him to give the continuity of experience desirable for such an 
appointment”.199 
 
But the observers in Paris remained suspicious of Hammarskjöld’s reorganisation. In 
another very critical analysis of the reorganisation, the French highlighted the “too 
large concentration of powers” in the Secretary-General.200 The French were worried 
that Hammarskjöld would not be in a position to exercise all these accrued powers 
and “it can thus be feared that a group of anonymous counsellors will be constituted 
around him that will hold the real levers of command. The efficiency of the 
administration will suffer gravely from this without mentioning the disadvantages that 
the existence of such a camarilla always brings with it”. The report is clear about the 
concern: If the Secretary-General needs to delegate “some of the important 
responsibilities on his immediate colleagues, it is the American-Scandinavian team 
that surrounds him and not the Under-Secretaries who will benefit from these 
delegations that will thus increase its hold over the Secretariat”.201 The French 
concerns of an overly powerful Secretariat running a policy out of line with the 
wishes of the member states would return.  
 
In 1953 the Soviets voted no to Hammarskjöld’s proposal, but the General Assembly 
nevertheless authorised Hammarskjöld to proceed with his proposals for reorganising 
the Secretariat on 9 December, with a vote of 53 for and 5 against.202 
  
All affairs came to be handled by Hammarskjöld directly or his immediate close 
circle. Even the smallest details were to be decided by Hammarskjöld personally or 
run by his office, down to the petty details such as travel authorisation for relatively 
junior staff.203 In some aspects, the work of the Secretariat was diminished, e.g. 
human rights, partly because Hammarskjöld and his close circle did not have the time 
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to manage it and there was no delegation of responsibilities.204 The Director of the 
UN division for Human Rights, John Humphrey, wrote in his diary of 
Hammarskjöld’s approach as “the failure […] to understand that a sine qua non of 
public administration is the delegation of power and responsibility” and that “nothing 
could be done in the Secretariat without express approval of the Secretary-
General”.205 In the prioritisations that Hammarskjöld did as he lessened the scope of 
the UN to activities that he could himself oversee the social programs and human 
rights were cut out to the benefit of political affairs.206  
 
 
B.2 Hammarskjöld and his team 
Hammarskjöld did not get the people he wanted for many posts and some of the 
Under-Secretaries-General were lacking in his view. To counter this Hammarskjöld 
relied heavily, as he had in Sweden, on his own “brain trust” of trusted lieutenants 
that often wielded more power than their nominal superiors who did not have 
Hammarskjöld’s confidence.207 This led to a situation where “[p]olitical affairs came 
to be regarded by many officials as the closely-held specialty of a small group, chosen 
personally by the Secretary-General without regard to organizational niceties”.208  
 
Hammarskjöld’s “capacity for work was enormous” and his “dedication to work was 
completely astonishing” at the UN.209 Hammarskjöld once replied to the question if 
he were tired by stating: “Tired, that would be frivolous”210. Cordier related an 
anecdote where Hammarskjöld had asked a delegate, at the end of a meeting at 4 a.m., 
to join him at ten the same morning for another meeting. After the delegate replied 
that he needed to sleep Hammarskjöld had “stamped up and down in the corridor 
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outside his office repeating ‘Sissy, sissy. The man has to sleep!’”211 Hammarskjöld 
could certainly be harsh on colleagues and others whom he deemed below his highly 
set standards. Hammarskjöld’s “judgments of people could be harsh and irrevocable, 
often being based on a single mistake or misunderstanding, and he resisted, often 
rudely, any attempt to presume on his friendship”.212 Urquhart, who worked in the 
Secretariat at the time, gave the following picture of Hammarskjöld as manager: 
 
“His relentlessly high intellectual and ethical standards made him intolerant of 
incompetence and impatient with slow or confused performance. He was at the same 
time shy but demanding, modest but arrogant, quiet but with a formidable capacity for 
anger and indignation. I do not think he was accustomed to dealing with people at close 
quarters, and he did not encourage intimacy or familiarity. Indeed those who attempted 
it usually suffered painful rebuffs. However, because his other qualities were so 
impressive, his aloofness seemed entirely natural.”213 
 
The Swedish Permanent Representative, Gunnar Jarring, who had also known 
Hammarskjöld from the Swedish Foreign Ministry, mentions Hammarskjöld’s 
“special ability to freeze people out” when he did not appreciate them.214 This would 
lead to a lot of internal criticism against Hammarskjöld by members of the Secretariat 
who felt that they were not given interesting tasks and were side-lined by 
Hammarskjöld’s circle. Hammarskjöld’s remarks about colleagues and others in 
private could be caustic and “not indicative of a particularly Christian disposition”.215 
But Hammarskjöld also had the gift to “inspire loyalties and affections of remarkable 
intensity and duration”.216 
 
The Executive Office of the Secretary-General became the “center for all important 
work on political matters” during Hammarskjöld’s time.217 The central role after 
Hammarskjöld was held by his executive assistant Andrew Cordier, who was 
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“closest” to Hammarskjöld.218 Cordier was a professor of history, who had joined the 
State Department in 1944 and had been a member of the US delegation at the creation 
of the United Nations. He had then been appointed executive assistant to Trygve Lie. 
Cordier described his working relationship with Hammarskjöld in the following 
words: 
 
“Everyday he [Hammarskjöld] came frequently to my office or I went to his to 
exchange views and to expedite business. We were constant luncheon companions for 
eight and a half years, and the call of work almost always brought us together on 
Saturdays and Sundays […] He made every matter of concern to him as Secretary-
General also a matter of concern to me.”219 
 
Hammarskjöld and Cordier developed a close working relationship right from the 
beginning. Already in April 1953 Cordier wrote to a friend to say that “the new 
Secretary-General is working out beautifully. As you know I usually speak with some 
restraint but I have difficulty in restraining my enthusiasm for his many good 
qualities. We have established a perfect personal working relationship and I have 
nothing but praise for the way in which he handles every situation.”220 In May 1953 
he wrote that “We are working together even more closely than I did with Mr. Lie, if 
that is possible.”221 James Barco, who worked in the US permanent mission to the UN 
during all of Hammarskjöld’s tenure, eventually rising to deputy permanent 
representative, described Hammarskjöld’s relationship with Cordier in the following 
words: 
 
“In the case of Cordier, Cordier was the one person who – to the maximum extent – 
was privy to the Secretary General’s thinking, and who was most frequently in 
attendance and present at meetings the Secretary General had. The Secretary General 
by no means had Cordier or anyone else in all his meetings with delegations. By and 
large most of the time, when I called on him in his office, he was by himself. And this 
of course put a burden on him, if there was anything to record or take action on, there 
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was nobody there to turn to, to carry it out. It’s my assumption that he informed 
Cordier afterwards.”222 
 
Another veteran of the UN, Ralph Bunche was appointed one of two Under-
Secretary-Generals without portfolio, the other being the Soviet Ilya Tcherneyev. 
Over the years Bunche would became one of Hammarskjöld’s most trusted advisors 
together with Cordier. Besides Cordier and Bunche, others who were at times part of 
Hammarskjöld’s close circle were Pakistani Bokhari and the British Sir Humphrey 
Trevelyan although both later fell out of favour and were “frozen out” by 
Hammarskjöld.223 Heinz A. Wieschhoff, Bunche’s former deputy in the Trusteeship 
Department, would later rise to prominence as Hammarskjöld’s foremost advisor on 
African affairs.  
 
Cordier, Bunche and Wieschoff had all been professors and had academic careers 
behind them. This is hardly a coincidence as Hammarskjöld, who loved to discuss 
ideas and theories, would have appreciated this. Furthermore, they were all dedicated 
hard workers and could be relied upon to stay at the office as long as 
Hammarskjöld.224 All three were also Americans and had worked for both the State 
Department and the precursor of the CIA, the Office for Strategic Services, during the 
war.225 This would later be an object for great criticism during the Congo Crisis, 
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which was handled mainly by a small circle of officials nick-named the “Congo club” 
almost all of whom were American.  
 
Hammarskjöld claimed that Cordier and Bunche were accepted as genuine 
international civil servants by all the countries of the world.226 Andrew Cordier, has 
given an interesting testimony on this:  
 
“I feel that you can be pursuing the interests of all of humanity while at the same time 
you are giving full and complete and loyal support to the proper and positive and 
constructive interests of your own people and your own country. The two are not 
incompatible. They supplement each other.”227  
 
This was, however, not possible for the Soviets as their national interest had global 
aspirations in that it advocated world revolution according to Cordier. Cordier saw no 
conflict between American interests and UN interests, as they were one and the same. 
If US interests and Soviet interests differed, then UN interests and Soviet interests 
could not be the same. What Cordier failed to realise was that the American national 
interest had the same global aspiration as the Soviet national interest as it sought a 
world that was safe for American interests and propagated the universality of 
American economic and political models. 
 
Bunche also felt that he was best serving his country’s interest at the UN. He had 
turned down an offer to be deputy permanent representative of the US delegation to 
the UN228 and in 1957 he turned down an offer by president Eisenhower to sit on the 
Civil Rights Commission. Bunche’s motivation was that “by continuing in the UN he 
can best serve his country’s interests”; the president’s staff agreed with Bunche.229 
The view of Cordier and Bunche, of being able to serve both US and UN interest at 
the same time, was of course not an impossible idea. But in a polarized confrontation 
like the Cold War where US and Soviet interests clearly collided, UN interests cannot 
at the same time be in line with both US and Soviet interests.  																																																								
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The influence of Hammarskjöld’s aides was important but Hammarskjöld remained 
“a one man operation”.230 Even Ralph Bunche “was an assistant in the full sense and 
the extent to which Hammarskjold directed operations in a detailed way quite 
naturally limited the scope for any one of his top people”, as one member of the 
Secretariat put it. 231  The regular meetings of Hammarskjöld with the Under-
Secretaries-General “consisted essentially of reporting by Hammarskjold, and the 
contribution around the table was relatively small”.232 Later on, during the Congo 
crisis, one new arrival to Hammarskjöld’s team would describe it as “meetings 
between a youngish headmaster and a bright sixth form”. 233  Since most of 
Hammarskjöld’s advisors owed their position only to Hammarskjöld’s favour and not 
to a secure position in the organisation, they were unlikely to provide Hammarskjöld 
with too much dissenting advice, especially as Hammarskjöld did not tend to 
appreciate such advice.  
  
Outside the circle of colleagues at the UN, Hammarskjöld also turned to Ernest Gross 
and Philip P. Jessup as trusted advisors on political and legal issues. Gross was a 
lawyer who previously served as the deputy permanent representative – and acting 
permanent representative during the Korean crisis, he was the man behind the Uniting 
for Peace initiative – at the US permanent mission to the UN. Jessup was professor of 
international law and diplomacy at Columbia Law School.234 Gross shared Cordier’s 
view on “how the United States can support the United Nations so as to promote 
effectively the United States national interest”.235 Hammarskjöld used Gross’ law firm 
for many services and used Gross in his personal capacity as an advisor (e.g. later on 
																																																								
230 Oral History Barco, p. 662.  
231 Columbia Oral History Schachter, p. 3. 
232 Columbia Oral History Schachter, p. 7. 
233 O’Brien, p. 51. 
234 Hammarskjöld called Gross to his office a few days after his first arrival in New York as Secretary-
General to discuss administrative issues at the UN, see Oral History Gross, p. 20. Hammarskjöld also 
hired the services of Gross’ law firm on several occasions, see e.g. Agreement between the Secretary-
General, on behalf of the United Nations, and the Law Firm of Gross and Hyde, New York City, 
Cordier Paper, box 130. Gross dedicated his book on the UN, published in 1962 to Hammarskjöld, 
Gross, Ernest, The United Nations: Structure for Peace (New York: Harper, 1962).  
235 These are the words with which Cordier introduced Gross’ contribution, entitled ”The United States 
National Interest and the United Nations”, to the collection of Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lectures 
entitled ”The Quest for Peace” edited by Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote, p. xvi. 
	 67	
ahead of his trip to Peking to negotiate with Chou En-Lai). According to Gross both 
Lodge and Dulles were happy to see Hammarskjöld bring Gross on board.236 
 
It was not Hammarskjöld’s idea, from the outset, to rely on a mainly American team. 
He tried hard to get qualified Soviet and French representatives in his close circle. He 
refused several Soviet suggestions for the new role of Under-Secretary-General 
without portfolio until Moscow agreed to Hammarskjöld’s choice of Ilya 
Tchernychev, whom Hammarskjöld knew from his time as Soviet ambassador to 
Stockholm. But although Tchernychev and, from 1958 Anatoly Dobrynin, were very 
seasoned diplomats, they did not play the same role as Cordier and Bunche as 
advisors – there were complaints that they were not even given anything to do – but 
served mainly in a secondary function as an additional liaison point with the Soviet 
government.237 The documents also testify to the fact that the Soviet Under-Secretary-
General was never given the same responsibilities as Cordier and Bunche. As an 
example, when it was Tchernychev’s time, according to a rotation scheme, to be 
acting Secretary-General in Hammarskjöld’s absence, Cordier reported to the US 
permanent delegation that it would have been “embarrassing” to pass Tchernychev 
over but that two sensitive areas would not be under his control, instead being placed 
directly under Bunche and Cordier respectively, while Tchernychev was acting 
Secretary-General.238 
 
Hammarskjöld also tried hard to recruit a qualified French advisor. He had told the 
Quai d’Orsay that he wanted a French official for a post as political advisor in the 
consulting group constituted as a brain trust around the Secretary-General; in 
Hammarskjöld’s words he would need a “diplomat of the very first order, relatively 
young, gifted with political aptitudes”.239 A young French diplomat named Jacques 
Chazelles was proposed and accepted by Hammarskjöld on the personal 
recommendation of the French permanent representative Henri Hoppenot. But 
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Chazelles’ superior refused to let him go.240 Hoppenot complained bitterly to the 
Director of Personnel at the Quai d’Orsay, stressing the importance of the post that 
Chazelles was to occupy and Hammarskjöld, who had been impressed by Hoppenot’s 
description of Chazelles, even offered him a higher grade; their efforts though were in 
vain and in the end no French diplomat was appointed to this post.241 The highest 
ranking French official in the UN, who took over after Georges-Picot, as the head of 
the newly merged Economic and Social Department was also a battle for 
Hammarskjöld. The French first tried to give the post to a favourite of the outgoing 
president Vincent Auriol with none of the experience or skills required for the post. 
Hammarskjöld strongly refused and asked the French to nominate Robert Marjolin, 
the first head of the OEEC whom Hammarskjöld knew well from his work with the 
Marshall Plan and the OEEC. Eventually, the French nominated Philippe de Seynes. 
Hammarskjöld was initially not impressed but when it was pointed out to him that de 
Seynes believed in the idea of the UN, he warmed to his candidacy.242 de Seynes had 
been appointed by the short-lived government of Pierre Mendès France to whom he 
was close . This, in the era of de Gaulle, would become a source of problems for 
Hammarskjöld as he would sometimes rely on de Seynes’ out of touch views of 
French policy and contributed to give Hammarskjöld a false picture of ideas and 
opinions in Paris.243  
 
 
C The Political Role of the Secretary-General 
C.1 “Dangerous implications” 
As part of his reorganisation, Hammarskjöld wanted to improve the analytical 
capacity of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs so that the 
Secretary-General and the two Under-Secretaries without portfolio could be fully 																																																								
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briefed on any situation that might require the attention of the UN. Dixon wrote to 
London in 1954 that while he found it laudable that Hammarskjöld was looking at 
ways to improve the work of the staff, he felt “somewhat uneasy at what lies behind 
his idea […] I think I detect in this evidence of a desire on the part of the Secretary-
General to assert himself more vigorously in the United Nations. He wishes to have 
his own team of advisers so that he can be more ‘au point’ and in a position to 
intervene effectively at short notice and at critical moments.” Dixon thought that the 
motive behind this was that “Hammarskjold, with his very wide experience and great 
sense of responsibility is, I think, somewhat irked at finding that he cannot exert much 
visible influence in world affairs. Fortunately he has not succumbed to his 
predecessor’s predilection for launching out on ideas of his own for settling 
international problems. But he is, I believe, beginning to suffer from the same urge”. 
To Dixon there were “dangerous implications” in Hammarskjöld’s proposal. Dixon 
had seen what he perceived as Hammarskjöld’s “first serious attempt to express 
publicly his views” in his intervention in the Guatemalan affair earlier in 1954 and he 
was not impressed.  
 
The Guatemalan government under president Arbenz Guzman had been pursuing 
policies with regard to land reform and nationalisations that were considered more 
and more radical, the most notorious being the nationalisation of the United Fruit 
Company lands. In what was a more successful version of the infamous Bay of Pigs 
affair, the CIA prepared an invasion composed of US-trained exiled Guatemalans led 
by Colonel Carlos Castillo Aramas. On 18 June 1954, Colonel Aramas led a force of 
150 men across the border into Guatemala. The next day, the Guatemalan government 
requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.244 Lodge stated that the matter 
should be referred to the Organization of American States. Hammarskjöld reacted 
strongly against this idea, stating that the Security Council could never be prevented 
from dealing with a matter due to another regional organisation. On 20 June a 
resolution referring the matter to the Organization of American States was vetoed by 
the Soviet Union. Instead a resolution calling for an “immediate termination of any 
action likely to cause bloodshed” was adopted. Two days later, the Guatemalan 																																																								
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Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, wrote to Hammarskjöld and asked for a further 
meeting since the resolution was not being adhered to. Hammarskjöld discussed the 
matter with Lodge who regarded the whole thing as a communist plot. When the 
meeting eventually convened, the agenda was rejected on the grounds that this was a 
matter for the Organization of American States, with a vote of 5 to 4 with France and 
the UK abstaining. Since this was a procedural question, the veto could not be used.  
 
Hammarskjöld had anticipated this outcome and prepared a legal analysis on the 
jurisdiction of the UN with regards to regional organisations. Hammarskjöld’s 
motivation was, he claimed, purely procedural. To him there could be no question of 
carving out the jurisdiction of the UN in this way. For the Americans, this was partly 
a matter of keeping the question out of the Security Council to avoid the Soviets 
lambasting them in public. Pierson Dixon “succeeded with difficulty” in dissuading 
Hammarskjöld  from making a public statement at the Security Council meeting by 
pointing out that this would “so alienate the Americans as seriously to prejudice his 
own position as Secretary-General”. Despite this, Hammarskjöld later prepared a 
detailed memorandum with a legal analysis setting out his views. It was his intention 
to circulate this memorandum to all delegations, but on the advice of Pierson Dixon 
he agreed to first send it to Lodge for comments. Hammarskjöld referred to his 
memorandum as “a rather dry, factual review without evaluations or conclusions”.  
 
In the State Department, Hammarskjöld’s memorandum was seen as “a most unusual 
document […] both as to form and content” and caused “the greatest surprise in the 
United States Government”. The Americans did not see the document as a “dry, 
factual review” but described it as “contentious in tone and faulty in reasoning” and 
as a direct challenge and attack on US policies in Central America. The Americans 
thought that Hammarskjöld probably did not fully appreciate the harmful effects his 
attack could have.245 Was Hammarskjöld merely motivated by procedural concerns as 
he claimed or motivated by other reasons? The issue has been portrayed as a clash 
between Hammarskjöld’s legalistic idealism and the realism of Dulles. Dulles, 
however, was a seasoned international lawyer, with a vastly superior experience than 																																																								
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Hammarskjöld, from his work both as a lawyer and as a member of the US 
delegations working on the preparatory committee to both the League of Nations and 
the United Nations. Dulles made full reference to these experiences in the Guatemalan 
case.246 In a telephone call with Lodge Dulles told Lodge that he would have used the 
veto, even if it was the first American veto ever, as it was “a matter of basic principles 
– there is a relationship of two organizations. It is fundamental to maintain the 
integrity of the American system. …The UN Charter is being violated. …”247 . 
Hammarskjöld’s motive was to expand, or at least not diminish, the powers of the UN 
and in the end himself as Secretary-General. But Hammarskjöld’s legal position was 
weak due to the fact that the Members of the Security Council had voted in 
accordance with the American interpretation. The Guatemalan affair showed the 
weakness of the Secretary-General’s position in practice and that he did not have the 
ultimate say in how the Charter was interpreted, something that Hammarskjöld would 
work hard to change.  
 
 
C.2 Hammarskjöld’s Method 
When he landed at Idlewild airport in New York for the first time as Secretary-
General, Hammarskjöld gave a speech in which he hinted at the role he wanted to 
play as Secretary-General: 
 
“The public servant is there in order to assist, so to say from the inside, those who 
make the decisions which frame history. He should - as I see it - listen, analyse and 
learn to understand fully the forces at work and the interests at stake, so that he will 
be able to give the right advice when the situation calls for it. Don't think that he - in 
following this line of personal policy - takes but a passive part in the development. It 
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is a most active one. But he is active as an instrument, a catalyst, perhaps an inspirer 
- he serves.”248 
 
The role Hammarskjöld was initially aiming for as Secretary-General was as the 
“trusted consultant” of all sides.249 He would also refer to the role of the Secretary-
General as a sort of “clearing-house” that “the delegations know can be used to check 
their own opinions against the opinions of other countries, who will pass on to other 
delegations not their confidences but the conclusions he has drawn from them, who 




A few days after Dixon’s report about the “dangerous implications” of 
Hammarskjöld’s ideas on his own staff for political analysis, Dixon found the 
opportunity to discuss the role of the Secretary-General with Hammarskjöld. 
Hammarskjöld “spoke very frankly about his ideas”: 
 
“Mr. Hammarskjold had evidently given considerable thought to this problem. Under 
the strict rule of the Charter (Articles 99 and 100) it could be argued that the Secretary 
General should intervene in political matters only when it was a question of bringing a 
mediatory influence to bear. This, however, did not correspond with realities. The 
reality to his mind was that the Secretary General, from the very nature of his office, 
must be expected to have some settled and continuing view of the role of the United 
Nations. If one looked at precedents, it was clear that both Sir Eric Drummond and Mr. 
Trygve Lie had conceived of themselves as having such a position. Their methods had 
been different. Sir Eric, while in public appearing as a perfect international civil 
servant, had in practice through his contacts exercised great influence on policy 
making. Mr. Lie adopted the method of “pronunciamentos”. Mr Hammarskjold 
preferred a different method.” 
 
Dixon replied, also “speaking very frankly” that: 
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“as long as it was clearly the voice of Mr. Hammarskjold, Governments would listen 
with pleasure and attention. But if it was the voice of a brains trust surrounding the 
Secretary General that would be a quite different matter. The British were 
constitutionally opposed to the building up of a strong Secretariat view in an 
international organisation, and above all in a universal organisation like the United 
Nations. It was for this reason that I hoped that he would not pursue his ideas for 
enlarging his own private office. 
Another factor which must be borne in mind was the sensitivity of the Americans to the 
role of the Secretary General. Of course it was right that he should speak for the 
organisation as a whole but we must face the fact that the Americans tended to regard 
the United Nations as an instrument in the struggle against Communism. Too many 
nicely balanced interventions by the Secretary General might therefore seriously upset 
his relations with the Americans, and we must never forget that the headquarters was 
situated in New York.” 
 
Hammarskjöld told Dixon that he intended to maintain “very close relations” with 
Dixon and “one or two others” and agreed with Dixon that this was the best way of 
bringing his opinion to bear. (Dixon wrote to the FO that “Hammarskjold tends to 
seek my advice on the various matters which are troubling him, sometimes even to an 
embarrassing extent”.) For his part, Dixon was confident that the British were “in a 
position to steer him away from his more dangerous ideas” and suggested three 
remedies. First, to go out of their way to keep Hammarskjöld informed of British 
policies and assessments and try and bring the Americans to do the same. Secondly, 
to try to “convince him that his most effective way of keeping us all on the right path, 
if we seem to him to be straying away from it, is by intervention in private, and on a 
strictly personal basis, not as part of a ‘Secretariat view’”. Finally, Dixon suggested 
that they should encourage Hammarskjöld to spend more time on the one 
international problem that was in the sphere of responsibility of the UN and to which 
he had not given enough attention so far: Palestine.251 
 
The Foreign Office in London agreed that generally Hammarskjold was “seeking to 
assert himself more than he should do as Secretary-General”. However, they also 
noted that in order for the Secretary-General to be able to evaluate situations under 
Article 99 he could perhaps argue that he needs special senior staff not only to collect 
information but also to analyse it so that he can exercise his judgement. The important 																																																								
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distinction to London was between the Secretary-General forming his own opinion, 
which was laudable, and expressing that opinion out of turn, which might well have 
unfortunate results.252 Dixon’s suggestions on how to deal with Hammarskjold were 
found “very sound”. A split with the Americans must also be avoided “at all costs”: 
“Any loss of confidence in Mr. H. at the present moment would do great harm to the 
United Nations”.  
 
London therefore believed it was important to inform Hammarskjold “of the great 
dangers that would result from his entering the partisan arena. That could be the only 
result of his being identified, particularly in American eyes, as the protagonist of any 
particular course of international policy”.253 On a legal note, London also noted that 
“[i]t is indicated nowhere in the Charter that the Secretary General should express 
views on international problems; in fact such taking of sides might almost be 
precluded by the second half of Article 100”. The British had hit on something that 
was to be defining of Hammarskjöld’s career: The paradox of remaining impartial 
while taking political action. Schwebel had summed up this contradictory aspect of 
the role of the Secretary-General in his 1951 article in the following manner: 
 
“Thus while the Secretary-General may be in a higher sense impartial in the carrying 
out of his political duties, he cannot be neutral. Neutrality implies political abstinence, 
not political action […] There is, indeed, an ‘un-neutral’ predisposition about the 
Secretary-General’s calling the attention of the Security Council to a matter threatening 
the peace, since it is unlikely that it can ever be in the equal interests of the parties to a 
dispute, in an exact, strictly ‘neutral’ degree, that a situation in which they are involved 
be brought before the Council. The unequivocal character of the Secretary-General’s 
intervention in the Korean case emphasizes this at least superficially partisan 
potentiality of Article 99.”254 
 
In much the same way, Hammarskjöld’s pointing out procedural concerns in the 
Guatemalan case might have been impartial, but not neutral. Hammarskjöld’s attempt 
to solve the problem of how the Secretary-General could pursue an active political 
role while remaining impartial was to base his actions on the “ideology of the 
Charter”.  																																																								
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C.3 The “Ideology of the Charter” and the “Secular Church” of Hammarskjöld 
The preparatory commission on the UN Charter had noted that the Secretary-General 
“more than anyone else, will stand for the United Nations as a whole. In the eyes of 
the world, no less than in the eyes of his own staff, he must embody the principles and 
ideals of the Charter to which the Organization seeks to give effect.” 255 
Hammarskjöld was well aware of the need for the Secretary-General "to try and reach 
the minds and hearts of people so as to get the United Nations efforts firmly based in 
public reaction”. 256  In a speech to the American Association for the UN, 
Hammarskjöld told his audience that he conceived of “the Secretariat and the 
Secretary-General in their relations with the Governments as representatives of a 
secular ‘church’ of ideals and principles in international affairs of which the United 
Nations is the expression”.257 By this he meant that the “relationship of the Secretary-
General to the governments should be one of a trusted consultant on those 
considerations following from adhering to the Charter and membership in the United 
Nations that should be taken into account by the governments in coming to their own 
policy decisions”.258 This was a new and idiosyncratic view of the Charter obligations 
of the Member states. To Hammarskjöld the Member states had subscribed to follow 
certain rules in international relations by signing up to the Charter and he viewed it as 
his role to remind them of their obligations when they strayed from them.  
 
Hammarskjöld’s leap of faith in his personal religious outlook corresponds to another 
leap in his official philosophy in the UN. In order to bridge the realism of great power 
politics Hammarskjöld developed what he himself referred to as the “ideology of the 
Charter”. A draft of his introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General 
from 1954 contained the following sentence: 
 
“[…] Because of this very fact, it is also true that the United Nations must oppose any 
policy in accordance with those principles of the Charter and support a policy in 
accordance with those principles, not in a spirit of partiality but as an expression of 
loyalty to the ideology of the Charter. [here “ideology” in the draft  is crossed out 																																																								
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and replaced with “principles”] The attitude proper to the United Nations is thus not 
one of neutrality but one of active effort to further those ideals [here the wording 
“very principles” is suggested instead of “ideals”] which have been fully endorsed by 
all the signatories of the Charter. […]”259 
 
In a discussion of this draft at a private meeting between Hammarskjöld and the 
Under-Secretaries-General on 25 June 1954 it was suggested that “loyalty to the 
ideology of the Charter” might not be clearly understood and the word “philosophy” 
was suggested as more suitable than “ideology”. In the end Hammarskjöld agreed to 
the deletion of the word “ideology” so that the passage simply referred to “loyalty to 
the Charter”.260 
 
Even if the word “ideology” was removed it was clear that Hammarskjöld meant that 
it was possible to take political action and remain impartial, as long as the action was 
in line with the “ideology” or “principles” of the Charter. But this strong belief in the 
Charter was not necessarily everyone’s interpretation of the Charter or the role of the 
UN. Nor are the principles expressed in the Charter very much to base a detailed 
policy on. The UN, like the League of Nations in the words of A.J.P. Taylor, “could 
cover anything from the Concert of Europe to a system of International Government 
in which national sovereignty ceased to exist”.261 Yet Hammarskjöld would continue 
to develop his philosophy of the UN in tandem with his development of a political 
role – and more often than not as a defence for an increasingly active and 
interventionist political role. No other Secretary-General has written so much about 
the political role of his office. His predecessor Trygve Lie had established some 
important rights for the Secretary-General, such as fact-finding missions during the 
Greek crisis in 1946. But the theory behind it was not Lie’s strong side. According to 
his biographer, Trygve Lie’s “heavily accented, imperfect command of English and 
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lack of French probably hindered his ability to discuss abstract questions dealing with 
the expansion of the powers and prerogatives of his office”.262 
 
Hammarskjöld also quickly realised the importance of building popular support for 
the UN. In his speech to the American Association to the UN, Hammarskjöld told his 
audience: “Your role is of the highest significance. No matter what their private 
judgment, those in positions of authority cannot go against prevailing public opinion 
or lead in a direction the public is not prepared to follow”.263 Ernest A. Gross, a 
previous American deputy representative at the UN, said of Hammarskjöld that “In 
time of crisis, the S-G’s views and actions are as important a political phenomenon as 
the Pope in Rome and his views”.264 The importance of Hammarskjöld’s views as a 
secular pope would eventually eclipse those of the Pope in Rome. To a great part this 
was due to the moral role that Hammarskjöld invested his office with, evident during 
the Suez crisis, that Hammarskjöld consciously built up.  
 
In the annual report that Hammarskjöld wrote for 1954 he made a thinly veiled 
comment on the American handling of the Guatemalan affair at the UN by 
emphasising that regional arrangements should not be permitted to cast doubt on the 
“ultimate responsibility of the UN”.265 But Dixon was content with the annual report 
and wrote to London that the annual report “the first in which the Secretary-General 
has formally analysed his views about the United Nations, does not confirm my 
apprehensions”. Although some of the views in the report might be at variance with 
those held in the US Administration Dixon thought that “Hammarskjold has 
expressed himself with reasonable restraint and caution” and the document had not 
caused any raised eyebrows among the Americans. “It is to be hoped that Mr. 
Hammarskjold will continue to act with the same degree of restraint in his future 
political dealings and pronouncements”, Dixon concluded.266  
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Hammarskjöld adopted some of Dixon’s advice and he would soon realise that he 
needed the full support of the Americans for any successful action. But Dixon was 
wrong about the path that Hammarskjöld would follow. Shortly after the Guatemalan 
affair and his discussions with Dixon on the role of the Secretary-General, 
Hammarskjöld wrote to Gunnar Myrdal, who was now head of the ECE, regarding his 
range of political initiative: “it is even in the case of the Secretary-General himself a 
matter of dispute which was never consistently explored by my predecessor and 
where I have to proceed with caution – also in relation to the most friendly 
governments – in my efforts to widen and consolidate recognized rights”. 267 
Hammarskjöld might have been dented in his efforts, but his efforts to widen the 
political role of the Secretary-General had just begun. 
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Chapter 3: Hammarskjöld’s First Attempts to Expand His Role 
All major studies of Hammarskjöld refer to the Peking mission as a great success for 
the Secretary-General and a breakthrough for Hammarskjöld as a mediator.268 But the 
Peking mission almost resulted in Hammarskjöld becoming persona non grata in 
Washington as the Americans and the British came to be more and more critical of 
Hammarskjöld’s tendency to overstep his mandate and power. During his mission to 
the Middle East in early 1956, however, governments came to accept, albeit tacitly, 
that Hammarskjöld could act as a mediator without a specific mandate from the 
Security Council or the General Assembly These episodes clearly highlight how 
Hammarskjöld proactively worked to expand his political role as Secretary General, 
amid general scepticism and governments’ opposition 
 
 
A The “Peking formula” 
 
A.1 Hammarskjöld’s Mission to Peking 
 
On 23 November 1954, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) announced that 11 US 
airmen and 2 US civilians had been convicted of espionage in Korea, while US 
claimed they were part of the UN force. As a matter of principle Dulles did not want 
to make the release of the American fliers part of a comprehensive settlement with the 
PRC.269 The US wanted the UN to adopt a resolution calling on the PRC to release the 
fliers and convened a meeting of the 16 countries who had participated in the UN 
intervention in Korea.270 The other 15, however, favoured some sort of good offices 
approach and in the end a paragraph that called on the President of the General 
Assembly “to use his good offices” was inserted into the draft resolution. Before the 
resolution was passed on 6 December the reference to the President of the General 
Assembly was changed to the Secretary-General after Hammarskjöld suggested this 
to Lodge.271  
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On 8 December Hammarskjöld told Lodge that he had decided to go to Peking 
himself.272 Lodge told Eisenhower that he thought Hammarskjöld could actually 
achieve something if he was given “a real opportunity to work it out” without too 
much discussion in the press and comments from American officials. Hammarskjöld 
also implored the Americans to try and minimise comments that might raise the level 
of tensions before and during his trip. Dulles and Eisenhower agreed to “keep the lid 
on” at least until Hammarskjöld’s return from Beijing.273  
While Nationalist China viewed Hammarskjöld’s mission with great suspicion, in 
light of the fact that Hammarskjöld was in favour of admitting the PRC to the UN, 
Lodge reassured the Permanent Representative of Nationalist China that 
Hammarskjöld was “to do no bargaining whatever on behalf of the US” and that “his 
powers came exclusively from the res[olution] passed by the GA”.274 Hammarskjöld, 
though, did not share this view, as it would soon transpire 
 
Hammarskjöld was received by foreign minister Chou En-lai on the evening of 5 
January and he immediately set the tone by explaining how he viewed his role as 
Secretary-General: 
 
“Under the Charter of the United Nations the Secretary-General is entitled – and, 
being entitled, in my view obliged, – to take whatever initiative he finds appropriate 
in order to get under control or reverse developments leading to serious tensions. His 
rights and obligations in this respect are not limited to Member Nations. They are of 
world-wide application and were given him when he was established in his post not 
only by a majority of the General Assembly but by the unanimous vote of the 
permanent members of the Security-Council. When he acts for the purpose indicated, 
it is not, and can never be permitted to be, on behalf of any nation, group of nations 
or even majority of Member Nations as registered by a vote in the General Assembly. 
He acts under his constitutional responsibility for the general purposes set out in the 
Charter, which must be considered of common and equal significance to Members 
and Non-Members alike.”275 
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This would be known as the “Peking formula” and it was partly designed as a clever 
way to circumvent the General Assembly resolution that Chou did not accept. But 
Hammarskjöld also took the opportunity to add his very wide interpretation of the role 
of the Secretary-General as having a standing mandate, indeed an obligation, to 
intervene in any world crisis and his remark on the Secretary-General’s independence 
was not a coincidence. The “Peking formula” represented an important development 
as it established that the Secretary-General could act independently from the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. It had “a political and juridical significance which 
was quite well understood by Hammarskjöld, and was very much taken into account 
by him”.276  
 
Chou welcomed Hammarskjöld “personally, and as Secretary-General”277 and told 
him that he “did not believe that they would be able to find a solution or a common 
view without approaching the matter from the angle of general political questions”.278 
The next day Chou attempted to discuss several more general questions such as the 
US treaty with Taiwan and UN representation while Hammarskjöld tried to get the 
discussions back to the fliers. On the third day of meetings, Hammarskjöld changed 
tactics and took the initiative to discuss the wider political situation, again taking the 
chance to explain his personal interpretation of the role of the Secretary-General: 
 
“[The Secretary-General] must, independently of the governments, form his own 
opinion as to what best serves the cause of peace and act on that basis without 
jeopardizing the position of his office by permitting himself to be drawn into open 
conflicts where a broad opinion might misinterpret his intentions.”279 
 
This statement contains two rather revolutionary ideas about the role of the Secretary-
General. That the Secretary-General should “form his own political opinion as to what 
best serves the cause of peace” and “act on that basis”. The only limitation seems to 
be that he should not do so in a way as to loose all support. Hammarskjöld’s mission 
to Peking is a very revealing illustration of how he put these ideas into practice. 
Hammarskjöld’s opinion was in fact that it would serve the cause of peace if he could 																																																								
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act as a mediator between Washington and Peking, including on the wider political 
issues, and he acted accordingly, regardless of not having such a mandate. As to the 
risk of jeopardizing his office, Hammarskjöld does not appear to have given that 
much thought.  
 
Hammarskjöld was much taken in by Chou and he thought there would have been 
some grounds for negotiation. Hammarskjöld also told Chou that “as to the question 
of representation you know from public statements what is my attitude” and called it 
“an anomaly” that “one fourth of mankind” was not represented at the UN, but added 
that he thought the problem could not realistically be solved for some time.280 No 
agreements were reached at these discussions, but Chou offered to give visas for the 
families of the imprisoned fliers to visit them in China and Hammarskjöld promised 
to discuss the question of imprisoned Chinese students in the US.  
Chou’s hope for Hammarskjöld to work as a channel between him and the US 
government was clearly stated on the day of Hammarskjöld’s departure, when he told 
him that he hoped “that you will be able, at times which you consider appropriate, to 
tell those countries concerned, although not friendly towards us, especially the United 
States, about China, our views and positions”.281 From Hammarskjöld’s words and 
actions, Chou had every reason to believe that he was going to act as an intermediary 
with Washington, and Hammarskjöld appeared eager to go to Washington and offer 
his services in this capacity.  
 
On his way home Hammarskjöld sent word to Dulles from Tokyo that he thought it 
would be “most useful” to discuss his trip with him and the President on his return. 
The American embassy in Tokyo also reported about the “considerable admiration for 
Chou’s intellectual and general ability” that the Secretary-General expressed.282 This 
hardly inspired confidence in Dulles, who allegedly refused to shake the hand of 
Chou at the 1954 Geneva Conference.283 Hammarskjöld claimed that whereas Chou 
had made much in public of the fact that they were to discuss “pertinent questions”, 
hinting that these included recognition, UN admission etc., in private he did not 																																																								
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expect them to be discussed.284 Though, as the transcripts of the meetings reveal, this 
was not entirely true, nor did it correspond with what Lodge had been told by Cordier, 
who reported on 7 January that Chou had related the question of the fliers to “the 
whole complex of questions”.285  
 
Dulles was “not keen” on seeing Hammarskjöld on his return. He felt that an official 
visit “would make trouble and would give the impression [Hammarskjöld] was the 
intermediary between the Sec. and the Pres. and Chou”.286 Instead Hammarskjöld had 
to settle for a meeting with Lodge on 13 January.287 The day after he again proposed a 
meeting with Dulles and Eisenhower, this time in the form of a “relaxed talk” in 
Washington but Dulles and Eisenhower decided that Dulles should invite 
Hammarskjöld over, but that he would not meet Eisenhower.288 
 
 
A.2 Secretary-General in Search of a Role 
When Dulles and Hammarskjöld finally met in Washington, on 19 January, 
Hammarskjöld jumped at the opportunity to give his views of the whole situation in 
the Far East and concluded that “the Chinese Communists were now a world power. 
They could no longer be treated as pariah”.  Dulles did not say much and, in 
Hammarskjöld’s view as he later told Dixon, Dulles listened to all he had to say “with 
interest, though without comment”. Hammarskjöld’s impression was that Dulles did 
not disagree on any point. Hammarskjöld told Dulles that although Chou was 
“undoubtedly cold and ruthless” he was “certainly not a petty man, nor was he 
incapable by nature of negotiation”. He also referred that Chou had told him “in a 
way clearly intended to be a message to the Americans” that he wanted to reduce 
tensions and seek a state of peaceful co-existence.289 
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If Hammarskjöld interpreted Dulles’ silence as tacit agreement he was mistaken. 
Dulles was growing weary of Hammarskjöld’s activities and had no intention of 
entering into negotiations with the PRC. 290  The Americans were frustrated by 
newspaper reports that portrayed the Hammarskjöld negotiations as concerning a quid 
pro quo of UN recognition or changes to the Formosa defence treaty in return for the 
release of the American prisoners.291 The New York Times had also published a 
picture from Hammarskjöld’s trip to Beijing that showed him under a sign that 
denounced American aggression in Formosa in Chinese letters.292 Hammarskjöld also 
stated in a press conference on 14 January that it would be “useful” if the PRC were 
directly represented at the UN.293  
 
In reality, Dulles thought that Hammarskjöld “had made no progress at all” and that 
the main effect of the Peking offer of visas and Hammarskjöld’s trip was to give the 
PRC a propaganda opportunity.294 The Americans now wanted the UN to call for a 
cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait area, even if the PRC would not comply with a UN 
cease-fire and the Soviets would veto such a resolution. Dulles in fact hoped that such 
a move would rally the “free world” and public opinion.295 The British were less 
enthusiastic about such an approach and thought they should aim to negotiate a cease-
fire that the PRC would actually be willing to accept.296 Hammarskjöld had not been 
consulted but was aware of the preparations to bring the Taiwan Strait situation to the 
Security Council. In a discussion with the UK representative to the UN, he suggested 
that the Security Council should ask the Secretary-General to “explore the situation” 
with the two parties in view of a possible future cease-fire. He also suggested that the 
resolution should not call on him to report to the Security Council, “but to give him 
wide discretion to examine the situation”.297  
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Dixon thought it “would be a mistake to use Secretary-General”.298 The next day 
Hammarskjöld told Dixon that “personally he would be glad to avoid being mixed up 
with the exercise”, but at the same time he felt strongly that the “Peking formula” 
meant that he was the only one suited for good offices. He even invoked Chou as 
support for his extensive interpretation of the rights of the Secretary-General: “Chou 
En-lai had apparently been able to reconcile his rejection of the right of the United 
Nations to interfere in matters relating to China’s domestic affairs with opening 
negotiations with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the grounds that the 
Secretary-General was constitutionally empowered under the Charter to investigate 
any situation giving rise to international tension”.299 Dixon was not convinced and 
found it difficult to determine under which Article or Articles of the Charter precisely 
Hammarskjold thought he derived “the general authority to investigate any situation 
giving rise to international tension”.300 
 
Dulles was not impressed by the suggestion to resort to Hammarskjöld’s good offices 
and felt it would arouse suspicions that there was a “deal” with the PRC. Dulles also 
felt that “Hammarskjold had been a bit naïve and had really not gotten anything at all 
but a mandate from the Chinese Communists to tell us to be more reasonable”. To the 
British fears of a Soviet veto, Dulles replied that the UN’s “main value lay in its being 
a forum for world opinion where influence was exerted on nations to conform to the 
standards of world opinion”. 301  The Americans were far from embracing 
Hammarskjöld’s extensive concept of the role of the UN, preferring to see the 
organisation as an anti-Communist tool, to provide the US with the political prestige 
of the UN as an expression of world opinion.302  
 
On 27 January Hammarskjöld wrote to Dulles complaining that he had not had the 
time to explain his ideas regarding the next steps of the negotiations. Hammarskjöld 
continued to explain the difficulties he had gone through to make the announcement 
of the visas for relatives to the imprisoned fliers as manageable as possible for the 
Americans only to find that Dulles treated it as “nothing but a propaganda move” and 																																																								
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did not intend to issue exit permits for the families. Hammarskjöld wrote “I must 
confess that I am worried when, in this way, I see issues which may be vital to the 
further negotiations, handled and settled without any consultation with the negotiator 
himself”. Hammarskjöld was also worried about possible action in the Security 
Council that might “widen the gulf between East and West” if it provoked a Soviet 
veto. He told Dulles that “as matters now stand, when the Secretary-General has a 
more direct impression of the Chinese aspect of the problem than anybody else in the 
West” he should be consulted.303 Dulles and Lodge reacted badly to Hammarskjöld’s 
letter and agreed that there was nothing in the Charter that said that they had to 
consult with the Secretary-General. Lodge thought that Hammarskjöld was in “way 
over his head” and had “delusions of grandeur”.304  
 
If Hammarskjöld felt that Dulles had treated him in a cavalier manner so far, the curt 
reply he received the next day made it perfectly clear that this was not by accident: 
“My Dear Mr. Secretary General: I have your letter of January 27th. It illustrates, I am 
afraid, the difficulty of you and me trying to deal with these matters on a direct 
personal basis. We were together for over one and one half hours. Yet you feel the 
time was inadequate. Perhaps it was, in the sense that it would have taken many hours 
to have covered the subject in detail. That is why I have to do a measure of delegating 
to Ambassadors and assistants”.305  
The rebuke was complete. After a meeting with Dulles the next day, the British 
ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, reported that “Mr. Dulles obviously regards the 
Secretary-General as gullible and I am afraid his stock is rather low here at the 
moment”.306 The Foreign Office noted that “it is ironical that whereas we had initial 
misgivings that the intervention of the Sect-General in this matter might lead to his 																																																								
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A.3 Mediator without a Mandate: “Volunteer operations on a freewheeling basis” 
The Security Council met on January 31 and decided to invite the Chinese 
Communists to attend Security Council discussions on a cease-fire in the Taiwan 
Strait. The United Kingdom and France wanted Hammarskjöld to deliver the 
invitation and also to add a comment on the importance that several of the members 
of the Security Council attached to the attendance of the representatives of the PRC. 
The UK and France added that the Secretary-General should not merely be “a 
transmitting agent” but should use “his judgment in making appropriate use of the 
contact he had established with Chou En-lai”. Lodge did not agree. After some 
discussion of this point it was decided that Hammarskjöld should send an official 
invitation and a personal message. The Americans protested at the wording of 
Hammarskjöld’s personal message as “exceeding his authority under the Charter” as 
it was not confined to the cessation of hostilities, but gave the impression of 
impending negotiations on an over-all solution.308 
 
Eventually, Hammarskjöld’s personal message did not reach Chou until after the PRC 
had already refused the Security Council invitation.309 Hammarskjöld later received a 
reply from Chou via the Swedish Ambassador in Peking, which floated the idea of 
direct negotiations with the US and suggested that “Hammarskjöld could facilitate 
this by persuading his American friends”. Hammarskjöld showed the message to 
Lodge on February 6 and said that it was “significant” that Chou had chosen the 
Secretary-General as a channel to put forward the idea of direct negotiations as it 
showed that “Chou did not want to use New Delhi or Moscow and that he did not 
want a Geneva-type conference”. (In fact, Chou had communicated via the Russians 																																																								
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and the Indians as well as with Hammarskjöld using all these channels at the same 
time.310)  
 
Hammarskjöld had already prepared a draft reply to Chou that cautiously noted 
Chou’s reasons for eliminating the Security Council as a forum adding that he did 
“not take this as meaning that you exclude the possibility of discussions under the 
aegis of the UN, if another, appropriate forum could be found”. Hammarskjöld told 
Lodge that as a starting point there should be no direct negotiations as such between 
the US and the PRC, but preferably negotiations should be under the aegis of the UN. 
Lodge asked Hammarskjöld if by this he meant that he himself should undertake the 
negotiations. Hammarskjöld avoided the question, but repeated that he “felt the matter 
should remain a UN matter”.311 In a conversation with Dixon, Hammarskjöld made 
reference to the “Peking formula” and said that it was clear to him that Chou drew a 
line between an invitation from Security Council, which he had rejected, and the 
communication from the Secretary-General, which he was interested in. To Dixon, it 
was obvious that Hammarskjöld was envisaging a role as mediator for himself.312  
 
Hammarskjöld informed Lodge on 8 February that he would reply to Chou’s personal 
message. Lodge replied that the US thought this exceeded the Secretary-General’s 
authority. Hammarskjöld replied that their interpretations of his authority differed.313 
In a meeting with the British ambassador, Makins, the same day Dulles said that he 
did not think that “Hammarskjold’s volunteer operations on a free-wheeling basis 
were contributing much” and added that “If [Hammarskjöld] were to play any role in 
the matter, he felt he would have to operate under instructions”.314 
 
On 9 February, in a meeting at the State Department, the British Ambassador 
informed Dulles that his government shared the American concern regarding 
Hammarskjöld’s “unauthorized” correspondence with the PRC. Dulles considered this 
correspondence “extremely dangerous” as Hammarskjöld’s efforts might be 
misunderstood in Peking. Dulles remarked that “Hammarskjold seems to think he has 																																																								
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a standing function as an arbitrator between the two sides in UN matters. This is a 
new concept, which should not be encouraged”. The British also regarded the role 
Hammarskjold had assumed as “outside his competence”. Hammarskjöld was now 
“discredited in Washington”.315 
 
At the Bandung conference Chou stated that the PRC wanted direct negotiations with 
the US. On May 6, Dulles discussed potential candidates to serve as intermediaries in 
discussions, ahead of a possible direct negotiation. When asked if Hammarskjöld 
could be a suitable intermediary Dulles replied that “Hammarskjold had not done a 
good job”.316 On May 28 Chou had informed Krishna Menon, the Indian ambassador 
to the UN and Nehru’s confidante, that the four fliers that had not yet been convicted 
would be sentenced to extradition and handed over to the Americans. Lodge thought 
that Hammarskjöld would be “quite burnt up” at Menon for having “moved into his 
act and taken over his role as mediator”. The same day Eisenhower sent a message to 
Nehru and Menon thanking them for their kind offices and invited Menon to 
Washington for informal and private talks.317 Lodge, in a press conference, also gave 
some credit to Hammarskjöld.318  
 
By the beginning of July Dulles was “fed up with all the intermediaries”.319 The time 
had come for direct contact. The idea was to use the framework of the Geneva 
negotiations the previous year so that it would not look like a major novelty. Dulles, 
via British Foreign Office channels, negotiated a resumption of talks at ambassadorial 
level in Geneva with the PRC.320 On July 25 it was announced that the talks would 
start in Geneva on the first of August.  
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In order to create a positive environment for the ambassadorial talks Chou released 
the 11 American fliers on 31 July.321 Menon was the first to bring note of this to the 
Americans as Chou had informed him in advance. Chou also sent a private message to 
Hammarskjöld in which he stated that “The Chinese Government has decided to 
release the imprisoned U.S. fliers. This release […] takes place in order to maintain 
friendship with Hammarskjold and has no connection with the UN resolution. Chou 
En-lai expresses the hope that Hammarskjold will take note of this point”. The cable 
also expressed the hope that the contact with Hammarskjöld would continue and 
congratulated Hammarskjold on his 50th birthday.322  
 
Chou’s letter with birthday greetings to Hammarskjöld has been taken as proof that 
Hammarskjöld’s efforts resulted in the release of the prisoners when, in fact, Chou 
informed both Menon and Hammarskjöld. The real reason behind the release was that 
the Americans had agreed to direct negotiations in Geneva.323 From the beginning, 
Chou had taken the issue of the imprisoned fliers as an opportunity to negotiate the 
wider political situation with the Americans. He initially gave Hammarskjöld hope 
that the prisoners might be released quickly, but this was tied to discussions of the 
wider situation or some offer of negotiations by the Americans, which Hammarskjöld 
could never deliver as he was not accepted as an intermediary by the Americans. In 
the end, as soon as an offer of direct negotiations came from the Americans, quite 
independently of Hammarskjöld’s efforts, the fliers were released. Chou did not want 
to miss the opportunity to flatter both Menon and Hammarskjöld and was also still 
entertaining hopes that Hammarskjöld, who was already in favour of extending UN 
membership to the PRC, would play a “go-between role” with the Americans.  
 
On 2 August Hammarskjöld dined with Alexis Johnson, the American representative 
at the ambassadorial talks in Geneva. During their dinner discussion Hammarskjöld 
told his host that he interpreted Chou’s message as a will to keep the UN channel via 
Hammarskjöld open. However he did not plan to take any further action while the 																																																								
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talks were ongoing in Geneva.324 On 7 August, Hammarskjöld called on Johnson to 
tell him that Wang, the Chinese representative at the talks, had delivered a written 
message from Chou emphasising how the PRC foreign minister wanted to maintain 
his “personal” contact with Hammarskjöld and asked him to “play a go-between role” 
in the talks in Geneva. Wang had then added orally that the PRC now expected 
“deeds” from the Americans. Hammarskjöld “stressed he could not and would not 
play any “go-between” role but [was] willing do anything he properly can as “third-
party””. This was Hammarskjöld’s cryptic, but characteristic way to say that he did 
not want a mission, but would of course be happy to accept if it were offered. 
Hammarskjöld thought that as “Menon channel has not produced anything”, Chou 
wanted to use the Secretary-General as a channel now. Johnson thought that Chou 
was trying to play different games, using all available channels, but of course had not 
said so to   Hammarskjöld.325  
 
On 10 September, Hammarskjöld cabled the report that he was required to submit to 
the General Assembly as an end to his mission to Chou. Chou replied immediately 
with an angry cable that he did not agree with the report and added that the PRC had 
acted on its own initiative in releasing the prisoners and did not care for the General 
Assembly or its resolutions. 326 Hammarskjöld’s reply to Chou’s angry letter was met 
by an oral rebuke from Vice-Foreign Minister Cheng. The contact between 
Hammarskjöld and Chou was broken, never to be resumed.327 Possibly Chou was 
frustrated that the talks were leading nowhere and that Hammarskjöld was not acting 
as a “go-between” as Chou had hoped. The Americans refused to widen the 
discussions beyond the question of the return of prisoners.328 Dulles saw the talks as a 
way to let the situation calm down as the PRC focused on negotiations and he was 
quite content to let the talks drag on without leading to anything. 
 
Hammarskjöld’s actions had given Chou the false impression that the UN Secretary-
General did have some sort of mandate from the US to act as a “go-between”, a role 
Hammarskjöld actively sought. Dulles considered Hammarskjöld’s efforts as 																																																								
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“volunteer operations on a freewheeling basis”, a consideration apparently later 
shared by Chou once he realised that Hammarskjöld was not going to act as an 
intermediary. His attempt to fulfil the role as a “trusted consultant” and mediator was 
not accepted in Washington. The inherent right of the Secretary-General to form his 
own political opinion and act on it that Hammarskjöld deduced from the Charter and 
expressed in the “Peking formula” was not accepted by Washington and London. 
Hammarskjöld’s first real attempt to expand the political role of the Secretary-General 
and act as a mediator can therefore hardly be qualified as a success. Nevertheless, 
Hammarskjöld treated the “Peking formula” as a part of an evolving body of 




B The Hammarskjöld Mission to the Middle East in 1956 
B.1 From “Agent General” to Secretary-General 
On 15 January 1956, Hammarskjöld left New York for a tour through the Middle East 
and Asia.329 Hammarskjöld defined his tour as “a journey without a mission”.330 At 
the same time as Hammarskjöld toured the Middle East, a Texan businessman by the 
name of Bob Anderson was also travelling back and forth in the region. Officially, 
Anderson was on a business trip. But, unlike Hammarskjöld, Anderson’s journey had 
a mission; a secret mission that was part of an American-British initiative, code-
named Operation Alpha, for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Operation 
Alpha was a covert operation that aimed at convincing Egyptians and Israelis to 
consider a settlement through secret negotiations. Alpha eventually failed, in 
Anderson’s view mainly due to Nasser, who was not in a position to sell a peace plan, 
neither to his own people, nor to his fellow Arab leaders.331  
 
Faced with the definite failure of the Anderson mission and a deteriorating situation in 
the Middle East, the Americans and the British now had to come up with alternative 																																																								
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plans.332 The Americans came up with the idea of appointing a UN mediator “with 
substantial powers – greater, in fact, than those that were held by Count 
Bernadotte”.333 Both governments were in agreement that it was essential to find “a 
really good man” and the Americans suggested Ralph Bunche, Nobel Prize winner in 
1949 for his earlier mediation efforts in Palestine that resulted in the armistice 
agreements. Furthermore, Bunche’s appointment, as he was UN Undersecretary-
General, “would help to save the Secretary-General’s face”.334 Dixon, who knew 
Hammarskjöld best, had warned from the beginning that any attempt to appoint a 
special mediator “should have to be careful not to offend the susceptibilities of the 
Secretary-General”. Dixon correctly suspected that Hammarskjöld had “certain 
aspirations in the field of mediation”.335 After consultations with Hervé Alphand, the 
French representative, Lodge and Dixon presented the Agent General proposal to 
Hammarskjöld on 13 March 1956. 
 
Dixon had been right and Hammarskjöld’s first reactions were “decidedly hostile”. 
“At the risk […] of being misunderstood [Hammarskjöld] suggested that he was 
himself the only person available to the parties (and to the Russians) and whose 
intervention would not upset the existing machinery”.336 Hammarskjöld was offering 
his services under the “Peking formula”. The fact that Hammarskjöld seemed to have 
never contemplated sending Ralph Bunche also points toward his clear wish to fulfil 
the mission himself. Despite having the world’s foremost expert on the Palestine 
question, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize for his previous negotiations in 
Palestine, in an office next to his, Hammarskjöld never discussed the Middle East 
with Bunche prior to the last months of 1956.337  
 
Hammarskjöld’s strong protests derailed the idea for an “Agent General”. Acting 
Secretary of State Hoover told Eisenhower a little later that “Hammarskjold very 
much wanted to undertake the mission to the Middle East himself […] 
Hammarskjold’s efforts would probably prevent us from getting enough support for 
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our proposal for an independent Agent General.”338 The Foreign Office preferred the 
original idea, but since the Americans were not prepared to go through with it in the 
face of the opposition of Hammarskjöld they were “prepared to accept the Secretary-
General”. But, they “did not want to inflate his status or establish a precedent for his 
unsolicited intervention in other disputes”. “It is therefore important to ensure that he 
is specifically appointed by a Security Council resolution and that his terms of 
reference are clearly defined”. 339  Dixon acknowledged that Hammarskjöld “is 
undoubtedly a skilful negotiator and might achieve some results”, but recommended 
that the mandate should be limited to the implementation of the Armistice 
Agreements.340 In other words, they wanted to avoid a repetition of “Hammarskjold’s 
volunteer operations on a free-wheeling basis” in his dealings with Chou En-lai. 
 
A limited mandate was not, however, what Hammarskjöld had in mind. Over lunch 
the same day Hammarskjöld handed Dixon a memorandum with his objections to the 
original plan for an “Agent General” and “since he did not wish to be negative, his 
ideas about what he might do himself”.341  Hammarskjöld had explained his habit of 
drafting notes and memoranda on his own views to hand to member states informally 
to Dixon already in 1954. Hammarskjöld hoped, by these means, to influence the 
parties before they had finally decided on their own views. In the memorandum, 
which he called “an attempt at an objective analysis”, Hammarskjöld stressed that any 
new activity in the region “should be so organised as to lift it entirely outside the Cold 
War orbit”; a prerequisite for this was that it was accepted by the Soviet Union and 
not seen as an initiative by the Tripartite Powers. To achieve this, Hammarskjöld 
suggested that he, as Secretary-General, could bring the matter to the Security 
Council so that it would, formally, be the Secretary-General’s own initiative, thereby 
avoiding any association with any particular country. Regarding the terms of his 
mandate Hammarskjöld proposed that his functions should be expanded so as to cover 
“in the first instance an exploration together with the governments concerned about 
the possibilities of an intensified attack on the major problems within the framework 
of the United Nations”. This wording was broad enough to include an attempt at 																																																								
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solving the wider Arab-Israeli dispute. Hammarskjöld also added that he did not 
consider a formal decision necessary, hinting that he considered that it was already 
within his rights as Secretary-General to mediate in the conflict.342  
 
The memorandum increased Dixon’s misgivings about involving Hammarskjöld,343 
but he was not aware of the new tack in the Foreign Office, now only too happy to 
hand the problem over to the UN. The Foreign Office informed Dixon that there had 
been a change in their policy and they wanted to dilute the Tripartite Powers’ 
responsibility. “The intrusion of the Soviet Union, the arrival of Czech arms and the 
rapidly growing self-confidence of the Arab states have completely changed the 
situation […] The danger now is that the Arabs and the Israelis will start a war and 
that, under the Tripartite Declaration, we shall find ourselves arrayed on the side of 
Israel against the Arab States backed perhaps by the Soviet Union”. For these reasons 
the Foreign Office did “not object to the Secretary-General playing the bigger role for 
which he seems to have cast himself”. But the Foreign Office as well underlined that 
the task should be given to Hammarskjöld by the Security Council and they “should 
resist the suggestion that the proposed powers are inherent in his office”.344 
 
When Dixon met again with Lodge and Alphand on May 15, they agreed to draft a 
Security Council resolution to give the Secretary-General a limited mandate to go for 
a brief tour to the Middle East. Lodge regarded this as a lead-in to appointing an 
“Agent General” later. The three representatives also secured a “gentleman’s 
agreement” with Hammarskjöld that he would not report to the Security Council 
without prior discussion with them. 345  The Americans did not agree with 
Hammarskjöld’s idea that the Secretary-General should present it to the Security 
Council as his own initiative and preferred to sponsor the resolution themselves.346  
 
On 4 April 1956, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution that 
requested the Secretary-General “to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey 
of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four general 																																																								
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armistice agreements and the Council’s resolutions under reference”.347 The mandate 
was limited to the practical aspects of upholding the cease-fire and improving the 
border survey and left no room for discussion of other issues or attempts to explore a 
settlement.  
 
Hammarskjöld wasted no time in pointing out his own interpretation of his double 
competence as Secretary-General and mandated by the Security Council. In a press 
conference the same day, he stressed this double aspect and said that he went not only 
with the mandate from the Security Council, but in his capacity “as Secretary-
General” and it seemed that nothing was outside the scope of what the Secretary-
General could discuss. He explained his thinking in response to a question: 
 
“Your question gives me reason to explain perhaps a little bit more fully how I 
regard my own relationship, as Secretary-General, to the special mission. The 
special mission, I think, is very clear in its indication of limits. A question of the 
type you refer to here [flow of arms into the Middle East] is outside the field of 
the mission, undoubtedly. On the other hand, you must not forget that the 
Secretary-General remains the Secretary-General, and – something quite apart 
from the Security Council action, where I represent the Security Council – I have, 
of course, unlimited, my regular right to bring up with governments points which 
I think are worth consideration because they tend to complicate matters or 
increase tension.”348 
 
But Dulles was not going to rely on Hammarskjöld to keep the peace in the Middle 
East. The failure of the Anderson mission and operation Alpha and an increasing 
disillusionment with Nasser led to a new US policy code-named Omega. On 28 
March, Dulles presented the outlines of this new policy to Eisenhower in a 
memorandum. The various steps, to be coordinated with the British, aimed to isolate 
Nasser and build up Iraq and Saudi Arabia as alternative Arab leaders.349 The British 
had drawn the same conclusion, but to a greater extent: Eden now saw no alternative 
but to get rid of Nasser; a path that would lead to the Suez crisis.350  																																																								
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B.2 Negotiating Between Different Mandates 
Initially, in his meetings in the capitals of the Middle East, Hammarskjöld stuck to his 
mandate from the Security Council, discussing the implementation of the Armistice 
Agreements only.351 But soon he started nurturing the hope that negotiations on wider 
issues might be successful and he requested a secret meeting with Ben Gurion to 
explain why he thought Nasser was ready for a broader settlement.352 The Israeli 
leader was not very impressed when Hammarskjöld told him that he was convinced 
that Nasser’s main concern was not over land and territorial claims, but about 
refugees.353  
 
Hammarskjöld next returned to Cairo with hopes of discussing the issue of free 
navigation in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, a topic clearly outside his 
Security Council mandate. In order to avoid any Egyptian opposition to such 
discussions, Hammarskjöld, contacted the Americans, British, French and the Soviets 
through Cordier, and asked them to have their respective Ambassadors in Cairo 
confirm his right to hold such discussions in virtue of his role as Secretary-General. 
The verbatim note for the ambassadors that Hammarskjöld proposed read: “The 
Secretary-General, as agent of the Security Council, to my knowledge seems to have 
remained within the limit of his mandate, but as to what the Secretary-General might 
do on the basis of his constitutional rights as Secretary-General, I neither have reason 
to express opinions nor any cause now to submit the issue to my government which, 
in due time, may have to express its view on the personal policy of the Secretary-
General.”354 Dulles forwarded the message to Ambassador Byroade in Cairo with an 
explanatory note indicating that he understood that “Hammarskjold has throughout 
mission made careful distinction between his SC mandate and his constitutional rights 
as SYG. By this distinction he has avoided Israeli injection of Suez Canal into context 
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his negotiations to carry out SC mandate”.355 The British did not believe that 
Hammarskjöld would get anywhere by discussing wider issues such as the Suez 
Canal, but thought that he should “clearly be allowed to play his hand as he thinks 
best”.356 
 
The Egyptians clearly stated from the very beginning how they had agreed to talks 
with Hammarskjöld on the basis of the Security Council resolution and not on any 
other inherent power under the Charter.357 In private, however, the Egyptian foreign 
minister Mahmoud Fawzi told Hammarskjöld that formally the Egyptians demanded 
the immediate Israeli evacuation of El Auja, but politically they had a different stand 
where they regarded the evacuation of El Auja as part of a reciprocal step towards 
easing the tensions in the region. By separating the formal and the political stands, the 
Egyptians managed to look strong in the eyes of the other Arab states and avoided 
being tied down to positions they were not really interested in, while at the same time 
in private accommodating Hammarskjöld. When Hammarskjöld returned to Ben 
Gurion with this message, the Israeli leader, while still highly suspicious, realised that 
he could not get an assurance from the Egyptians, but yet demanded they at least 
would give one to the Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld thought this would be very 
difficult and as there was no clear way forward, he decided to “freeze the situation” 
and drafted a letter that Ben Gurion agreed to sign assuring that the Israelis would 
withdraw from El Auja if the blockade on the Suez Canal was lifted.358 This was 
Hammarskjöld acting in the role he had devised for himself in 1953, as a “clearing-
house” for governments.359 
 
On April 18, when the first reports came from Hammarskjöld’s negotiations it became 
clear that the Secretary-General had been “extending the scope of his mission into 
discussions about a possible overall settlement” according to the British Ambassador 
in Beirut, seemingly, with American support360 The British thought the Americans 
“had been talking a little out of turn”, but noted that Hammarskjöld “would probably 																																																								
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in any case have taken the opportunity of discussing wider issues with the Govts 
concerned”.361 The Americans had, however, not been talking out of turn as far as 
Dulles was concerned and on April 20 he presented a new proposal to the British. 
Having failed to get a Palestine settlement through operation Alpha, Dulles proposed 
to seek Russian consent to get a settlement through the UN. The British were 
enthusiastic about the idea and thought the opportunity was too good to be missed. 
For once the Americans, the British, the French and now also the Russians seemed 
open to make the UN responsible for peace in the Middle East; and at that very 
moment the Secretary-General of the UN was in the area “giving very definitively the 
impression that he has more to do and probably new suggestions to make”. The 
British hoped to use the occasion to get out of “some of the more embarrassing of our 
commitments, notably the Tripartite Declaration”. They decided to approach Bulganin 
and Khrushchev scheduled to visit London on April 20. It was also decided that no 
new initiatives should be taken in the UN without consulting Hammarskjöld.362 
Dulles was of the same mind and suggested that the British should steer the talks with 
Bulganin and Khrushchev to the Middle East and the UN as much as possible. “In 
order to test Soviet good will and sincerity”, Dulles further suggested that the British 
should ascertain “whether the Soviets would give substance to their statement by 
supporting a Security Council resolution which would call upon Hammarskjöld, 
following his return and report upon his present mission, to consult the parties to the 
armistices and make recommendations concerning elements of a just settlement”.363  
 
The Anglo-Russian meeting in London boded well for Hammarskjöld’s mission. The 
Soviets even publicly committed themselves, through an Anglo-Soviet joint 
communiqué, to support United Nations action both in regard to keeping the peace in 
the area, and in seeking a “peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis”. The 
British thought this would strengthen Hammarskjöld’s hand in his current efforts and 
also encourage him to come forward with ideas towards the latter on his return from 
the Middle East, especially since the British were well aware that “he has been giving 
thought to this wider fundamental problem”. The British decided that the first step 
would be to consult Hammarskjöld on his return to New York.364 There now seemed 																																																								
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to be a consensus for strong UN action and the Foreign Office in London thought 
Hammarskjöld “is the right person to prepare and perhaps to launch this”.365 Dulles 
was adamant that they should consult Hammarskjöld before any further steps.366 It 
seemed that Hammarskjöld was now finally cast to play the role he had wanted all 
along. Everybody was now waiting with excitement about what ideas for further steps 
the Secretary-General would bring back from the Middle East. They were in for a 
disappointment.  
 
Hammarskjöld published his interim report on 3 May. The report concluded that a 
cease-fire had been established and that proposals had been put forward for 
strengthening border security under the Armistice Agreements. In the end, 
Hammarskjold did not manage to secure more than an adherence to the cease-fire 
agreements. On the other hand, this was what the Security Council mandate had asked 
of him and, considering the initial situation he faced on his arrival, this was an 
achievement. In the press the Hammarskjold Mission was hailed as a great success.367   
 
On his return to New York Hammarskjöld told the representatives of the three 
Western powers that he thought he had achieved a period of calm of perhaps two or 
three months, but he was pessimistic of further moves and “did not seem to visualise 
any further role for himself”. Hammarskjöld also told them that his “’eyes had been 
opened’ on Nasser, but [he] liked Fawzi, [and] got along splendidly with Ben 
Gurion”.368 His idea was that the three Western powers should try, with as much 
support as could be obtained from the Soviets, to use the period of calm his mission 
had achieved to try and solve some of the other pressing issues that he thought should 
be attacked on a piecemeal basis.369 In the Foreign Office they noted that “The 
Secretary-General is disappointing, but maybe it may be a gain that his ego is 
deflated”.370 Over the next days, Hammarskjöld confided in private to Dixon that he 
had returned “profoundly depressed” from the Middle East.371 Despite the fact that 
they “got along splendidly” he found Ben Gurion’s “basic attitude however shocked 																																																								
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him deeply”. Hammarskjöld felt that he “had had a very rough time and had to resort 
to methods very different from his favourite quiet diplomacy in order to achieve as 
much as he did. Several times he said it felt like being in a madhouse, and constantly 
stressed how often he had been obliged to thump the table and deliver ultimatums”.372 
 
On 10 May, Hammarskjöld gave his full report to the Security Council. It dealt at 
length with the cease-fire, the question of general compliance with the armistice 
agreements, local arrangements and also included passages on the Banat Yacub 
Canal, El Auja and the Suez Canal blockade. Hammarskjöld concluded that the re-
establishment of a full compliance with the cease-fire “represents a stage that has to 
be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues”. Hammarskjöld 
reported that the parties had agreed to the general cease-fire clause without retaliation 
(although the British noted that it was not clear how far the parties accepted this 
interpretation).373  
 
In addition to his official report, Hammarskjöld handed a dossier on his negotiations 
on the El Auja-Suez Canal Nexus to the British for the attention of Selwyn Lloyd. 
Hammarskjöld thought he could get Nasser to unilaterally withdraw troops from 
Sinai, which would give Ben Gurion cause to evacuate El Auja and the Egyptians 
could in turn lift the blockade. The British agreed that it was worthwhile to let 
Hammarskjöld explore this, although all the Middle East experts, from Trevelyan to 
Shuckburgh, thought Nasser would never have done so.374 Hammarskjöld ended his 
letter by saying that he had “dropped all diplomatic inhibitions” in speaking so openly 
with Lloyd and that he had done so because he considered it essential that they could 
“see eye to eye” and consult before “any of the big powers come out in the field”.375 
Lloyd instructed Dixon to keep Hammarskjöld informed of their consultations with 
the Americans and the French “and make sure that he is in agreement with the course 
of action proposed”.376 (This general instruction related to the tactical choices and not 
to the long-term strategy of Omega, of which Hammarskjöld was unaware.)  
 																																																								
372 Saving telegram No. 124 from UKUN (Dixon) to FO 8 May 1956, FO 371/121739. 
373 Letter from Ramsbotham to E.M. Rose 12 May 1956, FO 371/121737 VR1074/242. 
374 Minutes of meeting by P.H. Laurence 22 May 1956, VR1074/246, FO 371/121740. 
375 Letter from Hammarskjöld to Selwyn Lloyd 14 May 1956, FO 371/121740 VR1074/246. 
376 Telegram from FO to UKUN 17 May 1956, FO 371/121740 VR1074/246. 
	 102	
B.3 “Continued Good Offices” 
Dixon suggested that the Security Council should convene to keep up the momentum 
and suggested that they should ask Hammarskjöld to continue his good offices on the 
present lines towards full compliance with the Armistice Agreements and possibly 
towards a special issue such as the El Auja/Suez Canal deal that could be said to fall 
within the Armistice Agreements. Dixon thought that if the Soviets would agree to 
this, the Egyptians might find it hard not to discuss it.377 London agreed and asked 
Dixon to consult both the Americans and the French and, if they agreed, to take the 
Soviet representative into their consultations to the furthest extent possible.378 But the 
situation was deteriorating again and on 16 May the New York Times published an 
article about the difficulties the Israelis were making regarding arrangements in the 
Gaza strip as had been agreed to with Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld was “furious 
with the Israelis” and sent a strongly worded letter to Ben Gurion. He told the British 
that this made it imperative that a Security Council meeting be held fast to put a 
stamp of approval on his report or else he feared the parties would go back on even 
the few substantial agreements he had so painstakingly got out of them.379  
 
The Americans were looking for “something dramatic” and on 21 May, 
Hammarskjöld was “greatly disturbed” by a conversation with Lodge who suggested 
a reversion to the old idea of appointing an Agent General. Hammarskjöld asked 
Dixon to “hold the Americans in check”380and on 22 May, presented Dixon with a 
new memorandum containing “next steps”. Hammarskjöld told Dixon that one of his 
objectives in drafting it had been “to prevent the United States from taking any 
dramatic action and to stop them wobbling about future policy”.381 The “next steps” 
were the same as Hammarskjöld had recommended before with additional 
motivations. In regards to an Agent General, Hammarskjöld wrote that “No agent 
would be able to take up on the spot the threads where I left them, and no agent would 
have greater chances than those I give myself”.382 Hammarskjöld was adamant that he 
should remain the mediator. After consulting with the Americans and the French, 																																																								
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Dixon managed to get them to agree to a draft resolution that recommended 
Hammarskjöld’s report and simply called on him “to continue his good offices”, but 
without spelling out what he was really to do.  
 
What had happened to turn Dixon into a supporter of giving Hammarskjöld a free 
rein? Due to the close partnership with the British, Dixon felt sure that Hammarskjöld 
would consult with them on all important occasions while at the same time he was no 
longer showing signs of spectacular independent initiatives.   
A sort of symbiosis had developed whereby Hammarskjöld consulted with the British 
in advance on his plans and the British supported Hammarskjöld’s ideas in 
discussions with the Americans and Dixon urged the Foreign Office to take great care 
not to reveal the extent to which Hammarskjöld was taking the British into his 
confidence to the Americans, the French or anyone else.383 Giving Hammarskjöld a 
free rein, now that the British felt sure they would be consulted on all steps, was also 
a way to keep some control of the UN process while keeping the Soviets out.  
 
Hammarskjöld had planned to go from a meeting in Geneva to his country house in 
Sweden at the end of July.  But in the evening of 26 July 1956 Nasser nationalised the 
Suez Canal Company triggering the chain of events that would lead to the Suez crisis 
and a new role for Hammarskjöld. As Hammarskjöld put it, “henceforth, all we do 
will be in the shadow of the Suez Canal”. 
 
The Hammarskjöld Mission was not a case of “Leave-it-to-Dag” mentality on behalf 
of the Western powers, an idea made popular by media accounts and Hammarskjöld’s 
many biographers. On the contrary, it is a textbook example of how Hammarskjöld 
put into practice the methods he had developed in theory for making the Secretary-
General more influential. Building on the “Peking formula” Hammarskjöld claimed 
that the “Secretary-General”, as such and in virtue of his role, had a mandate to 
discuss any issue threatening world peace. He managed to steer the three Western 
members of the Security Council into accepting the Secretary-General as mediator 
instead of their preferred first choice of appointing an “Agent General”. 																																																								
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Hammarskjöld achieved this by proactively setting out his own ideas and arguing 
strongly against proposals to appoint other mediators.  
 
Hammarskjöld’s initial choice to expand negotiations in the Middle East was taken 
consciously against the wishes of the British and the Americans, who did not accept 
his view of the Secretary-General and were adamant that he should act only on a 
politically circumscribed mandate from the Security Council. But it was a rather safe 
gamble. As long as Hammarskjöld produced solutions acceptable to the parties, these 
would have been accepted by the Western powers. Out of political expediency, the 
Americans and the British later accepted, with some reluctance, Hammarskjöld’s 
“inherent rights” as Secretary-General. This meant that a precedent had now been 
established, unlike Hammarskjöld’s dealings with Chou En-lai, which remained 
“volunteer operations on a free-wheeling basis”. But unlike his negotiations under the 
Security Council mandate, where Hammarskjöld could pressure the parties into public 
agreements to respect the cease-fire, for the expanded discussions under his mandate 
as Secretary-General Hammarskjöld relied only on his “quiet diplomacy”. This 
approach, which Hammarskjöld saw as an open discussion about possibilities, was 
limited by the seriousness of the intent of his interlocutors and the lack of any means 
to pressure them into concessions. Hammarskjöld relied too much on his personal 
contact with the parties. Hammarskjöld was very impressed by Fawzi and tended to 
believe Nasser was more open to concessions than he was. Hammarskjöld’s views on 
the personalities in the Middle East would greatly influence his handling of the Suez 
Crisis and how it was perceived by the different actors. The fact that he was also kept 
in the dark regarding much of US and UK policy – including Alpha and Omega – also 
meant that his prospects for success were limited. Nevertheless, Hammarskjöld had 
now managed to establish himself as an impartial mediator and trusted consultant to 
governments that corresponded to his early view of the political role of the Secretary-
General. This enabled Hammarskjöld to become a central actor in the Suez crisis, 
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Chapter 4: The Secretary-General as “a force” 
In his valedictory dispatch, written in 1960 and summing up his experience at the 
United Nations, Sir Pierson Dixon described how “United States policy is caught 
between the horns of a perpetual dilemma: the need on the one hand to support its 
major allies, such as ourselves and France, in pursuance of its major interest in halting 
Communist encroachments; and on the other hand its instinctive desire, arising in part 
from its own past, to be on the side of the anti-colonial countries”.384 With the 
admission of many newly independent countries to the General Assembly, the issue of 
decolonization came to dominate a General Assembly characterised by a growing 
bloc of Afro-Asian countries that wanted to position themselves between the two 
blocs in the Cold War. Hammarskjöld managed to see how the Secretary-General 
could find a new political role at a time when the UN could no longer be effectively 
controlled by the US. Suez was the catalyst for this development as it showed both the 
risk of a split between the West and the Third-World and the new importance of the 
General Assembly, but Suez also demonstrated how Hammarskjöld could be 
instrumental in allowing the Americans to ride both horns of their dilemma through 
the UN.  
 
 
A The Suez Crisis as a Catalyst for a New Role for Hammarskjöld 
A.1 Hammarskjöld and the Americans at Suez: Cold War Priorities and Colonial 
Problems 
At the outset of the Suez crisis Hammarskjöld told the British that “[i]f the Suez crisis 
led to the disappearance of Nasser, so much the better”.385 He worried though that 
Suez could turn into a confrontation between the colonial powers and the Third-
World and for once, Hammarskjöld and Dulles were on the same page. Both feared 
that Suez would develop a “Europe v. Asia complexion”, that would certainly be 
exploited by the Soviets.386 Regardless of their common dislike for Nasser, they both 
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worked together for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. After long discussions, Dulles, 
Lloyd and the French foreign minister Christian Pineau, agreed that Lloyd and Pineau 
should hold private discussions with the Egyptian foreign minister Fawzi in 
Hammarskjöld’s office, with the active presence of Hammarskjöld.387 Dulles urged 
the UN secretary General to play an active role in the talks and Hammarskjöld 
reported on the progress of the talks to the Americans.388 The main result of the talks 
was a set of six principles, drafted by Hammarskjöld, based on the outcome of the 
discussions. Dulles managed to get the six principles adopted in the Security Council 
over the obstruction of Eden, a first example of what was to come.389  
 
Dulles thought that it had been a “great gain” that the Soviets had agreed to endorse 
the talks in New York and if this was not “nailed down” in the Security Council they 
“might never again have the opportunity to keep the Soviets out of the talks”.390 The 
new Soviet foreign minister Shepilov was also growing angry at not having a greater 
role. 391  Dulles promoted further substantive discussions under “Hammarskjöld’s 
auspices” and further talks were scheduled in Geneva.392 Dulles was, however, 
growing increasingly worried about what the British and the French were really up to 
and felt that “they are deliberately keeping us in the dark”; alarming reports of Israeli 
mobilisations were also coming in.393 What neither Hammarskjöld, nor the Americans 
knew was that on 24 October, British, French and Israeli representatives had met 
secretly in Sèvres and agreed on a concerted attack on Egypt. Israel would invade the 
Sinai and push towards the Suez Canal, while Britain and France would then issue 
ultimatums to both Israel and Egypt to withdraw 10 miles from the Canal and accept a 
British-French police force to safeguard the canal. Cairo was to accept the ultimatum, 
or the British and the French would begin military operations against Egypt. On 29 
October, the day scheduled for talks to take place in Geneva, Israel launched its 
attack. When the news reached Hammarskjöld, he immediately stated that, if 
necessary, he would take the new crisis before the Security Council, by his own 																																																								
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initiative, under Article 99.394 Later that evening State Department instructed the US 
mission to the UN to seek an urgent meeting of the Security Council the next 
morning. Hammarskjöld agreed to the American suggestion at once.395 
 
When the Security Council met the following day, on October 30, Lodge presented a 
resolution calling on Israel to stop military action and withdraw behind the armistice 
lines. After the Yugoslav and Iranian representatives had spoken in support of the 
American resolution, the Soviet representative Arkady Sobolev read out a news wire 
he had just received with the first report of the British and French ultimatum declaring 
their intention to intervene to protect the canal. All present were shocked, not least 
Dixon and the French permanent representative de Guiringaud, who had not been 
informed in advance. When the Security Council reconvened in the afternoon, Dixon 
read out Eden’s official speech with the ultimatum to the Security Council and urged 
Lodge not to press the American resolution. Lodge nonetheless presented the 
resolution to a vote. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, Britain and 
France then proceeded to veto an American resolution. The Soviets then proposed a 
similar resolution that was also vetoed. In the same afternoon the British and the 
French had vetoed both an American and a Soviet resolution. Faced with this 
deadlock in the Security Council, Yugoslavia proposed to call an emergency session 
of the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution. The “Uniting for 
Peace” procedure had first been used during the Korean War to avoid a veto and 
permitted a situation to be referred to the General Assembly if the Security Council 
failed “to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security”. As the referral to the General Assembly was considered a 
procedural question the British and the French could not veto this. Dixon moved that 
the Yugoslav resolution was out of order, but was voted down. The Americans also 
supported bringing the crisis to the General Assembly.396 
 
When the Security Council again met in the afternoon the next day, the UN Secretary 
General made a declaration that Lodge called “a major bomb”.397 In Hammarskjöld’s 
words it “gave the attentive reader an idea […] of the small personal side of the great 																																																								
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tragedy that we have all become the troubled witnesses to”.398 He first stated that he 
would have taken the initiative to call a meeting of the Security Council on his own 
had not the Americans done so, and then continued: 
 
“The principles of the Charter are, by far, greater than the Organization in which 
they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are holier than the 
policies of any single nation or people. As a servant of the Organization, the 
Secretary-General has the duty to maintain his usefulness by avoiding public stands 
on conflicts between Member Nations unless and until such an action might help to 
resolve the conflict. However, the discretion and impartiality thus imposed on the 
Secretary-General by the character of his immediate task, may not generate into a 
policy of expediency. He must also be a servant of the principles of the Charter, and 
its aims must ultimately determine what for him is right and wrong. For that he must 
stand. A Secretary-General cannot serve on any other assumption than that – within 
the necessary limits of human frailty and honest differences of opinion – all Member 
Nations honor their pledge to observe all articles of the Charter. He should also be 
able to assume that those organs which are charged with the task of upholding the 
Charter will be in a position to fulfill their task. 
The bearing of what I have just said must be obvious to all without any elaboration 
from my side. Were the Members to consider that another view of the duties of the 
Secretary-General than the one here stated would better serve the interests of the 
Organization, it is their obvious right to act accordingly”.399 
 
Why did Hammarskjöld make this statement of principles? Dixon told Hammarskjöld 
that he “wasn’t playing fair” (Pearson told Hammarskjöld the same thing)400; to which 
Hammarskjöld responded that it was not Dixon’s place to speak of “playing fair”.401 
According to Urquhart, Hammarskjöld never intended to resign, and showed the 
statement in advance to the permanent members of the Council. He had carefully 
planned his words to “make them as politically effective as possible” to both set a 
precedent for the Secretary-General to act only on the basis of the principles of the 
Charter and to bolster his credentials ahead of the special emergency session of the 																																																								
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General Assembly that had already been convened at the time of his speech.402 Both 
Lodge and Lester Pearson seem to have thought that the threat to resign was seriously 
meant and encouraged Hammarskjöld to carry on. 403  The direct effect of 
Hammarskjöld’s speech was words of approval and concurrence in his view of his 
functions from all the present representatives, including Dixon and de Guiringaud.  
 
The National Security Council met on 1 November to discuss the American response 
to the new turn of events. Dulles outlined the crucial nature of the General Assembly 
special session:  
 
“For many years now the United States has been walking a tightrope between the 
effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies 
on the one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and 
understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from 
colonialism […] in view of the overwhelming Asian and African pressure upon us, 
we could not walk this tightrope much longer. Unless we now assert and maintain 
this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the 
USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist 
policies.”404 
 
To Dulles and Eisenhower, this was a fight the British and the French could not win 
and the quicker they realised it the better. Eisenhower instructed Dulles to try and stop 
the situation from deteriorating by drafting a resolution that would be as mild as 
possible to the British and the French.405 
 
 
A.2 Hammarskjöld and the Americans tame the General Assembly 
At five o’clock, when the first emergency session of the General Assembly met, 
Dulles introduced a resolution urging the parties to agree to a cease-fire that was 
adopted.406 Canada abstained and Lester Pearson explained that they would have 
preferred a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to start making arrangements 																																																								
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for a UN force to keep the borders at peace while a political settlement was worked 
out and Dulles made very clear that he would support such a proposal.407 Pearson’s 
idea was to create a UN force, overseen by a committee of five, that would initially be 
comprised mainly of the Anglo-French force now prepared to invade Egypt. 
Hammarskjöld was initially very sceptical of Pearson’s idea and the Americans 
shared his scepticism.408 Eisenhower did not want the British and French to get ashore 
in Egypt and proposed to “get the Secretary-General into the act” to stop this. Lodge 
was instructed to “sell” the plan to Hammarskjöld and then to Pearson.409 Lodge’s 
deputy, James Barco asked Hammarskjöld to support an American resolution calling 
for the Secretary-General to prepare a UN force. Hammarskjöld assured Barco that he 
would support the American proposal.410 Lodge also managed to sell the resolution to 
Pearson who agreed to introduce it as a Canadian resolution. Hammarskjöld was “all 
for it” and “would push for it”. 411  From the beginning of the Suez crisis 
Hammarskjöld had been in close contact with the Americans and during the 
emergency session these contacts became even closer. Barco described the 
relationship in the following words: 
 
“during the period of Suez, where in a way the American delegation and 
[Hammarskjöld] were working as a team, and one didn’t take a step without the 
other one’s knowing it. We both consulted. We showed each other our drafts and 
proposals and discussed the negotiating position and so forth. That time was an 
extremely close relationship, up to a point.”412 
 
In another long-haul meeting, in the early hours of 4 November, the General 
Assembly adopted the Canadian resolution alongside a resolution sponsored by 19 
Afro-Asian countries that authorised the Secretary-General to implement the cease-
fire, called for earlier on by the American resolution.413 Hammarskjöld immediately 
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set to work and already on the afternoon of 4 November Eisenhower was informed 
that “great progress was being made by Hammarskjold”.414 
 
Ever weary of Hammarskjöld’s ambitions for his office, on 5 November Dixon noted 
in his diary how he “got the impression that [Hammarskjöld] was fascinated by the 
idea of building up a UN police force under his command”.415 Nonetheless, he 
recommended the “Pearson-Hammarskjöld plan” the same day with the motivation 
that it might be difficult to manage the General Assembly, and especially the Afro-
Asian bloc.416 Initially, the British assumed that the UN force would consist mainly of 
British and French troops. When they realised that this was not the case they tried to 
obstruct until the Americans put additional pressure on them. During November 7, 
Eisenhower told Eden on several occasions that “we are committed to 
Hammarskjold’s plan—& very definitely” and finally persuaded the British to accept 
that the UN Force would not include British or French troops.417 The French were 
happy to leave the responsibility for setting up the UN force in the hands of the 
Secretary-General.418 Eisenhower now thought that it was of “critical importance” to 
get Hammarskjöld to move ahead “as rapidly as possible to get the peace force in 
position”.419 The reason behind the haste was the American anxiety that the Soviets 
could still try and turn the situation to their advantage, as Eisenhower pointed out “the 
Bear is still the central enemy”.420  
 
Hammarskjöld and the Americans were determined not to have any British or French 
troops in the UN force as this would never be accepted by the Egyptians. To make it 
more palatable, Hammarskjöld, in a suggestion that would later be referred to as a key 
peacekeeping principle, put forward the idea that none of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council should provide troops to the UN force. The principle was not, 
however, born at Suez. In discussions regarding a potential strengthening of UNTSO 
already in March 1956 Hammarskjöld suggested that none of the permanent five 																																																								
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should participate with the express purpose to avoid an unwanted Soviet 
participation.421 Keeping Soviet, or communist, troops out of the UN force was still a 
major objective for Hammarskjöld at Suez and he now applied the same principle. 
When Romanian and Czechoslovakian units were offered for the UN force 
Hammarskjöld informed the Americans he was turning them down.422 Nor did he like 
asking the Yugoslavs “although he might mention possibility to them expecting 
refusal”. Hammarskjöld told the Americans that he would like to tell the General 
Assembly, in case it would be difficult to get the UN force in place quickly, that “the 
US would consider supplying a number of forces as a stop-gap and temporarily”. 
Hammarskjöld did not think that the Soviets, Arabs, UK or France would object to 
this as “obviously the US had no intention of occupying bases in Arab world”.423 This 
idea came to nothing, but it illustrates how Hammarskjöld applied his “principles” 
and a certain naivety on his part as to how the role of the US was viewed in the UN. 
Hammarskjöld’s principle that UN forces should not include troops from  the 
permanent five members was designed to keep out Soviet and communist troops. 
When the Egyptians protested against Canadian troops as being both members of 
NATO and close to Britain, Hammarskjöld was unyielding.424 In the Suez case, it was 
also used to keep out British and French troops, but this was caused by the 
circumstances, the motive behind the principle was to keep out communists. At the 
same time this was also how Eisenhower was trying to sell the idea to Eden.425 The 
Americans provided the crucial logistical support for the UN force and this would 
also become a standard for UN peacekeeping operations under Hammarskjöld, with 
dire consequences for his independence.  
On the afternoon of 7 November, Lodge told Hammarskjöld that Eisenhower had 
spoken with Eden, Mollet, Nehru and St. Laurent and told them “to get 100 per cent 
behind the SYG [Secretary-General]”, and in return the Secretary General asked 
Lodge to give Eisenhower “officially and personally, a message of his deep 
appreciation for the full support” he had received throughout the crisis. 
Hammarskjöld also agreed completely with the need for a speedy withdrawal to avoid 																																																								
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providing the Soviets with an excuse to move in. Later in the afternoon, Cordier 
informed Lodge that Hammarskjöld would arrange for a resolution to be introduced 
“probably by Sweden, Ecuador, Ceylon, Burma and some others” that would approve 
his plan for a UN force as put forth in his final report.426 Asking small “neutral” 
countries to introduce resolutions that had effectively been drafted by the Secretary-
General would also become a standard procedure for Hammarskjöld.  
The same day the General Assembly adopted two resolutions. The first resolution 
approved Hammarskjöld’s principles for establishing the first armed peacekeeping 
force ever, UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) and authorised him to establish 
an Advisory Committee to help him.427 This meant that no further consultation of the 
Assembly was needed as this was now delegated to the Advisory Committee, chaired 
by Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld was thus left to his own devices, which he much 
preferred. The Canadians would later tell the Americans that they “were most 
impressed with effective way [the Advisory Committee] had proceeded and with way 
it permitted Hammarskjold [to] utilize his talents to fullest in admittedly complex 
operation”. 428  The Advisory Committee contained reliable supporters of the 
Secretary-General, such as Lester Pearson and the Norwegian Hans Engen.  
In his study of the meetings of the Advisory Committee, Fröhlich describes them as 
long monologues by Hammarskjöld (or Cordier in his absence). Instead of a vote 
system, Hammarskjöld insisted that he would simply sum up the discussion for the 
record at which point any member was free to make a reservation; Hammarskjöld 
later boasted that there had never been any reservation.429 The Americans were happy 
to let Hammarskjöld proceed with as little interference as possible rather than leaving 
it to the “acrimonious debate” in the General Assembly.430  
Hammarskjöld’s “magnificent work under conditions of almost unbelievable 
pressure”, in the words of Lester Pearson, was the instrument through which the Suez 
crisis was resolved.431 The powers behind it, however, were Eisenhower and Dulles. 																																																								
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To the Americans, Hammarskjöld offered a way to continue to walk the tightrope 
between their colonial European allies and the Third-World emerging countries, yet 
avoiding a dangerous rift that the Soviets could have exploited. While Hammarskjöld 
and the UN were to all appearance solving the crisis it was really Eisenhower and 
Dulles who forced the parties to agree to the Secretary General’s proposals. In 
Dulles’s words “Hammarskjold is the fellow who has the titular responsibility […] 
but the fact of the matter is the effective power behind this thing is the US”. Although 
worried that Hammarskjöld was not being forceful enough, Dulles deferred to his 
judgment and took a backseat until called upon. During Suez Dulles instructed Lodge 
to inform Hammarskjöld that if “there is anything he wants done” he should just 
inform Dulles.432 
Regarding the overall political consequences of the Suez crisis both Hammarskjöld 
and the Americans viewed the crisis primarily through a Cold War lens. Whether 
Hammarskjöld was aware of Omega or not, he told the Americans in November 1956 
that they should work with “stable elements in Arab world” to build up a reaction 
against Nasser, in favour of a settlement of Palestine.433 Until the Palestine question 
was solved “the possibilities of unrest and of Soviet activity would persist”.434 From 
the beginning of the Suez crisis to the end, Hammarskjöld saw Nasser and Soviet 
activities as the problem and he saw his own role as helping the British and the 
French to extricate themselves from the mess they had gotten themselves into, as it 
risked pitting the colonial powers against the “Third World”, making the latter 
vulnerable to Soviet influence.  
 
 
A.3 “He had become a force” 
In the conclusion to his great study of the Suez crisis, Kyle states that “The 
organisation which emerged with enhanced credit from the whole crisis was the 
United Nations; the individual was Dag Hammarskjöld.”435 Dixon wrote that as a 
result of Suez, Hammarskjöld had become “more than a symbol or even an executive; 
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he had become a force”.436 But this was only made possible by the unwavering 
support of the American administration. Barco, who had been working closely with 
Hammarskjöld throughout Suez, claimed “that two men or three men made Mr. 
Hammarskjold the force that he was: they were Lodge, Dulles and Eisenhower”.437 
 
Ever cautious of Hammarskjöld’s expanding political role, Dixon had warned already 
on 7 November 1956 that “we may find it inconvenient to have to deal with a 
Secretary-General who will be elevated to the status of a Pope with temporal as well 
as spiritual powers”.438 During the Suez crisis Dixon would say of him: “In the first 
place he is a very obstinate creature with a unique gift for combining high moral 
principles with an obscurity of thought and expression, which makes it almost 
impossible sometimes to understand what he is saying, let alone what he is driving 
at”.439 According to Douglas Hurd, first secretary at the British UN mission during 
Suez, the British felt that they owed Hammarskjöld a great deal but increasingly 
started to feel that “with his moods and his obscurity and his pontifical outlook [he] is 
really exasperating”. 440 According to Hurd “it became clear that another aspect of his 
character was coming to the fore: “I remember my boss Pierson Dixon making a 
comparison which often people made in those days where he talked about 
Hammarskjöld as having a pontifical manner. And that was not a word chosen at 
random. It was a suggestion that the Secretary-General of the UN was gradually 
working himself into the position of a pope. That is to say he was gradually assuming, 
not precisely infallibility, but an assumption in his own mind that he had a mission: 
and the mission was to uphold the role, importance and integrity of the United 
Nations and the Secretary-General was the high priest”.441 Many noted a change in 
Hammarskjöld according to Hurd: “Parallels with Thomas Becket or with Sir Thomas 
More would not be exact, but, like them, Hammarskjöld began to place himself on a 
different moral plane to the representatives of temporal governments. He alone was 
the custodian of the United Nations Charter, and of the values and interests of the 
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international community. Article 99 of the Charter, by his own liberal interpretation, 
gave him the right to intervene wherever he thought it necessary”.442 
 
The reference to Thomas Becket is interesting. Hammarskjöld was very familiar with 
T.S. Eliot’s play “Murder in the Cathedral” about Becket and he had even made 
reference to the “temptations of Becket” in a speech at ECOSOC in 1955. In Eliot’s 
play, Becket’s last temptation is martyrdom to which Becket replies: 
 
“The last temptation is the greatest treason: 
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.” 
 
The play is ambiguous as to whether Becket succumbs to the last temptation or not 
and later Becket says: 
 
“For those who serve the greater cause may make the cause serve them,  
Still doing right: and striving with political men 
May make that cause political, not by what they do 
But by what they are. I know” 
 
Hammarskjöld knew about this temptation. Markings is full of remarks where he 
chastises himself for his ambition. He had an “affinity for the role of an independent 
world statesman” as Barco related: “I’m sure he did enjoy that role. I think he took to 
it, increasingly, and he must have known it had its dangers”.443 In his memoirs 
Urquhart wrote that after Suez “a certain hubris was setting in”, a “slightly 
evangelistic tone […] had begun to creep into some of Hammarskjöld’s utterances 
and attitudes […] I was sometimes uneasy at the possibility that Hammarskjöld might 
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B Hammarskjöld’s Development of an Independent Political Role 
B.1 The Vacuum Theory 
In his speech to the General Assembly after his reelection for a second term on 26 
September 1957, Hammarskjöld first stated that he did not believe that the Secretary-
General should be asked to act by the Member States, if no guidance for his action is 
to be found either in the Charter or in the decisions of the main organs of the UN”, but 
added at the same time: “On the other hand, I believe that it is in keeping with the 
philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General should be expected to act also 
without such guidance, should this appear to him necessary in order to help in filling 
any vacuum that may appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional 
diplomacy provide for the safeguarding of peace and security”.445 This meant that 
when Hammarskjöld himself deemed it necessary, he could act independently, 
apparently based only on his own judgment, in any situation when the Security 
Council or the General Assembly did not. In 1959 he developed his ideas further, in a 
speech in Copenhagen, to argue outright for a practice that might open the door “to a 
more generally recognized independent influence for the Organization as such in the 
political evolution”.446 
 
The first example of Hammarskjöld intervening in a “vacuum” came in 1958 with the 
crises in Lebanon and Jordan.447 Resistance to Lebanese President Chamoun’s attempt 
to amend the constitution to seek a new term led to a crisis which was brought to the 
Security Council as Lebanon complained of infiltration from the UAR. Hammarskjöld 
set up a Lebanon Observation Group (UNOGIL). After Brigadier Kaseem’s coup in 
Baghdad, interpreted as the beginning of a Communist inspired takeover of the 
Middle East by forces inspired or aligned with Nasser, the Americans sent 10,000 
marines to Lebanon. Hammarskjöld attempted to expand UNOGIL as a face-saving 
device to allow the Americans to withdraw.448 Faced with a Soviet veto in the 
Security Council, Hammarskjöld referred to his vacuum theory and set up a UN 
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presence on his own initiative as Secretary-General.449 There was even a joke among 
journalists in New York at the time: “you know what happens to a vacuum, don’t 
you? Mr. Hammarskjöld fills it!”450 To many, not least Macmillan, the British-
American intervention in Lebanon and Jordan was a successful remake of Suez.451 
Successful, because this time the British had managed to avoid being cast adrift by the 
Americans and getting Hammarskjöld on board. As Dixon described it: “This episode 
encourages the belief that firm Anglo-American action in the Middle East, with the 
help of Mr. Hammarskjold, can be successfully piloted through the United Nations 
machinery and thus deal effectively with a dangerous situation.”452  
 
Despite the successful Lebanese episode, the General Assembly was still considered a 
major problem for British UN strategy, and the problem was only likely to grow with 
the admission of new members, most of them small countries with a distinct anti-
colonial disposition. The conclusion for the British was, as Dixon put it in his Annual 
Report for 1958, that the “United Nations is becoming a less and less reliable 
instrument for Western policies. With the introduction of an increasing number of 
new members in the next few years this tendency must be expected to grow.” There 
were two reasons for this hollowing out of support for Western policies: first, the 
“great political importance which Member States attach to Colonial questions”; and, 
secondly, that “the general effect of the additional membership has been to increase 
the number of uncommitted countries who view with distaste and fear the continuing 
struggle between the Western and Communist powers and are interested only in the 
promotion of world conditions which will eliminate the risk of war between the 
advanced states and favour their own advancement to an equality in material well-
being with the more highly industrialised countries”.453 
 
Hammarskjöld was quick to pick up on this sentiment. He focused on technical 
assistance and development aid and cultivated his image as a leader of the “neutrals” 
in the UN. Georges-Picot, Hammarskjöld’s old nemesis who had returned as French 
permanent representative, reported to Paris that the Secretary-General’s Annual 																																																								
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Report for 1957 “shows, at times, aspects of a veritable electoral manifesto for the 
small states”. He also noted that “Hammarskjöld seems to have developed a taste for 
the role of the itinerant ambassador of the United Nations. We should therefore 
expect, over the coming years, to see him accept, or provoke with the help of the 
General Assembly, or even undertake by his own initiative, missions of this nature, 
with a certitude, nonetheless that he will veil himself in all possible legal 
safeguards”.454 But there were also those who saw that the new political role of the 
Secretary-General could be in their interest.  
 
 
B.2 “Mr. Hammarskjold’s prestige and influence” 
In order to win the day in the General Assembly, the Secretary-General was seen as a 
valuable support. In 1958, Dixon reported that “The Office of the Secretary-General, 
as interpreted by Mr. Hammarskjold, is the only institution of the United Nations 
which has grown in influence and scope during the year”. 455 In both the Annual 
Reports for 1957 and 1958, the Minutes in the Foreign Office show that the sections 
on the Secretary-General were seen as among the most important, in stark contrast to 
Dixon’s first Annual Report for 1954, which had not even mentioned the Secretary-
General. The Secretary-General was influential in his own right, for taking initiatives 
such as in the Lebanon crisis. The difficulty of reaching precise agreements in the 
General Assembly and the Security Council often led to a consensus – even if that 
consensus was only achieved through the inherent ambiguity of such a measure – on a 
resolution to give Hammarskjöld a more or less free hand to deal with a problem: “the 
difficulty of reaching precise conclusions has had both the General Assembly and the 
Security Council at times to content themselves with establishing a consensus as a 
basis for further decisions by the Secretary-General. In general, Her Majesty’s 
Government have no cause for complaint at the way his influence has been 
wielded”.456  
 
Hammarskjöld had proven to be an astute politician and had built up his standing in 
the UN: “Mr. Hammarskjold’s prestige and influence is now such that it is wise to 																																																								
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make sure of his approval before embarking on any important course of action in the 
United Nations.”457 
Noticing the growth of “neutralist” new members, Hammarskjöld had courted them 
and made himself the unofficial figure head of this view of world politics, as Dixon 
explained: 
 
“This increase in the influence of the position of Secretary-General has been 
accompanied by an interesting development fostered by the Secretary-General himself. 
The other day he remarked to me that a certain course of action would accord with the 
opinion of “the House”. When I asked him whom he included in the house he replied 
“Oh, Burmese, Swedes and those kind of people”. The fact is that there has grown up 
in the United Nations a body of neutral opinion composed of those countries who do 
not belong to the alliances whether of the West or the East, and who conceive it to be 
their duty to keep the peace between the power blocs and work for the pacific aims and 
ideals of the Charter. These delegations drawn from all continents (and indeed being 
sometimes able to count on members of N.A.T.O. such as the Canadians and 
Norwegians), are being added to daily as the new African states emerge to 
independence. It is to opinion of this kind that the Secretary-General tends to turn, not 
I think necessarily because he is himself exactly a pacifist or a neutralist, but more 
because he believes that the orderly running of the United Nations and the development 
of the Charter principles make it necessary to carry what in effect is a majority of 
members.” 458 
 
Earlier, Dixon had often warned of a more powerful and interventionist Secretary-
General, but after 1958 he saw Hammarskjöld’s increased role as largely positive for 
British interests: “I do not think there is any cause for alarm at the growth of Mr. 
Hammarskjold’s influence. He has a real respect for the principles and methods of 
British policy and there is no doubt that on major East/West issues he is 
wholeheartedly with the West. Yet it is disturbing to think that the growing influence 
of the office, which Mr. Hammarskjold wields on a completely personal basis, can 
hardly be inherited by anyone so able or so reliable.” 459  
 
If British strategy was to co-opt the Secretary-General, French policies would, from 
1958, develop along radically different lines. The tone had been set by Michel Debré, 																																																								
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who launched a violent attack on the Secretary-General in L’information on 22 
January 1958, denouncing the policy of the Secretariat as “a secret diplomacy, 
contrary to the fundamental principles of the UN; led by irresponsible officials; 
preferring the injustice of the faits accomplis by revolutionary means to any form of 
open conflict, which was exactly the diplomacy of Munich”.460 When, later in 1958, 
the Fourth Republic was replaced by the Fifth and de Gaulle became President, 
Michel Debré was appointed prime minister. The new Prime Minister was not alone 
among the men who swept to power with de Gaulle in having a decidedly hostile view 
of the evolution of the United Nations and the new role of its Secretary-General; it 
was shared, if not exceeded by de Gaulle himself and his loyal foreign minister 
Maurice Couve de Murville. When the United Nations were created, de Gaulle had 
fought hard to make France a permanent member of the Security Council; he was not 
going to give up the rights inherent in this position by accepting the usurpation of the 
Security Council’s role by the wilful General Assembly, or by a Secretary-General 
intent on enlarging his office; de Gaulle’s vision of the United Nations was clear: 
“The UN is the states. And first of all, the permanent [members of the Security 
Council]”.461 The French scepticism would only grow as the vacuum theory acquired 
a geographic element. Hammarskjöld spoke of the vacuum that would develop in the 
new African states when the old colonial powers withdrew. It was important to avoid 




B.3 “Spiking one of the heaviest guns in the Communist armoury” – economic and 
political assistance to the Third-World 
From the beginning of his tenure as Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld had pondered 
the issue of decolonisation; its connection to the cold war, and its impact on the future 
of the UN. In one of his first discussions with the British after his election, in June 
1953, he discussed the question of decolonisation and the growth of an anti-colonial 
bloc in the UN and said that the UN could play an important role not only with 
economic but also “political” assistance to the under-developed countries. This would 																																																								
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also be an opportunity for “spiking one of the heaviest guns in the Communist 
armoury” according to Hammarskjöld.462 Over the following years these ideas would 
develop into a full “doctrine” on the role of the UN in Africa. 
 
In 1955, Hammarskjöld ordered a study of all the African activities at the UN, he set 
up an African Working Group in the Secretariat and accounted for these activities in 
the 1955 UN Annual Report. Hammarskjöld wrote that “The peoples of Asia today, of 
Africa tomorrow, are moving towards a new relationship with what history calls the 
West. The world organization is the place where this emerging relationship in world 
affairs can most creatively be forged.”463 A further hint of the special focus on Africa 
in the Secretariat was the fact that the Introduction to the Annual Report, for the first 
time, contained a heading entitled African Problems; under this heading, 
Hammarskjöld gave some background to the African Working Group:  
 
“The great changes that are under way in Africa present a challenge to the rest of the 
world – a challenge to give aid in guiding the course of events in orderly and 
constructive channels. It is apparent that in the next ten years the peace and stability of 
the world will be strongly affected by the evolution in Africa, by the national awakening 
of its people, by the course of race relations, and by the manner in which the economic 
and social advancement of the African peoples is assisted by the rest of the world.  
I believe that this is an area of concern to the United Nations in which the Secretariat 
may prove helpful. As a first step in the Secretariat approach it is essential to bring 
together and into focus the many problems concerning Africa with which the United 
Nations is already dealing or will have to deal in the years ahead.”464  
 
The French diplomats in New York were concerned about Hammarskjöld’s interest in 
Africa, as a report by Charles Lucet, chargé d’affaires at the French Permanent 
Mission, highlighted in August 1955. Lucet described a meeting where “M. 
Hammarskjöld immediately launched into the sphere of high political strategy”. 
Hammarskjöld explained how the Asian continent was now the prey to the double 
influence of Nehru and Chou En-Lai and would in the coming years move more and 
more into the orbit of the Chinese Communists, with the result that the Soviets would 																																																								
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find themselves expelled from the Asian continent and would have to look for “new 
territories for expansion”. Hammarskjöld feared that over the coming years the 
principal thrust of Soviet propaganda would be directed at an African continent in 
political awakening. He went on to describe how the present focus on the rights of 
self-determination for the colonised peoples made this a very dangerous situation, 
which he hoped could still be canalised and controlled. Hammarskjöld predicted that 
the Soviet Union would “likely be supported by the coloured peoples of Asia and 
Africa who would want the aid of this powerful ally to win the day for their anti-
colonialist ideas”.465  
 
In the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee) and the 
Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization Committee) of the General 
Assembly there had already been much anti-colonial rhetoric and Hammarskjöld 
explained to Lucet that part of his motive for establishing an African Working Group 
at the Secretariat was to take the edge off future discussions at the UN. The African 
Working Group would undertake long-term studies at “a very slow rhythm and with 
all possible precautions”, enabling the Secretary-General to reply to the “fiery 
orators” of the Third and the Fourth Committee that he was “himself looking into the 
well-being of the African populations” and that “he should be left to his own 
methods”. This shows Hammarskjöld’s ambiguity towards the principle of self-
determination of peoples and how the same principle was in fact subordinated to his 
analysis of the Cold War context.466 
 
Lucet was not entirely convinced by Hammarskjöld’s argument and expressed 
“certain scepticism as to the influence that the Working Group might have on the 
evolution of African problems”. In the analysis of the French diplomat, 
Hammarskjöld would quickly find himself in an untenable situation. If he really 
meant to proceed along the lines he had indicated, the representatives of Asian and 
African countries would soon accuse him of excessive prudence and of dragging his 
feet; if, on the other hand, the Working Group would were actually to take any 
important initiative, this would lead to problems with the colonial powers. Lucet 
pointed to what would soon become a great dilemma for Hammarskjöld in steering a 																																																								
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course between the colonial powers and the anti-colonial movement. Nevertheless, 
Lucet found the project of the Secretary-General to be “inoffensive at the present 
time”. The report still provoked a vivid reaction in Paris, and the French were not the 
only ones interested in Hammarskjöld’s African ideas. The Belgian UN mission 
contacted Lucet to find out if the French Government would talk to Hammarskjöld “to 
bring his attention to the danger in seeing the United Nations showing too much 
interest in African problems”. The French had on occasion coordinated their UN 
policies towards colonial questions with the British and the Belgians and they now 
contacted Brussels467 and London468 to this effect. In London neither the Foreign 
Office, nor the Colonial Office shared the French concerns.469 Not for the first time, 
the British cooled down French feelings over Hammarskjöld’s projects and 
vouchsafed his good intentions. On 21 October 1955, de Guiringaud, who had 
replaced Lucet, met with de Seynes, the French Undersecretary-General. De Seynes 
allayed the French fears about Hammarskjöld’s African project, and reassured de 
Guiringaud that Hammarskjöld was not interested in “vast summaries and exercises of 
high politics”. De Seynes’ opinion was that the activities of the Secretary-General 
“did not present any danger, on any level” to French policies in their African 
territories. 470  A hand-written note on de Guiringaud’s report shows that this 
effectively closed the dossier on Hammarskjöld’s African Working Group: “In the 
light of the assurances given by de Seynes, we do not see why we should oppose 
Hammarskjöld’s initiative”.471 
 
Were the French correct in their perception of de Seynes as a guardian of French 
interests within the Secretariat? His predecessor, Georges-Picot, had been a staunch 
defender of French interests – and of the principle that the Assistant Secretaries-
General (now changed into Undersecretaries-General) should be a national 
representative in the Secretariat – with the effect that he got into a row with 
Hammarskjöld and resigned. De Seynes, on the other hand, saw himself as an 																																																								
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international civil servant, loyal to the UN rather than to France. Furthermore, he was 
a méndesiste and critical of some French colonial policies in Africa. But in 1955 his 
assurances were enough to reassure Paris. Lucet, a close ally of future French Foreign 
Minister Couve de Murville, would go on to become the head of the Political 
Department of the Quai d’Orsay in 1959 and from this vantage point he would see 
how his worst fears of Hammarskjöld’s African ideas would come true.472  
 
The development behind Hammarskjöld’s choice to focus on Africa was motivated by 
what he perceived as a new Soviet interest in Africa paired with the rise of anti-
colonialism. In 1955, the Geneva conference had led to a détente between the blocs in 
Europe. This was partly due to the threat of nuclear retaliation that had made a war in 
Europe almost unthinkable, and partly that the attempt to win the Western European 
countries for communism via elections had failed – the Marshall Plan, that 
Hammarskjöld had worked with, had been a major factor in achieving this. According 
to Hammarskjöld, after failing to foment revolution and strengthen communist parties 
in Western Europe, the USSR now looked to the Middle East and increasingly 
towards Africa. The change in Soviet strategy would be most clearly expressed in the 
Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, where the underdeveloped countries 
were identified as the main battlefield between the blocs.473 To what extent there 
really existed a Soviet grand strategy for the subversion of Africa is not clear, but the 
mere thought of it was enough; while the Communist ghost no longer haunted the 
streets of Western Europe, the fear of its sudden appearance in the jungles of Africa 
was quite sufficient to keep Western policy makers up at night.474 And besides, even 
if communism failed in Africa, extreme nationalism, directed against the West, would 
lead to major problems for the Western world and would play into the hands of the 
East according to a logic where what was bad for the West was good for the East.475 
This confrontation was also likely to play out in the UN; a State Department 
memorandum entitled “Communist Penetration in Africa” stated that “unhindered by 
ties with the colonial powers, the Soviet Union and its allies are able openly and 
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constantly to champion nationalist causes of the world stage, especially in the UN”.476 
Increasingly, the Soviet Union was finding itself on the side of the majority in the 
General Assembly as it supported Afro-Asian initiatives.477 
 
The Bandung conference, which took place in April 1955, also led Hammarskjöld to 
engage more with the question of decolonisation. The Bandung conference saw the 
emergence of “neutralism” as an anti-colonial force. In the introduction to the annual 
report in 1955, Hammarskjöld made a specific reference to Bandung and the fact that 
these countries had issued a statement on their adherence to the principles of the 
Charter, although many of them were not yet members of the UN.478 Hammarskjöld 
was sensitive to the fact that the countries that had assembled at Bandung were 
increasingly acting as a bloc in the UN and that the question that kept them together 
was a fervent anti-colonialism. Hammarskjöld had already been irritated at Menon’s 
attempt to mediate both in Peking and in Suez and he would increasingly try to 
portray himself as an alternative leader for the “neutralist bloc”.  
 
In the introduction to the Annual Report for 1956, Hammarskjöld wrote: “It is 
important to remember that the Charter endorses self-determination as a basis for 
friendly relations among nations. Both unrealistic impatience in the movement toward 
self-determination and wasteful resistance to it would contradict this philosophy of 
the Charter by leading to conflicts which might threaten peace”.479 In these words, 
Hammarskjöld comes across as a moderate; he was for independence, but it should 
not be rushed. Hammarskjöld’s personal assistant, Wilhelm Wachtmeister said that 
Hammarskjöld was not at all happy about the invasion of the General Assembly by 
the newly independent former colonies. In principle, he was for independence and 
decolonisation, but he was not convinced that all states were necessarily ready for 
it.480 As always, however, Hammarskjöld quickly adapted to the situation and the 
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On New Year’s Eve 1956, Dulles, met for luncheon with Hammarskjöld at Lodge’s 
residence in the Waldorf Towers for a stock taking of Suez and to discuss future ideas 
and policies. Barco, who was also present, described the luncheon as “very 
awkward”. Dulles and Hammarskjöld never seem to have connected on a personal 
level and very few words were uttered until the dessert when Dulles asked 
Hammarskjöld to express his views on economic development. This was the topic that 
Hammarskjöld had wanted to talk to Dulles about and he now launched into a long 
monologue – “and when Hammarskjöld would start on something he was very 
interested in, he was not lacking for words”, as Barco described, but “unless you were 
familiar with the Secretary-General’s manner of speaking, you often missed nuances 
and issues and points that were of considerable importance”. Dulles “hadn’t really 
understood what the Secretary-General was saying”, but he did not say so. What 
Hammarskjöld had wanted to discuss with Dulles can be discerned from the rather 
summary American report from the luncheon: “[Hammarskjöld] felt that some of the 
Arabs were sensitive to receiving aid from the US lest it put them under political 
obligations. He thought that some multilateral form of aid would be best”.481 While 
Dulles did not see the need for multilateral assistance in the Middle East he had had 
similar discussions before with someone he understood better than Hammarskjöld. 
Paul Hoffman, who had been in charge of the Marshall Plan as head of the ECA, had 
tried to convince Dulles earlier in 1956 that a large program of foreign aid to the 
newly independent countries “was vital to stop penetration of Soviet Communism”. 
Hoffman referred to this as “waging peace”, what it really meant was to win the Cold 
War by aid to the Third-World, much like the Marshall Plan had saved Western 
Europe from Communist penetration.482 Later Dulles realized that the two ideas went 
well together and he and Lodge proposed to Hammarskjöld that Hoffman should be 																																																								
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made the head of the new UN Special Fund for Economic Development (that would 
eventually become the UNDP).483 As the head of the UN Special Fund Hoffman made 
the same arguments about winning the Cold War through aid directly to 
Eisenhower.484  
 
Hammarskjöld had stayed in contact with Hoffman, Labouisse and many others from 
his work with the Marshall Plan.485  Hammarskjöld also shared their views on 
economic development. 486  Hoffman’s biographer writes that Hoffman “never 
questioned the efficacy of private enterprise and the capitalistic international market. 
Thus he and other prominent spokesmen for the Development Establishment sought 
to promote peaceful economic development as an alternative to revolution and other 
threats to the system that benefitted the United States”. 487  This mirrored 
Hammarskjöld’s ideas on economic development, to keep the peace by guarding the 
status quo from revolutionary movements, be they communist or nationalist. Hoffman 
also belonged to Hammarskjöld’s “informal cabinet” and his UN position was based 
to a great extent on his ability to get American support (the US was by far the greatest 
donor) for the Special Fund.488 As head of the Special Fund Hoffman produced a 
confidential memorandum entitled “How to Win the Cold War” which stressed that 
aid to the Third-World via the UN – in line with Hammarskjöld’s thinking on the 
subject – was crucial. There was every reason that the memorandum should be kept 
confidential; Hoffman wrote that “If economic aid is to play the part it should in the 
1960’s, we must […] take the programme out of the Cold War, not because it will not 
play a significant part in winning that war, but for tactical reasons”.489 In Africa 
Hammarskjöld saw the opportunity for the UN to play a new role along these lines. 
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C The “Hammarskjöld doctrine for Black Africa” 
At the turn of the year 1959-1960 Hammarskjöld undertook a six week odyssey 
through most of the countries and territories in Africa. As with Hammarskjöld’s trip 
to the Middle East in January 1956 this trip was planned as a proactive way of 
preparing and bringing in more African work to the UN.490 Back in New York, 
Hammarskjöld met with the new French permanent representative, Armand Bérard, 
on 2 February. After the meeting, Bérard reported back to Paris: “in one word, M. 
Hammarskjoeld returns persuaded of the grand role that awaits the UN in Africa and 
that it belongs, he thinks, to the Secretary-General to assume, in an organisation 
where he has ceased to be the simple executive agent of a now impotent Security 
Council”.491 Bérard noted that the financial means would limit the ambition of 
Hammarskjöld and recommended using the financial weapon to counter 
Hammarskjöld’s projects. Bérard also recommended that a tight contact should be 
established with Hammarskjöld “in order to orient his actions in a way that is not 
contrary to our influence or our policy”. In his memoirs, Bérard wrote of this meeting 
that Hammarskjöld’s ideas “if they were sincere, were those of a neophyte, his 
judgments often erroneous, and his projects hazardous for the role of the organisation 
in Africa”.492 The French press association AFP, reported that there now existed “a 
Hammarskjöld doctrine for Black Africa”.  
 
The Quai d’Orsay “did not doubt that the ‘missionary spirit’ that seems to animate M. 
Hammarskjoeld was inspired by elevated feelings, but the consequences of it could be 
serious in the political domain”. Hammarskjöld’s idea to send UN representatives to 
the new African countries was also vividly criticised from a legal point of view: “The 
Secretary-General does not, like a sovereign, enjoy the right of legation”. This 
practice “could be interpreted as a will to lay, progressively, the basis for a sort of 
international government”.493 A phrase in a speech by Hammarskjöld on the “now 
impotent Security Council” drew strong protests from the French: “The phrase on the 
Security Council as ‘now impotent’ and the conclusion that he draws for the increased 
role that he judges to be his cannot but lead to reservations from our side, as much for 																																																								
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491 Télégramme d’Armand Bérard à MAE du 2 février 1960, Archives MAE, AD, NUOI, 1116.  
492 Bérard, Armand, L’ONU oui ou non ? 1959-1970 (Paris: Plon 1979), p. 49.  
493 Télégramme de MAE à la délégation française à New York 4 février 1960, Archives MAE, AD, 
NUOI, 1116.  
	 131	
legal as for political reasons”. Furthermore, the French were astonished by the 
“categorical judgments, normally so rare in the mouth of such a prudent personality”. 
After reading Bérard’s report de Gaulle wrote an acid entry in his notebook: “The 
ambition and vanity of M. Hammarskjoeld appears in broad daylight in the interview 
with our ambassador. Mr. H… does not have any other idea than to replace the 
European powers in the role that they play in Africa with himself. To sum up, he 
wants them to nominate him, pay him and give him the means so that he can oust 
them”.494 To Bérard, de Gaulle simply said: “Regarding M. Hammarskjoeld, we will 
not re-elect him”.495  
 
Hammarskjöld presented his new ideas at a press conference on 4 February 1960. 
Hammarskjöld welcomed the political awakening in Africa, but underlined that it 
faced certain problems. Most African countries did not have “the kind of social 
grouping, the kind of social classes, from which you can recruit a broad 
administration and a broad political leadership”. What was needed was “assistance in 
human terms”, according to Hammarskjöld, “people, experts, technicians, and – why 
not? – officials”. The UN OPEX scheme provided some possibilities in this respect, 
but was, Hammarskjöld concluded, “ridiculously modest – in relation to the needs”. 
Hammarskjöld then explained how the UN was uniquely positioned to provide this as 
it was “infinitely easier to receive financial assistance and technical assistance by 
experts and so on through an international body than on a bilateral basis, and it is 
infinitely easier for them to receive it through an international body of which they are 
themselves members”. 496 These were explosive ideas and they did not go down well 
with the colonial powers. On February 5, Hammarskjöld met with Bérard to reassure 
him that “all his efforts aimed at supporting the action of France and Britain in the 
African continent, especially at a moment when they were developing the most 
generous of policies” and that he hoped to “combine closely his action with [France]”. 
497  Regarding the representatives Hammarskjöld had in mind to send to Africa, he had 
only meant “to choose as coordinators of the technical aid persons who were not only 
economists, but also capable of showing a certain political spirit”. Bérard cautioned 																																																								
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Hammarskjöld to “be careful not to give the [great] powers the suspicion that the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations [is trying to] go outside his rights”.498 
 
Dixon also met with Hammarskjöld to draw him out as much as possible on his 
African ideas, which did not prove difficult. Hammarskjöld had already been 
“discussing fairly widely around the United Nations with Representatives” and now 
he delivered “rather over an hour’s monologue” to Dixon.499 “Not for the first time”, 
Dixon reported, “the Secretary-General has been fired by the prospect of a decisive 
and benevolent impact by the United Nations on a complex new situation which is 
clearly of the very first importance”. Dixon thought that it “may be that to some 
extent he [Hammarskjöld] has come to feel that his credit has been over-extended in 
the Middle East, and that his energies and the prestige of his office could in the 
immediate future be more rewardingly engaged in the problems of Africa”. Dixon 
summarised Hammarskjöld’s “African ideas” in the following way: 
 
“the result of the irresistible tide of African nationalism will be the emergence in the 
near future of a large number of independent African States. In most of these there 
will exist in varying degrees dangerous elements of instability which in some cases at 
any rate could lead to chaos, and even barbarism, and which are in any event likely 
to provide opportunities for the spread of Communism. In these circumstances there 
will emerge opportunities and responsibilities for a contribution to stability to which 
only the United Nations will be able to respond adequately”.500  
 
Hammarskjöld believed that the newly independent countries would be suspicious of 
all national governments and all former Colonial powers, “however enlightened”. As 
an alternative to help from the old colonial powers, Hammarskjöld’s “intellectual 
mind” had constructed a “more or less precise pattern” of how the UN, “through the 
Organ of the Secretary-General” could influence the political development of Africa. 
Hammarskjöld’s plan was to establish “in all the new territories of Africa of a United 
Nations representative of high calibre and sharing the general ideas of the Secretary-
General”. This representative would nominally be the head of a technical assistance 
office, but would be giving the local African leader – Dixon noted that it was clear 																																																								
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that Hammarskjöld thought of the new African Governments in terms of personalities 
– political and economic advice to the degree appropriate for the country concerned. 
The political influence of the UN representative would, in Hammarskjöld’s thinking, 
especially be exerted to counter  
 
“(a) territorial ambitions by one new African State against another;  
 (b) internal fragmentary tendencies calculated to lead to a breakdown of law and order; and  
 (c) developments affording an opportunity for the assertion of Soviet or any other foreign dominating    
influence”.501 
 
Hammarskjöld thought that the whole concept would have to be based on “relations 
of confidence between the Secretary-General and the African leaders. It would thus be 
based on a relationship between the African States and the Secretary-General 
personally rather than the United Nations as such”. 502  This was the way 
Hammarskjöld loved to influence; the civil servant giving impartial advice to further 
the national interest. This was the idea that Hammarskjöld had been pursuing all his 
life; in Sweden as the non-political civil servant; in New York as the impartial advisor 
of governments; and now as the international civil servant ready to serve the newly 
independent states in Africa. If Hammarskjöld’s idea of his own role was essentially 
the same, the problems inherent with this role were also the same. Hammarskjöld 
assumed that he, and his trusted circle at the UN, could, by impartially weighing the 
facts, see what was the right course to follow for a newly independent country. As in 
Sweden, Hammarskjöld assumed that he could serve a higher “common interest” 
without getting bogged down in politics. Compelling as a thought, this was not a 
realistic view. In Sweden, Hammarskjöld had also steered a course that was hardly 
“neutral”, but clearly pro-Western and conservative. In the summing up of his three 
points (a to c above), Hammarskjöld shows himself as a guardian of the status quo, 
and an opponent of communism and the Soviet Union. Hammarskjöld’s theory of the 
impartial international civil servant giving advice to governments failed to take into 
account situations where there were differing interpretations of what the national 
interest was. And what if some governments would perceive that their national 





Hammarskjöld’s focus on personal relations also served another purpose. 
Hammarskjöld predicted that most of the newly independent states would be led by 
strong men and dictators. Sekou Touré was one such strong man who had impressed 
Hammarskjöld and, in a discussion with Dixon, Hammarskjöld “spoke of Sekoue 
Toure’s one party system as typical of political development in the new African 
countries”. Hammarskjöld did not see a direct problem with this, but said that “The 
Westminster model was not suitable for automatic export to independent African 
countries, and we must, he thought, accept that the one party system would be, at any 
rate to begin with, general”. If Hammarskjöld admired Touré in early 1960 (his 
attitude to Touré would change), he had made “plain his distaste for President 
Nkrumah, his dictatorial methods and territorial ambitions”.503 As with Nasser’s pan-
Arab aspirations, Hammarskjöld felt a strong dislike for Nkrumah’s pan-African 
aspirations that he would refer to as “an African Hitler-Mussolini drive”.504 
 
Dixon thought that Hammarskjöld was “rather too inclined to try and fit the many 
diverse problems into one matrix, and to regard them all as susceptible to more or less 
the same ‘school solution’”. Hammarskjöld also announced to David Owen, head of 
UN technical assistance, “I think we have found the practical solution to the post-
colonial vacuum in Africa”.505 In the Secretariat there were also those who felt that 
there was a naïve view that the UN could deal with any problem, including political 
problems, in Africa through economic and social development.506 De Seynes, who as 
Under Secretary-General for economic and social affairs was in charge of much of 
this work later wrote of “our mentality as ‘enlightened westerners’ devoted to the 
Third World”.507 
 
While remarking that Hammarskjöld’s ideas appeared in “some respects disturbingly 
precise”, Dixon thought that Hammarskjöld would be “open to influence” and ready 
to modify his plans. Hammarskjöld was well aware that although he may exert some 																																																								
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pressure on governments to accept his ideas, “he cannot in the last resort put them 
into effect unless they have the genuine support of the key governments”. Dixon’s 
analysis was that Hammarskjöld was now, as was his habit, floating his projects in an 
ideal form in order to get reactions, many of which Dixon expected him “to absorb 
into his own thinking”. Dixon also noted that Hammarskjöld had tailored his 
presentation to his listeners; for instance, he had not told Dixon that he wanted to send 
a UN representative to Tanganyika before independence, although he had said he 
planned on doing so to others. Dixon felt that there were a number of “obvious 
weaknesses” in Hammarskjöld’s plans “including the extra strain it would impose on 
Mr. Hammarskjold himself, and the possibility that because of this he would be less 
able to be useful to us in other connexions”. Dixon also warned of French reactions. 
Dixon recommended – especially since the ideas were likely “to get a good deal of 
support” in the UN – that they should be turned to advantage; “our best course would 
be to seek to influence rather than to discourage his plan”.508 
 
In London, Hammarskjöld’s new ideas “caused a good deal of fluttering in the 
Whitehall dovecote(e/s)”.509 From a constitutional perspective, the Foreign Office 
noted that these new ideas were “in line with the Secretary-General’s conception of 
his developing role in international affairs. We have kept a close but fairly benevolent 
eye on the growth of this concept”. The idea of special representatives of the 
Secretary-General would “be a considerable step in this development and clearly has 
some dangers”, but it was not a complete novelty and generally, the British view was 
that Hammarskjöld could “use his staff more or less as he likes as long as he does not 
put things on too formal a basis and provided he is able to get away with it”.510 In the 
Foreign Office, Dixon’s advice to try and influence rather than stop Hammarskjöld’s 
ideas was accepted as sound advice. Hammarskjöld’s ideas were in line with the tide 
of African opinion and the British did not want “to put ourselves publicly on the 
wrong side of this movement of thought”. Several of the points that Hammarskjöld 
had made in his press conference on February 4 were, if not shared, at least 
understood, by the officials in the Foreign Office: “Indeed, Africans (like Mr. 
Hammarskjoeld himself) tend to give the United Nations a mystic significance 																																																								
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beyond the mere sum of its members. They see in membership of it the criterion of 
independence; and they look to it as a source of uncontaminated aid”. Unlike the 
Africans, however, the British were not content to put all their trust in Hammarskjöld 
and the UN. While Hammarskjöld had British support, there were more officials than 
Hammarskjöld working at the UN: “We cannot rely too much upon the magical 
personality Mr. Hammarskjoeld tends to give the United Nations Organisation as a 
projection of himself. The effect on our interests of a United Nations servant in an 
African country would depend, not only on his calibre, but on his attitude and his 
nationality. A high-calibre Egyptian could, for example, be a disaster. There is a large 
weight of opinion in the United Nations emotionally unsympathetic to the Colonial 
Powers; some, at least, of Mr. Hammarskjoeld’s disguised United Nations 
Ambassadors in the African States would reflect this outlook and we should get 
nothing or worse from them in exchange for our share of their salaries.”  
 
The British also raised the fundamental question of if, and if so how, a member of the 
UN Secretariat, be it the Secretary-General or a Special Representative, could perform 
political tasks such as the ones enumerated by Hammarskjöld to Dixon (“(a) territorial 
ambitions by one new African State against another; (b) internal fragmentary 
tendencies calculated to lead to a breakdown of law and order; and (c) developments 
affording an opportunity for the assertion of Soviet or any other foreign dominating 
influence”). 511  The British questioned how any UN representative could 
“realistically” go about giving political advice according to these three points. If they 
exerted an influence against Soviet influence (c), this “would mean him [the UN 
Special Representative] taking sides to an extent which would scarcely be compatible 
with his United Nations function”. The same was true for other political advise: “And 
who would decide on the policy to be followed on the various issues on which advice 
would be given under paragraphs 4 (a) and (b), in which the interests of different 
States or groups of States might be set against one another (as in (a)), or different 
theories about the internal organisation of a country might be canvassed (as in b)?” “It 
seems likely that the United Nations representative would either be ineffective or, if 
not, would be assuming functions which go beyond those properly exercised by the 
United Nations Secretariat and indeed edge the concept of world government”.512  																																																								
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On March 9, Dixon was treated to another long monologue from Hammarskjöld. 
“Although in his own mind Mr. Hammarskjold is evidently making adjustments to his 
original ideas to take account of the difficulties which have been put to him as a result 
of his consultations with ourselves and others”, Dixon reported, “the fact remains that 
the general impression has spread around the United Nations […] that the Secretary-
General intends to establish Representatives in Africa with political functions”. He 
lamented – “as you know it is by no means easy to do one’s full share of the talking in 
discussion with Hammarskjold, especially on questions such as this in which he is 
passionately interested”. Nevertheless Dixon hoped that he had got across some 
critical points though he was not entirely satisfied that Hammarskjöld had taken them 
on board. Dixon’s main point was that in accepting a degree of responsibility for 
influencing both political and economic developments in African territories, the 
Secretary-General and the UN “may incur odium if things do not turn out entirely 
satisfactorily in either sphere”. There was also a substantial risk that a UN 
representative with the sort of role Hammarskjöld envisaged would get “involved in 
the international relations of the countries concerned, and thus be subject to 
international pressure”. Dixon pointed to the discussions regarding US versus Soviet 
financing of the Aswan Dam in Egypt, and noted that if there had been a UN 
representative advising the Egyptians at the time, he would no doubt have come under 
substantial pressure from both sides. Hammarskjöld shrugged this off and simply 
“remarked that this sort of hazard was inevitable”. Hammarskjöld’s remarks did not 
calm Dixon. In words that would soon ring prophetic, Dixon reported after the 
meeting that Hammarskjöld “agreed that all these risks existed and said that he had 
calculated them. However he showed no disposition to go more deeply into these 
matters, and I felt some uneasiness that, although he has accepted intellectually that 
there are these problems, he may not have fully grasped their gravity and may perhaps 
over-estimate his own capacity to overcome them”. But there was also substantial 
support for Hammarskjöld. It was evident to Dixon that Hammarskjöld felt that he 
had the general support of the Americans; Hammarskjöld also told Dixon that the US 
Secretary of State Christian Herter had told him in a meeting on March 8 that 
Hammarskjöld’s initiatives were “the minimum that should be done”. The British also 
noted that Hammarskjöld’s ideas probably had the support of a majority of the 
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African states.513 On 5 December 1959 the General Assembly had also adopted a 
resolution that “invited” the Secretary-General to give urgent consideration to 
requests from newly independent states for “high-level technical experts” and “all 
other forms of technical aid”.514 Hammarskjöld was aware of this and he had two 
purposes for discussing his African ideas widely. Firstly, Hammarskjöld wanted to get 
feedback from the great powers so that he could attenuate any proposals that were 
likely to prove completely unpalatable. Secondly, Hammarskjöld was building 
support for his ideas among the members of the Afro-Asian bloc, sowing the seeds for 
a majority in the General Assembly, and making it harder for the great powers to 
refuse his ideas outright. In conclusion, Dixon wrote that he still thought “that the 
Secretary-General’s ideas could be turned to good effect, and that we should be ready 
to support and encourage him but I am rather disturbed that he may be 
underestimating the depth of the waters into which he is moving”.515  
 
The French view under de Gaulle was that the Secretary-General was merely a 
servant of the member states and should not act without being asked to do so: “It was 
not proper that he should take initiatives of this kind”. This French “purist” (as the 
British called it) view of Hammarskjöld’s role no longer held water according to the 
British as Hammarskjöld had come to their aid so many times in the Middle East that 
they could “hardly adopt the attitude that he should not speak until he is spoken to”.516 
Despite official French fears of Soviet subversion in Africa, France moved somewhat 
closer to the Soviet Union at the UN in its critique of the “ambitions” of 
Hammarskjöld. Kosciuzko-Morizet, the French delegate at the Trusteeship Council, 
reported to Paris that his Soviet colleague had told him of his fear of Hammarskjöld’s 
“ambitions” and the American influence over the UN. The Americans were using the 
UN as a cover for their economic penetration of the African continent at the expense 
of European capital, an idea that appealed to the French. Kosciuzko-Morizet wrote 
that he would not accept that, “under the pretext of technical assistance and the cover 
of international officials the trusteeship of the old powers will be substituted with the 
trusteeship of the United Nations. The Americans, who are aware that their dollar 																																																								
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diplomacy is too conspicuous and unacceptable to the Africans, want to use the 
United Nations as a screen and this goes hand in hand with the desire of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to play an increased role with the newly 
independent states”.517 This suspicion of UN involvement as a cover for the American 
penetration of Africa would linger and become the focus of public Soviet critiques of 
Hammarskjöld in the near future. 
 
The challenges facing the political activities of the Secretary-General and his special 
representatives that Dixon feared materialised almost immediately on the 
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Chapter 5: “Gamesmanship”: The Congo Crisis until September 
1960 
 
The Congo crisis saw the pinnacle of an independent political role for the Secretary-
General and is often interpreted as the first Cold War crisis in Africa.518 The Cold 
War conflict partly concealed the very real conflict between a newly independent 
country and its former colonial master struggling to keep its socio-economic 
privileges in the old colony.519 To Hammarskjöld the Cold War screen served a useful 
purpose to cover the colonialist actions in his attempts to preserve the alliance of the 
Americans, the West Europeans and the Afro-Asians that he had built his position on. 
Until the middle of September 1960, Hammarskjöld managed to control the Congo 
crisis at the Security Council in New York, carefully balancing between the demands 
of the West and the Afro-Asians with the full backing of the Americans, against an 
increasingly hostile Soviet Union. On the ground in the Congo, Hammarskjöld 
managed to foil the Congolese government when it interfered with his plans and he 
was on the verge of turning the Congo into a de facto UN trusteeship. 
 
 
A “The Most Advanced and Sophisticated Experiment in International Co-
operation Ever Attempted”520 
A.1 UN action to “keep bears out of Congo caviar” 
Hammarskjöld had identified Belgian Congo as a country where the UN would have 
an important role. Already before independence Hammarskjöld sent a “mission of 
information and observation”521 and dispatched Sture Linnér to Leopoldville as UN 
resident technical representative. Ralph Bunche was sent to attend the independence 
celebrations on 30 June 1960 as the Secretary-General’s representative. 522 
Independence, when the Belgian government belatedly opted for it, was only meant to 
be political independence; the socio-economic dependence on Belgium, it was 																																																								
518 Most studies of the Congo crisis follows this interpretation to some extent, a classic example is 
Kalb, and a recent example is Namikas. 
519 A study that focuses on this aspect and its relation to the Cold War is Kent. 
520 Lippmann, Walter,  “The Congo and the UN” in The Michigan Daily 22 July 1960.  
521 Coded cable from de Seynes to Hammarskjöld, 17 June 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld Papers L179:155. 
522 Hoskyns, Catherine, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 112-113. 
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assumed, would continue.523 When Patrice Lumumba won a surprise victory in the 
first legislative elections organised ahead of independence it was a sign that the 
Congolese might not quietly accept the socio-economic status quo.524 A mutiny broke 
out on 5 July and thousands of Belgians fled as rioting, looting, attacks on whites and 
rapes were reported. Lumumba himself was attacked in an attempt to negotiate with 
the mutinous soldiers before he and Kasavubu reached an agreement with the soldiers 
on 8 July.525 On 9 July, the Belgians announced that they were sending 1,200 troops 
to reinforce the 2,500 Belgian troops already in the Congo.526  
 
The next day, on 10 July, Kasavubu and Lumumba, made an oral request for UN 
assistance to Bunche. The idea to ask the UN for assistance had come from the 
American ambassador, Clare Timberlake whom they had approached initially for US 
assistance. Timberlake realised that it was unacceptable for the old colonial power to 
send in troops without even asking the Congolese government, and feared this might 
provoke the Soviets to come to the aid of the Congolese.527 Timberlake did not have a 
clear idea about what the UN should do in the Congo,528 but thought that a request for 
UN assistance “should keep bears out of the Congo caviar”. Timberlake foresaw the 
possibility of a Soviet veto at the Security Council, as any resolution the Americans 
would want to sponsor would inevitably be Belgian-friendly, but assumed that the 
General Assembly could then step in.529 Bunche reported to Hammarskjöld that the 
“situation clearly demands some urgent and possibly unprecedented action”.530 
 
Eisenhower was firmly opposed to any US unilateral action in the Congo and wanted 
the UN, in close coordination with the US, to take the lead. The Americans were 																																																								
523 See Kent, pp. 10-11; and Gibbs, David N., The political economy of Third World intervention: 
mines, money, and U.S. policy in the Congo crisis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), p. 78. 
524 For a detailed account of the Belgian attempts to prevent a Lumumba government and the 
consequences on the relationship between Kasavubu and Lumumba see Kent, pp. 14-15. 
525 Kent, p. 16. 
526 According to an agreement between Belgium and the Congo that had been signed but not ratified, 
the Belgians had a right to retain Kitona and Kamina as military bases. 
527 Kent, p. 16. 
528 US Ambassador Timberlake “variously mentioned UN force replacing Belgian troops, UN 
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faced with several dilemmas. The US could no longer control the UN as they had 
during the Korean War when they controlled a majority in the Security Council as 
well as the General Assembly. Hammarskjöld had, however, offered a solution to this 
in his promotion of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. The Americans were 
convinced of Hammarskjöld’s pro-Western and anti-communist stance and the 
Secretary-General could therefore be seen as a trusted partner of the Americans. At 
one point Eisenhower even asked why they had to bother with the Security Council, 
could not Hammarskjöld “just go out there and do his thing”.531 Secondly, the 
Americans wanted to avoid a situation, where they had to take sides between their 
colonial European Nato-allies and the anti-colonial countries in the Third World. A 
third important driving force in the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration 
that played a role in the Congo was the promotion of liberal capitalism. To many 
countries in the Third World, the planned economies of the Soviet Union and China 
were alluring. Especially if capitalism was tainted by colonialism, as in the socio-
economic status quo that the Belgians and their European allies were trying to uphold 
in the Congo. Finally, the American choice to rely on the UN was also motivated by 
the upcoming elections. As Lodge told Dixon: “it had been absolutely essential to 
move the United Nations into the situation; otherwise there might have been another 
Korea, with American forces operating in Africa, which would have been intolerable 
just before the presidential elections”.532 This reason was extra compelling to Lodge, 
who would soon leave the UN to join Nixon’s ticket as candidate for Vice President. 
On 11 July, Lodge was instructed to inform Hammarskjöld and Cordier that the US 
saw an important role for the UN in the Congo and that the Secretary-General “should 
take [the] lead in formulation and implementation UN actions in Congo”.533  
 
By 11 July the situation had deteriorated in the Congo and the resource rich province 
Katanga, which provided 47 per cent of income from taxation in the Congo,534 
declared its independence. The Katangan economy was dominated by the Union 
Minière du Haut Katanga that controlled the mining sector.535 Union Minière backed 																																																								
531 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Eisenhower and Herter 12 July 1960 FRUS 
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532 Telegram from Leopoldville (Scott) to FO 1 August 1960, No 400, JB2251/115, FO 371/146774. 
533 Telegram State to USUN 11 July 1960 FRUS 1958-60 Vol XIV. 
534 As taxes paid on revenue earned in Katanga, Kent, p. 8. 
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the political party Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT), 
which, led by Moïse Tshombe, pursued secessionist policies with the backing of 
white settlers. CONAKAT won a slender majority in the provincial elections, due to a 
technicality, but its main opponent, the Association des Balubas du Katanga 
(BALUBAKAT) won a majority of the popular vote.536 BALUBAKAT boycotted the 
provincial legislature, leaving Tshombe in complete control. But BALUBAKAT 
continued to dominate northern Katanga and it was only with the arrival of Belgian 
troops and European mercenaries in the Katanga gendarmerie that Tshombe managed 
to control the unruly province. Although the Belgian government did not officially 
support Katangan independence, the secession was backed by Belgian and Western 
European interests and made possible by the active support of Belgian troops.537  
 
The Belgian involvement in destabilising the Congo became obvious with the 
secession of Katanga and led Kasavubu and Lumumba to send a new appeal to 
Bunche, this time in a very different tone. Instead of requesting UN technical 
assistance, as in the first request, the second request asked for UN “military 
assistance” to protect the Congo specifically against Belgian aggression. The request 
denounced the “colonialist machinations” that had led to the secession of Katanga and 
set out that the “essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the 
national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a 
threat to international peace”. If the UN would not lend such military assistance, the 
letter continued, the government of the Congo would “be obliged to appeal to the 
Bandung Treaty Powers”.538 The Congolese government was no longer asking for 
assistance to uphold law and order, it was asking the UN for military assistance 
against the Belgians and to end the secession in Katanga.  
 
Hammarskjöld decided to “ignore the part indicating they want the troops to act 
against Belgian aggression”.539 Any military action against the Belgians would have 
been stillborn in the Security Council, vetoed by the French, the British and the 
Americans. It would also have risked a situation where the Third World might side 																																																								
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with the Soviet Bloc against the West. Hammarskjöld had no mind to lend UN 
military assistance to the Congo government on any terms other than his own. The 
fact that Hammarskjöld wittingly ignored what the Government of the Congo had 
specifically asked for and the fact that the UN operation that Hammarskjöld 
envisaged was completely different from the one that the Congolese government had 
requested would soon trigger a set of events that would lead to a rupture between 
Hammarskjöld and Lumumba.  
 
Hammarskjöld called the Security Council meeting on 13 July on his own initiative 
under Article 99 of the UN Charter – the first and only time Article 99 has been used.  
This brought the Congo operation into an intimate connection with the Secretary-
General from the outset. Hammarskjöld realised that it would be difficult to steer a 
resolution through the Security Council, and he had prepared a plan B, as he cabled to 
Bunche: “If vetoed, I will see to it that proposal is carried through to special 
emergency session [of the General Assembly] where I have no doubt about 
majority”.540 
 
Hammarskjöld was now faced with walking the tightrope of a policy that was 
acceptable both to the Western European colonial countries and the Afro-Asians in 
order to avoid a rift between the two where the Soviets would support the Afro-
Asians against the West. Afro-Asian support was also important as the Soviets would 
not want to vote against the Afro-Asians. The British and the French were 
sympathetic towards the Belgians, and the British, who had major economic interests 
in Katanga, were naturally interested in keeping their economic privileges in the 
Congo. The Afro-Asians were critical of the Belgians and any course of action that 
smelled of supporting colonialism or limiting the newly gained independence of the 
Congo. The Americans tried to balance between the two. 541 In this they were close to 
Hammarskjöld’s position and the US instructions for the Security Council meeting on 
the evening of 13 July was that the US should give “every feasible support” to 
Hammarskjöld, while not appearing to take a lead. If Hammarskjöld wanted to “down 
play US involvement for obvious reasons” this was fully understood.542  Some 																																																								
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American diplomats were sceptical of a policy that they would describe as a “carte 
blanche” without restrictions to Hammarskjöld, in effect saying: “Whatever you say, 
we will support”.543 
 
Hammarskjöld had drafted a resolution with the mandate he wanted and asked the 
moderate Tunisian permanent representative Mongi Slim, who would become an 
important ally, to present it as this would make it harder for the Soviets to veto it.544 
Slim’s help was important as the Tunisians coordinated closely with the African states 
and were seen as the African representative on the Security Council. The British and 
the French, supported by the Italians, directed their efforts at deleting or amending the 
first operative paragraph of the resolution that called for a Belgian withdrawal. Lodge 
would have preferred to delete this paragraph as well, but Hammarskjöld convinced 
him that Slim would need this paragraph to secure his role as representative of all 
Africans in the Security Council.545 Slim thought that this formula was the “point of 
equilibrium” where both the West and the Afro-Asians could support the 
resolution.546 In the debate at the Security Council, Slim also made clear that the text 
was left intentionally imprecise to reach a compromise.547 Presented as an Afro-Asian 
resolution, although drafted by Hammarskjöld, it was “extremely difficult” for the 
Soviets to veto the resolution for being too soft without angering the African states.548 
The operative parts of the resolution read as follows: 
 
“1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the 
territory of the Republic of the Congo; 
2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in 
consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the 
Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the 
efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United 
Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the 
Government, to meet fully their tasks; 
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3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as 
appropriate.”549 
 
The Soviet delegate then proposed three amendments: that Belgian aggression should 
be condemned; that the Belgian withdrawal should be “immediate”; and that it should 
be specified that African nations were to provide the troops for the UN force. The 
three amendments were defeated and the resolution adopted. Lodge reported that the 
Security Council had “done its part and now we don’t need a special session of the 
GA and we really did much better than we had a right to expect”; the resolution was 
“not perfect but it gives [Hammarskjöld] what he wants”.550 Hammarskjöld would 
later refer to it as a “political miracle”.551 
 
Although the Belgians and their supporters would interpret it differently, the first 
operative paragraph was unequivocal in its call for the Belgians to withdraw. The 
second operative paragraph, on the other hand, was vague in that it left it to the 
Secretary-General to set up the UN operation in the Congo. It was, however, 
unambiguous in its stress on the relation between the UN operation and the Congolese 
government. The Secretary-General should act “in consultation with the Government” 
and “provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary”. 
Ambiguity would be the hallmark of the Security Council resolutions during the early 
months of the Congo crisis and Hammarskjöld would exploit this to push through his 
own policies for UN action. Hammarskjöld later told Dayal that a “new course in 
international cooperation was being chartered that would expand the frontiers of the 
Organization’s responsibilities and functions and greatly stimulate its future 
growth”.552 To the West’s objectives of keeping the Soviets out and upholding the 
socio-economic status quo, Hammarskjöld added a third objective: to expand the role 
of the UN and its Secretary-General, which would lead to policy and actions of the 
UN in the Congo being influenced by the logics of the UN as an organisation seeking 
to expand its role and influence. A success for the UN operation in the Congo became 
a goal in and of itself; but what was good for the UN was not necessarily good for the 																																																								
549 Security Council resolution S/4387of 14 July 1960. 
550 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and Lodge 14 July 1960 FRUS 1958-60 
Vol XIV. 
551 Hammarskjöld to de Seynes, outgoing code cable, 19 July 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld Papers 
L179:155. 
552 Dayal, Rajeshwar, Mission for Hammarskjöld: The Congo Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 
1976), p. 12. 
	 148	
Congo. Later on, Hammarskjöld wrote to Cordier regarding complaints that the UN 
was not consulting the government: “Of course we can satisfy them by lip service to 
consultation even in cases where Govt. is utterly incompetent to judge or utterly 
incapable of acting but where the ultimate responsibility must be ours as we cannot, 
with open eyes, in order to placate Govt., do things we know to be harmful to best 
interests of the Congo.” Hammarskjöld also added that the UN “lives under its own 
laws and may act for purposes which override any single national consideration”.553 
 
 
A.2 ONUC and the “Congo Club” 
The same day that the Security Council resolution was adapted Kasavubu and 
Lumumba sent a message to Khrushchev in which they asked him to follow the 
situation carefully as “Soviet help might be required if the Western powers failed to 
stop aggression”.554 From the outset, one of the major objectives of ONUC was to 
prevent Soviet interference in the Congo, just as it had been a main objective for 
Hammarskjöld’s ideas on a UN role in Africa in general – Hammarskjöld’s slogan 
“keeping the Cold War out of the Congo” meant keeping the Soviets out of the 
Congo. As the British Ambassador to the UN would write later, looking back on the 
first months of the UN operation in the Congo: “[Hammarskjöld’s] fundamental 
political aim […] was to keep out the Great Powers, by which he really meant the 
Soviet Union. It is because this coincides with British policy and interests that we 
have been able to support [Hammarskjöld]”.555  
 
Hammarskjöld had presented a set of principles according to which ONUC should be 
set up during the debate in the Security Council. First, Hammarskjöld would ask 
African countries to contribute troops, then other countries who were not permanent 
members of the Security Council.556 The African troops were to avoid any taint of 
colonialism, and non-permanent members of the Security Council was, as at Suez, a 
principle used to keep Soviet troops out. Both Hammarskjöld and the Americans were 
clear that no Soviet Bloc troops would be used in the Congo. Instead a token 
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Yugoslav force was acceptable to “neutralize” the Soviets. 557  Hammarskjöld 
predicted from the outset that differences over UN policies might occur with some of 
the most enthusiastic troop contributors. Hammarskjöld therefore tried to decline the 
offers of troops from Guinea altogether and then delayed their arrival. 558 
Hammarskjöld and his military commander then made sure that the Guineans were 
sent to a “remote jungle region” so as not to be a possible power factor in the 
capital.559 Hammarskjöld also declined an offer from Guinea to provide political 
advisors, stating as an excuse that they were not needed, but told Lodge in private that 
Guinean political advisors would have been “impossible”.560 The Guinean, Ghanaian 
and United Arab Republic (UAR) contingents were highly suspicious to 
Hammarskjöld, who referred to them as “flags of convenience” for potential African 
nationalist or Soviet (or a combination of both) interests and therefore likely to have 
an equivocal loyalty to the UN.561 As at Suez, the Americans provided the bulk of the 
logistical support for the UN operation. 
 
If Hammarskjöld could not be too picky when it came to troop providing countries, he 
could choose the top level of UN officials. For the head of the UN force 
Hammarskjöld selected his countryman Major General Carl von Horn, who was 
“uncompromisingly pro-Western and anti-Communist”. 562  Bunche was 
Hammarskjöld’s Special Representative and in charge of ONUC, although Bunche 
was given little leeway and reported constantly to Hammarskjöld on the smallest 
things.563 Hammarskjöld’s right hand man in New York, Andrew Cordier – who was 
to play a crucial role in the Congo crisis – was also American. A third American, 
Heinrich “Heinz” Wieschhoff, completed the triumvirate of Hammarskjöld’s closest 
advisors during the Congo crisis. According to Barco, who worked closely with them, 
all three appeared to share Hammarskjöld’s views and there was never any real 
difference of opinion in the group, although Wieschhoff sometimes appeared to want 																																																								
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to go further than the others.564 By 1960, Wieschhoff was Hammarskjöld’s chief 
African adviser and Hammarskjöld referred to him as his “grey eminence”.565 
Wieschhoff had been deputy to Bunche when he headed the Trusteeship department 
but was now the Director of the Department for Political and Security Council 
Affairs, and therefore nominally the deputy of the Soviet Under Secretary-General for 
Political and Security Council Affairs. To Hammarskjöld, theoretical hierarchies 
mattered little and his Soviet superior was not allowed access to the Congo files, 
which were instead handled by his Wieschhoff.566 During the Second World War 
Wieschhoff had – as had Bunche and Cordier – worked for the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), a precursor to the CIA, and for the State Department. To this 
triumvirate was added a fourth American, Henry Labouisse, Hammarskjöld’s friend 
from the days of the Marshall Plan, who was borrowed from the World Bank.567 This 
was the inner circle of the “Congo Club”, as the small group that ran ONUC from 
New York was nicknamed. 568  To this inner circle was added Sir Alexander 
MacFarquhar569, the Secretary-General’s adviser for civilian operations in the Congo, 
Indar Jit Rikhye, the Secretary-General’s adviser for military operations, and Philippe 
de Seynes, who worked with the financial aspects of the Congo operation. This was 
the full list of the Congo Club from the beginning.570 Later, after criticism, the Congo 
Club was expanded to take in more members and a greater geographic diversity, but 
this was a watered down version and at these meetings Cordier and Wieschhoff 
tended to say very little; they remained, however, Hammarskjöld’s closest advisers, 
but their counsel was for an intimate circle only.571 It was hardly surprising that this 																																																								
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state of affairs did not commend the neutrality of the operation to the Soviets and 
other critical observers.  
 
The relations between Cordier and the State Department were very close. It is, 
however, important to not misunderstand the nature of these relations. 572  The 
Secretariat, in order to function, must have close contacts with member states and it is 
only natural that a member of the Secretariat will be expected to have privileged 
contacts with his government, which does not mean acting on the orders of that 
government. Nothing says that the Secretariat should not share information and work 
closely with member states, and especially members of the Security Council in a 
Security Council mandated operation. The problem arises when we compare with the 
Soviets. It can hardly be considered correct for the Secretariat to have the intimate 
relationship that Cordier had with the State Department with one government, but not 
with others. The problem also arises when the Secretariat attempts to be something 
else than the member states and have an independent political role, then it becomes 
problematic that they are discussing and outlining that policy with some member state 
and not others. From the beginning, Hammarskjöld geared the whole UN operation in 
the Congo in an anti-Soviet and pro-Western way. As UN policy was anti-Soviet, this 
also explains the reluctance to share UN documents with Soviet members of the UN.  
 
 
B Hammarskjöld Against Lumumba 
B.1 “Guarantees of Western interests” 
The different views of the role of the UN in the Congo came to the fore as soon as the 
first troops arrived in Leopoldville. “Bunche was now finding his dealings with 
Lumumba, who had a totally wrong notion of the role of the UN troops, increasingly 
difficult”, Hammarskjöld’s military adviser, Rikhye wrote.573 If Lumumba’s idea of 
the role of the UN was “totally wrong” it is worth considering if the UN should even 
have stayed in the country as it was there on the invitation of the Congolese 
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government and mandated to work in close cooperation with the government.574 On 
18 July, four days after the Security Council resolution, Hammarskjöld remarked to 
the Americans that “this is first time UN has had to assist country where it had no 
government and whole UN program is going ahead without Govt of Congo approval 
in any clear-cut form”. Hammarskjöld did not feel he had to pay attention to 
Lumumba’s government. Instead Hammarskjöld acted without consulting the Congo 
government, in direct contradiction of the second operative paragraph of resolution 
143. The Americans noted that Hammarskjöld did not seem daunted by the fact that 
there was no consent from the government “and in fact appears intrigued by creative 
role thrust upon the UN”. Hammarskjöld also held a low opinion of the Prime 
Minister Lumumba, who, in Hammarskjöld’s opinion was “not very strong and 
probably will not last”.575  
 
Hammarskjöld’s views also differed starkly from those of the Congolese government 
regarding how to deal with the secession in Katanga. Already on 18 July, he had spelt 
out his strategy towards Katanga to the Americans and the British. Hammarskjöld’s 
“general tactic will be that he will deal directly with Tshombe and by implication 
recognize his importance and at same time trade that recognition for permission have 
troops enter Katanga”. Hammarskjöld thought that the problem would go away once 
UN troops were installed in Katanga, as Tshombe’s efforts to secede would then 
“likely lose their footing”, prompting Tshombe to seek a reconciliation with the 
central government. Hammarskjöld also “emphasized he does not wish UN action to 
have effect of artificially bolstering Lumumba”.576 The British had also been adamant 
that Hammarskjöld should not try and help the central government to regain Katanga. 
Hammarskjöld replied, both in public, commenting on the resolution of 14 July, and 
privately to the British, that the UN force “would not in any way interfere in internal 
political or constitutional issues”, a euphemism for not interfering with Katanga.577 
The British objective, was “to see achieved a settlement between the Katanga and the 
Central Government which preserves Katanga’s rights as a province and offers 
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guarantees of Western interests there”.578 In other words, to keep the socio-economic 
status quo. Hammarskjöld reassured the British that his “long-term objectives were 
identical” in this regard.579 Both Britain and France abstained (the French also warned 
Hammarskjöld they would follow developments closely580) on the resolution and 
Hammarskjöld’s first priority was to convince them that he would implement the 
resolution in accordance with their preferences. 
 
In the evening of 17 July Kasavubu and Lumumba, as the Belgians showed no signs 
of withdrawing despite the arrival of UN troops, presented Bunche with an ultimatum 
that if the Belgians had not left the Congo by 19 July they would ask the Soviets for 
help. This ultimatum and other instances of the central government asking for help 
from other quarters than the UN has often been interpreted as proof that Lumumba 
was erratic, or held communist sympathies, or both. However, it fits in perfectly with 
the logic pursued by Kasavubu and Lumumba. To them, the overriding goal was to 
achieve full independence as a truly sovereign nation; the two main objectives to do 
so were to get the Belgians out and end the Katangan secession. It was to deal with 
these two problems that they had asked for UN assistance. The first appeal had been 
to the Americans, who had in turn persuaded them to turn to the UN. But the UN 
quickly showed that it had objectives that were not the same as those of the Congolese 
government in its willingness to ignore the Belgians and instead focus on exclusive 
multilateral assistance.  
 
 
B.2 Exclusive Multilateral Assistance or a UN trusteeship? 
Already before independence Hammarskjöld had seen the Congo as an opportunity to 
implement his ideas for a large technical assistance scheme for the Congo.581 He now 
argued for UN exclusive technical assistance to the Congo partly as a way to prevent 
Soviet technical assistance, unless it was given via the UN. Exclusive UN technical 
assistance was, however, not something the Congolese government had ever asked 
for, nor was it mentioned in the Security Council resolution. The Americans backed 
Hammarskjöld’s plans for exclusive UN assistance and suggested that the UN should 																																																								
578 Telegram from FO to UKUN 18 July 1960, No 916, JB2251/32, FO 371/146770. 
579 UKUN (Beeley) to FO, 19 July 1960, No 519, JB2251/46, FO 371/146771.  
580 Note by Dag Hammarskjöld 14 July 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld Papers L179:141.  
581 Cable from de Seynes to Hammarskjöld, 17 June 1960, UN Archives, Series 217, Box 1, File 1. 
	 154	
enter into an agreement with the Congo “giving it the exclusive right to furnish all 
necessary technicians” to which the UN agreed. As a corollary to this, a group had 
been set up in the State Department that had “spotted all the key places in the 
Government of the Congo in which we would prefer not to have Soviet technicians 
placed. We will try to have our own technicians in these positions or at least prevent 
their being filled by Soviet technicians.”582 The reason for this was that “Western-
oriented or at least neutral Congo extremely important in Cold War”.583  
 
The Congolese Government was not interested in exclusive UN technical assistance 
and limiting Soviet influence. To Lumumba technical assistance would not be a 
problem: the Congo held enormous riches and there would always be foreigners 
willing to help the Congolese extract these. (To Lumumba there was “no difference 
fundamentally between Russians and Americans since both would come to Congo to 
exploit it”. 584 ) Lumumba would welcome whoever wanted to work with the 
Congolese on the best terms for the Congolese.585 What he did need help with was 
getting rid of the Belgians and asserting control over Katanga. If the Americans and 
the UN were not going to help with this, Lumumba made it clear that he would look 
for help elsewhere. As Lumumba stated in a press conference on 20 July, the Congo, 
as a sovereign nation, had the right to “ask any nation in the world for help”.586 To 
Lumumba this right was an integral part of being a sovereign nation that the UN was 
now trying to deprive the Congo of with its insistence on exclusivity. Lumumba 
might also have been hoping that rattling the Soviet sabre would get the UN to put 
more pressure on the Belgians, at least this was the analysis of Lodge. After meeting 
Lumumba in New York he reported that “Lumumba is certainly not crazy; that he 
wasn’t getting anywhere so he threatened to call in the Chinese Communists which 
put the necessary heat on the U.N. to get quick action […] he is a little flighty and 
erratic in some respects; but he knows exactly what he is doing”.587 In the short run, 
Lumumba’s tactic was successful. As a direct consequence of the ultimatum the 
Soviets called a new meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Belgian defiance 																																																								
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of resolution 143. This was exactly the situation that Hammarskjöld and the 
Americans wanted to avoid. From a Cold War perspective it was very embarrassing 
that the Soviets were now lambasting the Belgians for breaching Security Council 
resolution 143.  
 
When Tunisia and Ceylon presented a draft resolution that called for “immediate” 
withdrawal – the exact wording of the Soviet amendment that had been defeated a 
week earlier – Hammarskjöld and the Americans had to use every effort to avoid an 
Afro-Asian-Soviet Bloc-alliance against the Belgians. Finally, the wording was 
changed from “immediate” to “speedy”. When he introduced the resolution Slim 
stated that he would have preferred stronger wording such as “immediate”, but had 
acquiesced to get general support for the resolution.588 In other words, the African 
representative now went on the record as preferring a wording first proposed by the 
Soviets, but agreed to water it down to get the support of the Western members of the 
Security Council. Both Hammarskjöld and the Americans realised that the Belgians 
were the problem. But they had to tread carefully and not alienate the Belgians or 
their French and British sympathisers in the Security Council. Behind the scenes, 
Hammarskjöld and the Americans put pressure on the Belgians to make an 
announcement of their intentions to withdraw ahead of the Security Council meeting 
to take some of the wind out of the Soviet sails, which Wigny, the Belgian Foreign 
Minister, also did. For now it calmed the situation and Lumumba was happy with the 
outcome.589 The Belgians were also happy with the outcome and the British found 
resolution 145 “surprisingly satisfactory”. This was due to the operative paragraph 
leaving it to the Secretary-General to coordinate the “speedy withdrawal”. As Dixon 
reported, the Secretary-General’s ideas on the subject were very similar to British 
views.590 Even the French, for all their scepticism of ONUC, had voted for resolution 
145 after Wigny had specifically asked them to.591 A few days earlier Wigny had told 
the British Ambassador in Brussels that he was worried about the resolutions against 
Belgium, but recognised that they “were at present neutralized by Secretary-General’s 
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helpful and robust attitude”, although he was worried that they were now putting all 
their trust in the Secretary-General’s implementation of the resolutions.592  
 
It was in the days after the 17 July ultimatum that the CIA director Allen Dulles 
famously labelled Lumumba “a Castro or worse”.593 The Belgians had tried to portray 
Lumumba as a Communist for a long time to turn the Americans against him, but the 
Americans had taken these reports with a large pinch of salt. Now, as Lumumba 
turned more and more against the UN, he was – Communist or not – de facto acting 
against American interests. On 19 July Burden, the American ambassador in Brussels, 
summed up the situation after Lumumba’s ultimatum: “Whatever circumstances and 
motivations may have led to present situation, Lumumba has now maneuvered 
himself into position of opposition to West, resistance to United Nations and 
increasing dependence on Soviet Union and on Congolese supporters (Kashamura, 
Gizenga) who are pursuing Soviet’s ends”. In the light of this it was “only prudent” 
that a “principal objective of our political and diplomatic action must therefore be to 
destroy Lumumba government as now constituted, but at same time we must find or 
develop another horse to back which would be acceptable in rest of Africa and 
defensible against Soviet political attack”.594 Although Burden’s views were among 
the most hawkish, this would become the American policy, hampered only by the fact 
that it was very hard to find “another horse to back”. Burden added that for this policy 
it was “important persuade United Nations authorities and representatives see 
situation in Congo as we do”.595  
 
But there was little need to persuade the top UN officials of the dangers of Lumumba. 
To the Americans he represented a danger to their Congo strategy; to the UN he 
represented a danger to its very existence. If the UN would have to leave the Congo, it 
would mean an end to all Hammarskjöld’s ambitions for the UN. Rather than the 
Americans convincing the UN that Lumumba was dangerous, Hammarskjöld 
portrayed Lumumba to the Americans and the British as a “Communist stooge” and a 
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dope addict in private meetings.596 The insistence of Hammarskjöld and other UN 
officials that Lumumba was a “Communist stooge” was not consistent with the 
reports that the Americans received from other sources. A report from the Bureau for 
Intelligence and Research on whether Lumumba was a Communist stated that they 
had found “nothing to substantiate this allegation”. The report concluded that “The 
most accurate summary of his views is probably his own declaration of July 5, 1960, 
‘We are not Communists, Catholics, or Socialists. We are African nationalists. We 
reserve the right to be friendly with anybody we like according to the principles of 
positive neutrality’”.597 The American embassy in Léopoldville was of the same 
opinion: “Lumumba is an opportunist and not a Communist”.598 At the US mission in 
New York there were those who felt that Hammarskjöld was “moving perhaps to 
rapidly to the conclusion that it was impossible to work with Lumumba” and that 
Hammarskjöld rejected Lumumba out of hand.599 
 
As far as Hammarskjöld and his confidants were concerned, third-world nationalism 
and revolutionary movements were viewed with a striking lack of analytical depth 
that seemed stuck in the inter-war period with a passion for discarding all nationalists 
as Hitlers and Mussolinis. With a logic that could have been borrowed from Anthony 
Eden, Hammarskjöld was also fond of referring to “Munich” as a historical argument 
for acting early against any nationalist and revolutionary tendencies. Before the Suez 
crisis Hammarskjöld had referred to Nasser as both a “Hitler” and a “Mussolini” in 
private discussions with the British and now he cautioned against the perils of 
Nkrumah’s pan-africanism.  In a cable to Cordier he described it as an attempt to 
create “a coastal empire, stretching from Ghana down to and including the ex-Belgian 
Congo”, and referred to this as “Nkrumah’s African Mussolini-Hitler drive”.600 
Cordier held the same views and wrote that “Nkrumah is the Mussolini of Africa 
while Lumumba is its little Hitler”.601 Bunche was also opposed to this brand of pan-
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africanism602 and Wieschhoff derogatorily referred to the delegates of the fourth 
committee as the “Mau-mau”.603  
 
Lumumba’s trip to New York in July 1960 would bring out the differences between 
his vision of the Congo and Hammarskjöld’s. During his stay in New York, 
Lumumba kept to his tactics of holding all doors open, meeting with the Americans as 
well as the Soviets. Multilateral assistance, as defined by Hammarskjöld, would on 
the other hand mean that all doors were closed except the UN door. By now, 
Lumumba knew a bit more about the UN, and he had come to realise that exclusive 
multilateral assistance was not what he wanted. In a discussion with Cordier, 
Lumumba said that it “smacked of trusteeship”.604 Real independence and sovereignty 
were Lumumba’s goals.605 Lumumba brought this up as one of his main concerns 
with the Americans: “[Lumumba] did not like idea of all countries chanelling their aid 
through UN. This would make Congo subservient to UN. As sovereign nation Congo 
should be able to negotiate bilateral treaties with various nations”.606 Lumumba met 
several times with Hammarskjöld, flanked by Cordier and Wieschhoff. Kanza, the 
Congolese representative at the UN, who was present at these talks wrote that 
“misunderstandings and disagreements […] dogged all their talks”; he was 
“witnessing a real conflict of personalities”.607 To Lumumba, the Congolese economy 
should not be in thrall to Western European companies. To Hammarskjöld the Congo 
represented the opportunity to put into practice all his theories of UN technical 
assistance and development – of filling the vacuum in Africa, and keeping the Soviets 
out. While Lumumba focused on the internal situation, Hammarskjöld’s focus was the 
international situation, where the logic of the Cold War was paramount. 
Hammarskjöld held “Lumumba to be an ignorant pawn, in his utter lack of experience 
of the big political currents, balances and pressures”.608 To Hammarskjöld it was 
imperative to keep the Soviets out, but also to keep Western style capitalism as the 
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base of the economy.609 This meant not only keeping Soviet troops and political 
influence out, but also keeping Communist or leftist socio-economic influence out. It 
was therefore important to show the success of a Western capitalist economy as the 
way forward. Technical assistance on a massive scale was needed. Lumumba 
threatened both of these objectives with his flirting with the Soviets and his economic 
ideas. Exclusive UN technical assistance was not only needed to keep the Soviets out, 
but also to fulfil Hammarskjöld’s dream of the UN’s destiny in Africa as the provider 
of technical and political assistance on a massive scale. There was never any real 
discussion or exchange of ideas between Hammarskjöld and Lumumba, and they 
continued to view the Congo crisis from two different points of view, both 
underestimating the other. Hammarskjöld thought that he did not need to cooperate 
with Lumumba and could go against Lumumba with impunity, failing to realise his 
support among other African leaders. Lumumba underestimated Hammarskjöld and 
his influence not only over the UN, but also over American policy in the Congo and 
the extent to which the Americans would support Hammarskjöld.  
 
When the Americans discussed UN assistance to the Congo with the African 
ambassadors it soon transpired that, contrary to Hammarskjöld’s claims after his 
African trip, many countries had a negative view of UN exclusivity when it came to 
technical assistance. Guinea’s ambassador was “firmly opposed since this might be 
taken as indication Congo considered U.N. Trust Territory”. Instead he urged the US 
to make a bilateral offer of aid for fear that Lumumba would otherwise be likely to 
accept a Soviet offer. The Moroccan and Tunisian representatives, considered 
moderates by the US, also showed understanding for the “Congolese sensitive to 
limitations on sovereignty such as exclusive aid arranged even with U.N. might 
imply”. The Liberian and Ghanaian ambassadors, on the other hand, agreed that the 
UN should be an exclusive channel. All the African ambassadors, however, 
emphasised that the “immediate problems of Belgian troops and Katanga outweighed 
all considerations and nothing could be settled in Congo in absence of settlement”.610 
This had been Lumumba’s view all along; it was not, however, the priority of 
Hammarskjöld.  
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B.3 “Showdown” with Lumumba over Katanga 
For some time Bunche had argued that Tshombe was a “puppet” and that 
Hammarskjöld and the US should make a clear statement of support for the central 
government. 611  Wieschhoff argued strongly against Bunche’s line both with 
Hammarskjöld and in meetings with the Americans.612 Wieschhoff thought that 
Lumumba would evolve into a radical and that the UN and the US should support 
“Tshombe as politically important conservative political counterweight to extremism 
of Lumumba”.613 
 
Hammarskjöld did not view the Katanga secession as an urgent problem before his 
first trip to the Congo at the end of July and he hoped that he could negotiate a UN 
entry into Katanga in Brussels. Hammarskjöld also succeeded in securing Belgian 
agreement to the entry of UN troops with the proviso that direct negotiations with 
Tshombe would first be held.614 The Belgian Foreign Minister, Wigny, also told the 
British Ambassador in Brussels that he thought Hammarskjöld “might be satisfied if 
this were only a token force”.615 When Hammarskjöld arrived in Léopoldville from 
Brussels he soon realised that he would not be able to solve the Katanga problem so 
easily. Lumumba had instructed Antoine Gizenga, the Deputy Prime Minister, to put 
the heat on Hammarskjöld during his visit.616 At a dinner in Hammarskjöld’s honour 
Gizenga gave a speech, broadcast on the national radio, that criticised the UN in harsh 
terms for not sending troops to Katanga. In New York this statement was immediately 
backed up by Lumumba, Ghana and the Soviet Union.617 Faced with this pressure 
Hammarskjöld declared on 2 August that he was sending Bunche to Katanga on 5 
August to negotiate the entry of UN troops who, Hammarskjöld added, would enter 
Katanga the following day, 6 August. This schedule would hardly leave any time for 
negotiations with Tshombe, and the entry of UN troops seemed a foregone conclusion 
as Hammarskjöld had phrased it. It was not what the Belgians had agreed to, and they 
felt they had “been abused and Hammarskjold had not acted properly”.618 Tshombe 																																																								
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immediately sent a telegram to Hammarskjöld stating that UN troops would be 
resisted by force, but agreed to discuss the situation with Bunche. When Bunche 
arrived in Elisabethville he received a hot welcome that left him shaken and 
convinced that any attempt to deploy UN troops would be met with fierce 
resistance.619 Whether this was true or not, Hammarskjöld decided to postpone the 
deployment of UN troops to Katanga and instead call a meeting of the Security 
Council.  
 
The Katanga question had now become an existential question for the UN. From New 
York, Lumumba immediately attacked Hammarskjöld for giving in to the Belgians 
and Tshombe, and both Ghana and Guinea offered to put their UN contingents at the 
disposal of the Congolese government for a move against Katanga. Lodge pressed the 
Belgian foreign minister to withdraw the Belgian troops and, later in the day, Lodge 
met with Hammarskjöld who shared Bunche’s analysis from the field with Lodge. 
Bunche’s cables painted a sad picture of the UN position in the Congo and concluded 
that the situation could only be saved by an immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops 
and the entry of UN forces in Katanga. There was a risk that this would lead to an 
exodus of westerners from Katanga, but “such a risk must be taken in order pull rug 
out from under extremists among Congolese political leaders”.620 To Hammarskjöld, 
Lumumba and other “extremists” were using the Katangan secession and the 
prolonged Belgian military presence as a means to increase their power and 
potentially opening the door for Soviet intervention. If, however, a UN presence could 
be established in Katanga, Lumumba would be bereft of his trump card. This was a 
strange analysis that shows how the Cold War logic had gotten the better of 
Hammarskjöld. Lumumba had, from the outset, only wanted two things from the UN: 
to get the Belgians out and end the Katangan secession. It is hard to see that 
Lumumba preferred to use the Belgian troops and the Katangan secession to 
strengthen his position and invite the Soviets. On the contrary the Belgian presence 
and the Katangan secession were undermining Lumumba’s government. If the 
Belgian presence and the Katangan secession continued this might lead Lumumba to 
request Soviet aid, but as an act of desperation. The surest way of keeping the Soviets 
out would therefore have been to secure a Belgian withdrawal and end the secession 																																																								
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in Katanga. The reason Hammarskjöld had not acted more strongly against Tshombe 
was because he did not want to strengthen Lumumba. Hammarskjöld was at this point 
also well aware of the Belgian involvement in backing Tshombe and obstructing a 
UN entry. Hammarskjöld showed Lodge a report from Linnér that showed that the 
business lobby in Katanga were trying to sabotage the UN entry into Katanga on the 
orders of the Belgian representative d’Aspremont and that Tshombe was supported by 
money rather than local political success.621 Nonetheless, despite the fact that both the 
Americans and Hammarskjöld were by now clear that the Belgians were the problem, 
they chose to accommodate their demands. 
 
To resolve the issue of the entry of UN troops in Katanga, Hammarskjöld needed to 
give strong assurances to Tshombe and the financial interests behind him. 
Hammarskjöld realised that the Belgian government was not in a position to call the 
shots in Elisabethville; if he wanted to make headway, he would have to offer 
something directly to Tshombe. This was also in line with US and UN policy to keep 
Tshombe as a strong moderate influence in the Congo. To deal with the problem and 
give Tshombe the necessary assurances and strengthen his own hand by getting 
express Security Council endorsement for his interpretation of the mandate 
Hammarskjöld prepared a report, in which he outlined his views for tackling the 
Katanga question, which he presented to the Security Council on 8 August. In the 
report, Hammarskjöld said that he did not interpret the previous resolutions as giving 
the UN a mandate to use force against Katanga. Furthermore, Hammarskjöld’s report 
stated that the problem “did not have its root in the Belgian attitude” nor in the 
Katangan authorities’ wish to secede.622 Hammarskjöld was well aware that this was a 
misrepresentation of the situation and admitted “emphatically” to the Americans that 
the Belgian troops in Katanga were indeed the root of the problem, “although in his 
written report he had decided play it differently”.623  Hammarskjöld also went to great 
lengths to put in writing that the entry of the UN into Katanga would not in any way 
mean “taking sides in the conflict” and that Tshombe would be left free to work out 
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his differences with the central government.624 The report thus met with more or less 
all of the demands that Tshombe had been making earlier, although officially 
Hammarskjöld ignored these demands. 625  The Belgians found it “unexpectedly 
favourable from the Belgian point of view.”626 Even the French, although they would 
abstain on the final resolution, told the British and the Americans that they supported 
a resolution along the lines of Hammarskjöld’s report.627 Lodge correctly foresaw that 
the African countries would be “unhappy” with Hammarskjöld’s report, “and 
Lumumba and Soviets even more so”.628  
 
Hammarskjöld asked the Security Council to adopt a resolution along the lines of his 
report. The Western members of the Security Council declared themselves in favour 
of this, while the Congolese Foreign Minister, Bomboko, and the Tunisian Slim, 
presented evidence that the Belgians were actively backing the Katangan secession. 
The Soviet representative Kuznetsov followed up on these remarks and introduced a 
draft resolution which called on the Secretary-General “to take decisive measures, 
without hesitating to use any means to that end, to remove the Belgian troops”, but 
this was withdrawn when a Tunisian-Ceylonese draft resolution, largely following 
Hammarskjöld’s report, was adopted.629 The Belgians, were “extremely satisfied” 
with the outcome, even though the resolution called for the “immediate” withdrawal 
of Belgian troops from Katanga.630 The resolution also stated that “the United Nations 
Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to 
influence the outcome of any internal conflict”.631 
 
In a meeting with the US mission to the UN, Wieschhoff, Hammarskjöld’s “grey 
eminence”, explained that now that Hammarskjöld had received the necessary 
backing from the Security Council to deal with Katanga in his preferred way, “his 
next problem will be Lumumba”. Hammarskjöld anticipated strong resistance from 
Lumumba to his way of dealing with Katanga. In Wieschhoff’s “personal view” it 																																																								
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might be a good thing if Lumumba tried to interfere with Hammarskjöld’s plan for 
Katanga as this would precipitate a test of strength with his opponents in the Congo. 
Wieschhoff believed that “Lumumba would now lose such struggle and it would have 
result of weakening or destroying his role in govt”.632 Hopefully, a success in Katanga 
would result in both under-cutting Lumumba and tempering the criticisms of the 
Africans and the Soviets. From this meeting, on 10 August, can be dated the 
beginning of a tactic by Hammarskjöld to force a confrontation with Lumumba with 
the objective of ousting him from office. The reasons were many. Hammarskjöld and 
most of the UN personnel in the Congo were unable to cooperate with Lumumba, 
who was opposed to UN schemes for exclusive multilateral assistance. But Lumumba 
was also embarrassing Hammarskjöld by pointing out that the Belgians were in 
breach of the Security Council resolutions.  
 
What was meant by a success in Katanga was far from clear. To Hammarskjöld, form 
seems, as so often, to have triumphed over substance and any UN presence was the 
goal, not the end of secession. On 12 August Hammarskjöld, accompanied by 240 
Swedish UN soldiers, went to Elizabethville without consulting Lumumba. Tshombe, 
who referred to the Swedish contingent as Hammarskjöld’s “body guard” and 
arranged for pictures to be taken with Hammarskjöld in front of the secessionist flag 
of Katanga, welcomed Hammarskjöld. To Hammarskjöld this was a great success: 
there now was a UN presence in Katanga, albeit a small token force of white soldiers. 
To Lumumba it seemed less so: the UN might have been allowed into Katanga, the 
central government was not. Hammarskjöld had not consulted the government before 
his move and Katanga was as secessionist as ever. What Lumumba had wanted was 
UN assistance to end the secession. Hammarskjöld had achieved something quite 
different. The UN had tacitly accepted eight out of ten of Tshombe’s conditions, 
which would be proved by UN actions over the next months.633 To all intent and 
purpose, the UN now safeguarded the neo-colonial order that the Belgians had 
orchestrated in Katanga. This was the American interpretation as well, who 
considered that the UN entry into Katanga was “accomplished on basis of assurances 
which in essence meant UN presence would not be permitted to upset status quo”.634 																																																								
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In Elisabethville, the arrival of UN troops under these circumstances was celebrated 
as a great success.635 In fact this gave Tshombe the time he needed to consolidate his 
power and build up the Katangan troops. As one observer put it: “If the internal 
organization of Katanga can be strengthened, if the UN troops limit themselves 
strictly to their role as a police force and if the existence of Katanga security forces 
becomes more than a myth, then Lumumba can go boil himself an egg; he will have 
lost the game.”636 By the time the UN realised that something more had to be done 
about Katanga the situation would be much worse with tragic consequences for both 
the UN and Hammarskjöld. 
 
But Lumumba was not about to go and boil himself an egg. Instead he protested 
vigorously in a letter to Hammarskjöld. There followed an exchange of letters 
between Lumumba and Hammarskjöld that were marked by Lumumba’s increasingly 
accusatory tone and Hammarskjöld’s frosty responses. In his final letter Lumumba 
wrote: “The government and people of the Congo have lost their confidence in the 
Secretary-General”.637 Hammarskjöld did not seem perturbed in the least; instead he 
made the correspondence public and returned to New York to convene a Security 
Council meeting to decide whose interpretation of the UN mandate was correct – the 
Secretary-General’s or the Prime Minister’s. 
 
The “crux of the issue”, read the American instructions for the upcoming Security 
Council meeting, “has now become dispute between Lumumba and [Secretary-
General] re future of UN role in Congo”.638 This was largely due to Hammarskjöld, 
whose intransigent attitude to Lumumba had caused the confrontation that 
Hammarskjöld had wanted. Hammarskjöld was certain that Lumumba would lose his 
support both in the Congo and on the international scene over a confrontation with the 
UN. Hammarskjöld told Lodge that “’Only Lumumba would be stupid enough’ to 
look for a showdown when the Secretary-General had all the ‘cards in his hand’”.639 
																																																								
635 Hoskyns, p. 173.  
636 Hoskyns, p. 173, quoting from Davister, Pierre, “Katanga: Enjeu du monde” (Bruxelles: Editions 
Europe-Afrique, 1960), p. 156. 
637 Kalb, p. 48. 
638 Telegram State to USUN 16 August 1960 FRUS 1958-60 Vol XIV. 
639 Kalb, p. 58. 
	 166	
Hammarskjöld seemed very “sure of himself” and told the Americans that “this is a 
showdown and that the UN cannot yield”.640  
 
Hammarskjöld’s calculations were based on the premise that the Afro-Asians would 
side with him against Lumumba, although the Americans were less convinced of 
this.641 Hammarskjöld’s problem was the Soviets, who would support Lumumba, 
which meant that any resolution in support of the Secretary-General would most 
likely run into a Soviet veto. He therefore came up with a new tactic to prevent a 
Soviet veto that he elaborated on in discussions with “his friends” the British642 and 
the Americans. Hammarskjöld told them not to press for a resolution: “the West 
should not put up a resolution but let the Soviets do so if they want to. The rest can 
vote against or abstain”.643 At a brief meeting with the French Foreign Minister at 
Orly in between flights, Hammarskjöld also explained that “from a tactical view 
point, his view was that the West should refrain from tabling a resolution approving 
his report to avoid the risk of a Russian veto”.644 His idea was that if no resolution 
critical of the Secretary-General’s conduct of the UN operation was adopted, that 
meant that his interpretation was validated. If the Soviets proposed a resolution that 
supported Lumumba’s interpretation and this was defeated, this meant that 
Lumumba’s interpretation was not supported. It did not follow that the Security 
Council endorsed Hammarskjöld’s interpretation, but this would be the implication. 
Hammarskjöld was of course careful to avoid pressing a resolution in his support as 
this would be vetoed, thus exposing that his interpretation was not supported either. 
This was something of a fiction, but Hammarskjöld thought that as long as only the 
Soviet Bloc was against him he could get away with it. The key issue for 
Hammarskjöld was to keep the support of the “neutral” Afro-Asians on the Security 
Council – Tunisia and Ceylon  – to show that he had the support of “neutral” world 
opinion against the isolated voice of the Soviet Bloc. To do this, Hammarskjöld 
needed the support of the broader Afro-Asian group, to whose opinion Tunisia, in its 
bid for African leadership at the UN, was especially deferential. Although a moderate 
influence, the Tunisians were careful not to be caught voting with the West against 																																																								
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the interests of the Africans. The Tunisians were also critical of what they perceived 
as the colonialism of the Belgians and their French allies.  
 
Ahead of the Security Council meeting, Soviet opposition to Hammarskjöld’s plans 
grew stronger and on 20 August the Soviets rejected his plan for an expanded civilian 
operation in the Congo.645 The Soviets were also preparing a draft resolution, based 
on a demand made by Lumumba, that a group comprising representatives of the troop 
contributing countries should be set up to monitor the implementation of the 
resolutions. To pre-empt this Hammarskjöld made a similar, but much more informal, 
proposal for an Advisory Committee of troop-contributing countries. The French were 
also sceptical: “we should not give Hammarskjöld a blank check concerning his 
disputes with the head of the Congolese government”.646 Hammarskjöld’s supporters 
in the council all echoed the view that there was no need for the Security Council to 
confirm his interpretation; if anyone disagreed they were free to put forward a draft 
resolution with another interpretation. In practice, this circumvented the veto power 
and meant that the Secretary-General could follow an independent policy without 
support from the Security Council until a resolution was voted that said otherwise. 
The Soviet representative withdrew a draft resolution censuring Hammarskjöld for 
lack of support. No resolution in support of Hammarskjöld was adopted either. The 
idea that Hammarskjöld’s Congo policy had the backing of the Security Council now 
rested on a fiction. 
 
Hammarskjöld concluded his remarks to the Security Council by stating “I have the 
right to expect guidance, but it should be obvious that if the Security Council says 
nothing I have no other choice than to follow my conviction”.647 This was the 
situation Hammarskjöld preferred, the vacuum, that he could fill with his own policy. 
No longer content merely to fill vacuums when they arose, Hammarskjöld was now 
showing himself quite adept at creating them as well. He never intended to offer any 
compromise that would have opened a meaningful dialogue with Lumumba, or made 
it possible for the Soviet Union to agree to a resolution that did not go so flagrantly 
against the Central Government; and, arguably, against the two previous Security 																																																								
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Council resolutions. Reigning by ambiguity had long been Hammarskjöld’s strategy 
and in the first months of the Congo crisis it allowed him to control the UN. This was 
not lost on his collaborators, one of whom suggested that his motto should be Per 
Ambigua ad Astra.648 In a cable to Bunche Hammarskjöld savoured the moment “an 
even greater parliamentary defeat for Lumumba than I had played for… We still have 
some way to go [at this point the words “break this man, who believes that he can 
dictate to the world” are crossed out]… but we have won important round and will of 
course continue on straight line”.649  
 
Lumumba’s destiny had been sealed already before the Security Council meeting. If 
Hammarskjöld had failed in his design to provoke a coup against Lumumba in the 
Congo, he had managed to convince the Americans that Lumumba had to go. 
Hammarskjöld’s real triumph over Lumumba in the “showdown” he had provoked 
came not in the Security Council, but at a meeting of the National Security Council on 
18 August. At the meeting, Dillon explained to Eisenhower that while there was no 
immediate threat to Hammarskjöld’s position, the “real danger” was that Lumumba 
might simply ask the UN to leave the Congo. According to Dillon, Hammarskjöld’s 
view was that “the only way that the Congo can be kept going is for the UN to run it 
as a UN trusteeship, although it would not be called that”. This view did not shock the 
Americans at all. Instead they focused on Lumumba (who had been right that 
Hammarskjöld wanted to turn the Congo into a trusteeship) as the problem. 
Eisenhower concluded that “the possibility that the UN would be forced out was 
simply inconceivable”. When Dillon pointed out that Lodge, as the expert on UN 
affairs, doubted whether the UN could stay on in the Congo if the Congo was really 
opposed to the UN, Eisenhower replied “that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent – 
we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by 
the Soviets.” When it came to choosing between the Secretary-General, who had 
stated that he wanted to run the Congo as a UN trusteeship, and the elected Prime 
Minister of the Congo, the Americans chose Hammarskjöld: “The situation that 
would be created by a UN withdrawal was altogether too ghastly to contemplate.”650 
It was not primarily because he was viewed as a Communist that Lumumba had to go, 																																																								
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it was because he threatened the UN and the Secretary-General’s position and this in 
turn was because he questioned Hammarskjöld’s ideas on how to run the Congo. 
Hammarskjöld had successfully made it a question of him or Lumumba – the Congo 
could not hold them both. The next day Lodge sent a telegram with contingency plans 
in the event that the UN was asked to leave the Congo after the Security Council 




C The Conspirators 
C.1 Kasavubu’s Coup – the UN Tries to Topple Lumumba 
The Americans were not the only ones plotting Lumumba’s downfall. On 26 August 
Hammarskjöld told Lodge that the “issue in Congo must come to crisis shortly and 
that Lumumba must be ‘broken’”. Hammarskjöld had “in mind that new crisis 
between Lumumba and UN, in which UN victorious, will under-cut Lumumba’s 
political power in Congo sufficiently that Kasavubu or Ileo will be able to assume 
effective control”. Hammarskjöld even predicted – with striking accuracy as it turned 
out – that this crisis would develop at the end of the meeting of the African leaders in 
Léopoldville that Lumumba had arranged for the beginning of September. 
Hammarskjöld also told Lodge that he had made various plans for the development of 
a crisis that would prepare the way for a coup against Lumumba. One likely crisis 
scenario that Hammarskjöld had planned for was if Lumumba asked the UN to leave 
the Congo. If Lumumba did so, Hammarskjöld told Lodge that he would call a 
Security Council meeting and say that the Force Publique could not maintain peace 
and order in the Congo and that the withdrawal of UN troops would therefore threaten 
world peace as foreign intervention would be inevitable. The UN would then, 
according to Hammarskjöld’s logic, be in a position to use enforcement measures to 
“restore international peace and security” under Article 42 of the UN Charter. 
Hammarskjöld later made the same remarks to Beeley, at the British UN mission. 
Any invocation of Article 42 would, however, require a prior determination by the 
Security Council under Article 39 that international peace and security was indeed 
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broken or threatened.652 It is therefore hard to see how Hammarskjöld would have 
been able to invoke enforcement measures on his own authority without calling a 
meeting of the Security Council, where, of course, the Soviets were likely to veto any 
such move. But Hammarskjöld had thought of this eventuality and thought that the 
negative tactic of blocking any resolution against his interpretation and counting this 
as endorsement would succeed again. Hammarskjöld realised that the Soviets might 
not accept this, but there was little they could do about it. They could play the Uniting 
for Peace-card and demand that the issue be referred to the General Assembly, but 
Hammarskjöld was convinced that they would be “defeated by a vote of 70 to 12” in 
the General Assembly and the Soviets would therefore not attempt this. After a 
Security Council or General Assembly session that confirmed the Secretary-General’s 
right to invoke emergency measures, Hammarskjöld told Lodge, the “UN would in 
effect be taking over control of Congo and that he would then be in position to disarm 
Force Publique by force if necessary”. 653  Hammarskjöld was now proactively 
planning to turn the Congo into a UN trusteeship.  
 
Despite, or perhaps because, of the great challenges ahead for the UN Hammarskjöld 
was in high spirits and told Lodge that “he had never worked so hard or enjoyed 
himself so much since he came here. He is clearly looking forward to forcing issue 
with Lumumba, but wants latter create the situation. He is confident that he can win 
with backing of substantially entire UN except Communists.”654 State Department 
was “greatly reassured by Hammarskjold’s assessment of Congo”655 According to 
Hammarskjöld “there was no Katanga problem between Tshombe and Kasavubu or 
Ileo but only with Lumumba”. This statement shows that Hammarskjöld was not 
concerned with the neo-colonial order set up in Katanga, something he was aware of 
through the reports from Linnér and others. Soon enough, however, Hammarskjöld 
would be aware that – Lumumba or no Lumumba – there was a very real Katanga 
problem, and it was only growing worse in the meantime. Herter, also concluded that 
“SYG’s objectives re Congo are parallel with our own, e.g., keep UN in Congo even 
over objection Lumumba; Katanga problem to be resolved peacefully and not to 																																																								
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West’s disadvantage; Force Publique to be brought under control; UN to obtain 
progressive control airports and ports; and Soviet influence in Congo to be 
minimized”.656 
 
Rajeshwar Dayal, who arrived in New York at this time before replacing Bunche also 
noted that Hammarskjöld “carried about him an aura of supreme confidence, the 
immensity of his responsibilities seeming only to exhilarate him.”657 The fight that 
Hammarskjöld was so confidently looking for was now approaching fast. On 29 
August, Timberlake reported from Léopoldville: “I think showdown with UN near 
and I hope they are ready for it”.658 Hammarskjöld had just despatched his right-hand 
man, Cordier, to Leopoldville. Cordier’s brief stay in Leopoldville would have 
momentous consequences. Kanza described it in the following terms: “the few days 
that he was in the Congo at the head of the UN, Cordier could be described as having 
been in effect the Congolese head of state, with Timberlake as personal adviser and 
vice-president”.659 Just like Hammarskjöld, Cordier saw Lumumba as the problem. In 
a letter to a friend a few days before he set out for the Congo Cordier explained the 
delicate situation that faced the UN:  
 
“The only real solution of the problem is a change of leadership. It will not be easy, 
however, to remove Lumumba from his position. Furthermore there are limits to our 
own capacity to bring about a change of leadership. We can produce such a situation 
in the international climate as to affect political pressures within the country, but we 
are excluded under the Charter from direct action of a political character which 
would affect the political balance of leadership within the country. In various ways 
the Secretary-General has given encouragement to the moderates and they are also 
receiving encouragement from other powerful political sources.”660 
 
But the international pressure was clearly not enough to affect the political balance of 
leadership within the Congo. The Americans had for some time been scouting for a 
horse to back against Lumumba. Kasavubu presented himself as the most obvious 
contender, but Timberlake reported that Kasavubu was not a feasible alternative, at 
least not as long as Lumumba was around. Timberlake also warned that “[w]hile 																																																								
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Lumumba’s elimination would remove one problem, it might well create many 
more”. One of them was that the “UN would also be accused at least of negligence, if 
not of complicity”.661 
 
Soon after arriving in the Congo, Cordier met with Kasavubu who seemed at last 
ready to move against Lumumba. Kasavubu discussed his plans for dismissing 
Lumumba with Cordier and wanted to know how the UN would react. Cordier made 
no attempt to stop Kasavubu and likely encouraged him in his designs against 
Lumumba. Cordier instituted special measures for the cable traffic with New York on 
3 September and afterwards asked his secretary to make sure all sensitive cables had 
been disposed of and asked her to bring “the originals of the three or four short letters 
which Kasavubu addressed to me on the night of 5 September”.662 Considering 
Kasavubu’s phlegmatic personality and the fact that he sought out Cordier’s advice it 
can be assumed that he would not have proceeded with his coup if Cordier had tried 
to dissuade him. Kasavubu also asked Cordier to close the radio station and the 
airports, which Cordier did.  The decision to close the radio and the airports – and its 
relation to the role of the UN in the Congo – would be greatly debated both at the 
time and in later studies of the Congo crisis.  
 
The measures hurt Lumumba infinitely more than Kasavubu (who had asked for 
them). Kasavubu had access to the powerful radio of Abbé Youlou over the river in 
Brazzaville, and was hardly affected by the closure of the radio in Leopoldville. The 
airports were also much more important to Lumumba as he had the bulk of his 
supporters outside of Leopoldville, whereas Kasavubu’s stronghold was the capital 
and the surrounding area. Kasavubu’s supporters were also allowed to use the airport 
on at least one occasion to fly out to build up support in the provinces.663 The British 
representative in Leopoldville, Ian Scott, who Cordier informed in advance of 
Kasavubu’s coup, also urged Cordier to take over the radio station and prevent 
Lumumba from going to Orientale province.  Scott’s report to London, sent before 
Kasavubu’s coup took place, also throws additional light on Cordier’s role: “The 																																																								
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United Nations is faced with a delicate situation”, Scott reported to London, “but 
Cordier is fully behind Kasavubu. He will provide Kasavubu with a Sudanese and 
Moroccan guard and will take other necessary precautions.”664 Cordier also refused to 
see Lumumba after his dismissal, as he was now a “private citizen”.665  
 
Hammarskjöld was aware of, and supported, Cordier’s actions.666 Hammarskjöld had, 
for some time, been actively trying to provoke a “showdown” and had even predicted, 
accurately, that it would occur after the African conference in Leopoldville. The fact 
that he sent Cordier to the Congo at this precise time is intriguing. Officially, Cordier 
was to serve in the interim period between Bunche and Dayal, while Dayal was 
briefed by Bunche in New York. But there was no obvious reason why Dayal could 
not have been briefed in Leopoldville, nor why none of the persons already in 
Leopoldville could fill the interim instead of Cordier. Dayal also arrived in the Congo 
on 5 September, yet Cordier, stayed in control for several days.667 Hammarskjöld’s 
cables to Cordier throw an interesting light on the perceived principles of impartiality 
that the UN followed in the Congo. On 5 September Hammarskjöld cabled Cordier 
with the hope that he would “find the proper balance between strictly legal and 
extraordinary latitudes” – clearly something that might not be “strictly legal” was 
encouraged. Hammarskjöld also added what he termed “an irresponsible 
observation”: “that responsible people on the spot may permit themselves, within 
framework of principles which are imperative, what I could not justify doing myself – 
taking the risk of being disowned when it no longer matters”.668 Hammarskjöld also 
added that he would come up with an “elaboration of thesis we would use” to defend 
the UN actions.669 Within a few hours Hammarskjöld had come up with a defence for 
the UN actions that he cabled to Cordier: “Our suggestion would be that your 
defence… should be elaborated on basis of thesis of “law and order” in roughly the 
following terms…”. Presented this way, the actions would be seen to “not involve any 
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taking of sides”.670 This succession of cables shows in a remarkable way how 
Hammarskjöld, famous for his stand on principles and the impartiality of the UN, first 
urged his Special Representative to conduct political actions that in fact were, at best, 
abetting a coup d’état, and then came up with the principles to justify the actions 
afterwards. The principles followed the actions; not the other way around. Rather than 
adopting a policy that was derived from principles of impartiality and non-
intervention in an internal conflict, Hammarskjöld’s policy was to intervene in the 
internal conflict. The principles of impartiality were created afterwards to defend 
actions that were motivated by partiality.  
 
 
C.2 “A Lumumba victory” followed by a new coup 
Meanwhile, Cordier was shocked by the lack of aptitude for coup-making that 
Kasavubu showed and called “the whole situation… a story out of Gilbert and 
Sullivan”. Cordier, who had done his best to support Kasavubu’s coup, reported in 
amazement that “after the President returned from the radio station he went to bed 
around midnight and assumed I guess that his job had been done. There were most 
essential contacts that he should have made in the early hours of Tuesday morning but 
he was unavailable. On the other hand Lumumba… worked around the clock without 
regard for sleep or meals… rounding up support and generally beating down efforts 
made by the President and his few active supporters”.671 The next day Lumumba 
turned the tables on Kasavubu when he received a double vote of support from 
parliament. Now Hammarskjöld was starting to get cold feet. He told the British that 
he “was obliged to consider the situation which would confront him if Lumumba won 
the present constitutional conflict… He must, therefore, adhere formally to the terms 
of his mandate.” And he continued by explaining that “while in practice the action of 
the United Nations favoured and was designed to favour Kasavubu, it could be 
represented as being strictly impartial”.672 Just like Cordier, Hammarskjöld lamented 
the fact that “As an organiser of a coup d’état Kasavubu had revealed himself to be 
extraordinarily incompetent, and had given Lumumba the opportunity to fight back.” 
Hammarskjöld felt that the UN needed to hedge against the possibility that Lumumba 																																																								
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emerged as the victor; but he was hoping that this could still be prevented, “and that a 
Government with which it is possible to do business on a reasonable basis may 
emerge”.673 
 
On 7 September Wieschhoff was scolded by the Americans for the failed coup, which 
the Americans now described as a “Lumumba victory”, and the amateurishness of the 
UN coup-makers. Like Cordier and Hammarskjöld, Wieschhoff blaimed Kasavubu. 
Rikhye and Liu, Bunche’s translator and advisor, who doubled as political advisor 
and had been sent by Cordier to discuss “next steps” but had not been able to reach 
Kasavubu. “How can you make a revolution with such material?”, Wieschhoff asked. 
The Americans told Wieschhoff that the perceived impartiality of the UN had been 
jeopardised without results: “UN should not have gone half-way against Lumumba; 
[this] seemed to produce disadvantages of interference without desired results”. 
Wieschhoff replied that the UN had planned for stronger intervention and among 
other things “had planned mount massive display of UN force at Parliament during its 
deliberation” and to intervene against the Force Publique. However, when the 
reluctant coup-makers Kasavubu and Ileo took no action and the Force Publique was 
“welcomed by both sides” the UN had found it impossible to act. “[T]here were limits 
as to how far UN could stretch its authority”, Wieschhoff explained, “Such action by 
UN force would have been too clearly intervention in internal affairs”.674  The coup 
against Lumumba did not fail for lack of backing from the UN but because 
Kasavubu’s inactivity tied the hands of the UN.  
 
Later on 7 September, the US mission, after talks with Hammarskjöld himself, 
reported that the “pattern” of the UN actions over the last days was now clear: 
“[Hammarskjöld] admitted at end that what he was trying to do was get rid of 
Lumumba without compromising UN position and himself through extra-
constitutional actions. (He compared his activities to “gamesmanship—how to win 
without actually cheating.”)”675 The reference Hammarskjöld made is to the classic 
1947 book Theory and Practice of Gamesmanship: Or the Art of Winning Games 
Without Actually Cheating by Stephen Potter, first published in 1947 but still in print 																																																								
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today. Gamesmanship, as explained by Potter, has been summarised as “pushing the 
rules to the limit without getting caught, using whatever dubious methods possible to 
achieve the desired end”. At first light, this hardly squares with Hammarskjöld’s 
many public statements about diplomacy being based on the ethics of the person 
involved. But Hammarskjöld was convinced that he was engaged in a fight that was 
so important that all means were permitted. Indeed, Hammarskjöld’s oft cited 
inspiration Meister Eckhart can be interpreted as saying that if you have the right 
strength of spirit and ethics, the means are less important than the goal.676  
 
The UN was now being harshly criticised for its actions in the press as well as by the 
Soviet Union, Ghana, Guinea and the UAR.677 Hammarskjöld felt compelled to 
convene a new Security Council meeting as he “wanted a broad resolution giving him 
freedom of action”; to achieve this he would need to keep the support of the Africans 
to pressure the Soviets.678 On 10 September, ahead of the Security Council meeting, 
the Americans told Hammarskjöld “U.S. Govt continues stand behind you in 
supporting Kasavubu’s effort to oust Lumumba and, in spite setback of last few days, 
hopes you can take further action to reinforce his position.”679 Hammarskjöld told the 
Americans that he was “still convinced he must break Lumumba and believes he will 
be able to do it”, but that it was “extremely difficult ‘to break Hitlers when 
alternatives were Hindenburgs’”.680 Herter also called Hammarskjöld before the 
Security Council meeting to tell him that the US were “with him 1000 %”. They also 
briefly discussed that the Congo crisis might be put before a special emergency 
session of the General Assembly, where Hammarskjöld was sure of getting 60 or 70 
of the votes.681 At the beginning of the Security Council meeting on 9 September, 
Hammarskjöld, with his usual penchant for legal arguments, mentioned the “fact” that 
Kasavubu had a constitutional right to revoke the mandate of the Prime Minister.682 In 																																																								
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fact it was not clear how the Congolese constitution should be interpreted on this 
point.683 Hammarskjöld also supported Cordier’s actions while distancing himself 
somewhat from them stating that “I was not consulted, but I fully endorse the action 
taken and I have not seen any reason so far to revise the decisions of my 
representatives”.684 
 
Things did not go as smoothly as Hammarskjöld had hoped. The American mission 
reported that there was a clear danger that the Security Council would not support 
Hammarskjöld. A resolution drafted by Hammarskjöld was turned down by Slim as 
unacceptable to the Africans. The Americans were also averse to calls for a good 
offices committee to reconcile Kasavubu and Lumumba as this “inevitably would 
seek to find some mid-point compromise between Lumumba, Kasavubu, and 
Tshombe. This would tend strengthen Lumumba rather than advance our objective of 
increasing UN control and consolidating Kasavubu’s position.” 685  Both the 
Americans and Hammarskjöld would continue to actively work against a political 
reconciliation in the Congo in favour of “UN control”.   
 
In the search for a new horse to back in the Congo, more and more eyes had been 
trained on the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the Force publique, Joseph Mobutu. 
The Moroccan General Kettani – originally recommended to Hammarskjöld by the 
Americans686 – had been assigned as adviser to Mobutu. Kettani soon gained a strong 
influence over Mobutu, who referred to him as “my military advisor and best 
friend”.687 But Mobutu’s influence over the Force Publique was small and after the 
Kasavubu coup he moved with his family into a house close to Kettani for 
protection.688 On Kettani’s advice, Cordier now decided to strengthen Mobutu’s sway 
over the Force Publique and keep the unpaid soldiers calm by arranging for a 																																																								
683 The President’s right to revoke the Prime Minister in Article 22 of the Loi Fondamentale was based 
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payment of 1 million dollars that Hammarskjöld approved, so that Mobutu could take 
the credit.689 But Kettani was not the only friend Mobutu had made. In the memoirs of 
Devlin, the CIA station chief in the Congo, there is a photo of Mobutu with the 
inscription: “To my old and excellent friend, L. Devlin, to whom the Congo and its 
chief owe so much”.690 After the UN paid the troops and thus gave Mobutu a real 
platform of power in the Force publique, Mobutu seems to have never lacked funds 
and according to Dayal several Western military attachés “visited Mobutu with 
bulging brief-cases containing thick brown paper packets which they obligingly 
deposited on his table”. 691  On 14 September, while the Security Council was 
deliberating in New York, Mobutu, backed by the Force publique dismissed both 
Kasavubu and Lumumba and appointed a “college” of students to rule for an interim 
period. Mobutu also suspended parliament. In his first public address, Mobutu stated 
that it was his aim to cooperate with the UN and asked all Soviet and Czech 
personnel, including their embassies, to leave the country. The CIA were definitely 
better coup-makers than the UN and the Mobutu coup, unlike the amateur Kasavubu 
coup, ended in what seemed like a resplendent victory for the UN and Western 
interests with the Soviet Bloc literally sent packing.  
 
On 16 September a Tunisian and Ceylon sponsored resolution was introduced but 
vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Americans then introduced a resolution calling for 
an emergency special session of the General Assembly. This was considered a 
procedural question so the Soviets could not use the veto and the resolution was 
adopted. Hammarskjöld’s “gamesmanship” – “how to win without actually cheating” 
– so far seemed to have paid off. His tactical objectives to “break Lumumba” and 
“explode what the Soviets were up to” seemed to finally have succeeded. But the 
methods employed, as more and more voices were complaining, actually looked like 
“cheating”. The short term tactical gains also undermined the strategic long-term 
goal: the subversion of Lumumba had made sure the UN could stay in the Congo for 
now, but the partial interventions of the UN against Lumumba jeopardised 
Hammarskjöld’s support among the Afro-Asian block and the “neutrals” that was 																																																								
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crucial to his position. The days when Hammarskjöld could set the agenda were 
quickly coming to an end. With the referral of the Congo issue to the special 
emergency session of the General Assembly Hammarskjöld could no longer control 




Chapter 6: “A Completely Do Nothing Impartiality”: The Congo 
Crisis from September 1960 to January 1961 
 
As the Congo crisis moved from the Security Council to the General Assembly 
Hammarskjöld had predicted that he would get 60 or 70 of the votes, easily reaching 
the required two-thirds margin.692 The support base Hammarskjöld had built over the 
years was frail and Hammarskjöld would only get support by changing his Congo 
policies radically. Although Hammarskjöld and the Americans tried to portray the 
Congo crisis as a Cold War conflict – steering discussions in New York to a Soviet-
UN conflict – the evolution on the ground in the Congo increasingly put the focus on 
the neo-colonial aspects of the crisis as Belgian and other Western interests backed 
Tshombe in Katanga and Mobutu and Kasavubu in Léopoldville. 
 
 
A The Congo Crisis in the General Assembly  
A.1 The Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly 
As the delegates assembled in New York for the special emergency session of the 
General Assembly the Americans were trying to make the most of the Cold War 
schism that had developed between the Soviets and the UN. In order to prevent a 
“Soviet-US confrontation” the Americans wanted to turn it into a “Soviet-UN 
confrontation” to “the maximum possible extent”. This way the focus would be on the 
Soviets as opposed to the UN in general rather than the pro-American policies of the 
UN in the Congo in particular. The Americans were aware that although the Afro-
Asians did not like recent UN policy in the Congo, they were still strong supporters of 
the UN as an organisation and would not appreciate Soviet attacks on the UN as such. 
When the debate started, the Soviet representative Zorin promptly accused the 
Americans of using Hammarskjöld to force Lumumba out of office. In his reply to the 
Soviet accusations, Hammarskjöld turned the issue into a vote of confidence stating 
that “The General Assembly knows me well enough to realize that I would not wish 
to serve one day beyond the point at which such continued service would be, and 
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would be considered to be, in the best interests of this Organization”.693 As he had 
done on many earlier occasions, Hammarskjöld avoided a discussion of policy by 
offering to resign in a gesture that made all criticism of his actions a criticism of his 
integrity, thus turning the criticism into a vote of confidence. In doing so, 
Hammarskjöld, like the Americans, turned the discussion into one that focused on the 
UN and the Secretary-General as institutions rather than a discussion of the policies of 
the UN in the Congo. And as institutions both the UN and its Secretary-General had a 
strong support among the Afro-Asians. In the end, the Ghanaian ambassador 
introduced a draft resolution that was sponsored by 17 of the Afro-Asian states, based 
on the Tunisian-Ceylonese draft resolution that had been vetoed by the Soviets in the 
Security Council. Introduced by Ghana and backed even by those Afro-Asian states 
who had been most critical of Cordier’s actions in the Congo, this appeared to be a 
ringing endorsement of the Secretary-General in light of the Soviet attacks. 
 
But the Afro-Asians were no longer content with generally worded resolutions that 
left implementation to the interpretation of the Secretary-General. The Ghanaian draft 
resolution was both stronger in tone and more detailed than the Ceylon-Tunisian draft 
resolution. The resolution supported Hammarskjold and the UN against the Soviet 
attacks – partly since Hammarskjöld had manoeuvred to turn the vote into a vote of 
confidence – but it also clearly spelled out that the Afro-Asians were not content with 
the current UN policy and called for a number of specific actions that the UN should 
take in the Congo; actions that the UN had so far been counteracting, such as 
conciliation between the different political parties in the Congo. Even the moderate 
Afro-Asians were critical, a Ceylonese diplomat summed up the feelings of support 
for Lumumba and suspicion of Hammarskjöld shared by many of the Afro-Asians 
when he asked rhetorically of a British colleague  “was not Lumumba the true 
explosion of nationalist progressive forces?”, adding that “some of the Secretary-
General’s actions did not appear impartial, e.g. use of Swedish troops in Katanga”. 694 
The Americans and the British supported the resolution because of the humiliating 
defeat it would bring the Soviets – when seen as a vote of confidence in the Secretary-
General – but they did not appreciate the wording of the resolution nor the intention 																																																								
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of the sponsoring Afro-Asian states. 695 
 
The resolution was finally adopted on 20 September 1960 as General Assembly 
resolution 1474 with a vote of 70 to none – the very result Hammarskjöld had 
predicted – with eleven abstentions, including the Soviet bloc, France and South 
Africa. To all outward appearance, this was a resounding victory for the Secretary-
General. Hammarskjöld’s prediction of the result boded well for his ability to hold 
sway over the General Assembly, which started its 15th regular session the same day 
that the special emergency session ended.   
 
Hammarskjöld had long cultivated the Afro-Asians. In a cable to Dayal, who had 
taken over as his Special Representative in the Congo after Bunche and Cordier, 
directly after the vote in the special emergency session of GA, Hammarskjöld 
explained this strategy and how the vote had proven him right: 
 
”if the Afro-Asians stick together, or if only the Africans stick together, they represent a 
new big power to which certain others have to bow. You know this theory on which I have 
worked now for two months. Today it was fully vindicated and I regard the fact that the 
Afro-Asian group in this way stood up to the test, found its own strength and a new 
cohesion, is more important than any other result. Hope that Nehru, who is coming Sunday, 
will use this to the full”696 
 
This was of course Hammarskjöld’s interpretation of the vote, and in writing to Dayal 
Hammarskjöld was hoping to impress this interpretation and the need for a solid Afro-
Asian support for the UN not only on Dayal, but on the man who perhaps held the 
best claim to speak for the non-aligned movement – Nehru. But as would soon 
become apparent to Hammarskjöld, the support from the Afro-Asian bloc had not 
come without conditions and did not represent a support for his policies in the Congo. 
Hammarskjöld’s cables to Dayal are often written in a style that defends the UN 
operation to a third-party, and are much less frank than the cables to Bunche and 
Cordier. Dayal’s memoirs do not give a clear picture of this as he quotes from some 
very outspoken cables that were not sent to him but to Bunche or Cordier (when 
Dayal wrote his memoirs he had access to all the cables in the UN archives and he 																																																								
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quotes from them without distinguishing to whom they were originally addressed). 
Hammarskjöld also later told the Americans that he wrote to Dayal with the idea that 
Dayal would show his cables to Nehru. “SYG made point that at present time Dayal 
served useful political purpose in keeping Indian support for UN action in Congo. He 
believes Dayal has sent direct reports to Nehru which help account for more moderate 
position India is taking in comparison with certain other Afro-Asians.”697 
When the Americans, the British and the French summed up the situation after 
resolution 1474, Charles Lucet, the man who had been sounding the alarm in Paris 
regarding Hammarskjöld's African ambitions five years earlier, now the Director of 
Political Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, explained that the French had 
abstained as they felt that the UN was not the proper forum for the question, echoing 
de Gaulle. Lucet added that “The French felt that the goal of the United Nations was 
to expel white influence from Africa”. Nonetheless, he admitted that the “French were 
extremely pleased with the result of the latest vote, but [also] pointed to the ambiguity 
in the resolution”. The problem was that the UN did not know where they were going. 
The American representative, Merchant, replied that the “United States felt it had no 
alternative but completely to back Hammarskjold” for fear of losing all Western 
influence in the Congo. Without wanting to elaborate on the point, he added that 
“Hammarskjold in walking the tight rope had done some things we didn’t like” but 
differed strongly from the French view and said that “there was no question of 
Hammarskjold trying to have the white Western elements evicted from Africa”. 
Merchant also added that “he knew that Hammarskjold has as a continuing long-term 
goal the utilization of white Western technicians, preferably Belgians, in the 
Congo”.698  
 
A.2 Khrushchev v. Hammarskjöld in the General Assembly 
The fifteenth session of the General Assembly saw an unparalleled number of world 
leaders descend on New York City. Eisenhower and Khrushchev; Nasser and Nehru, 
everyone with a stake in the Congo crisis attended – with the exception of de Gaulle, 
whose absence was demonstrative of French feelings towards the UN. The fact that 
the number of African countries in the General Assembly was about to rise from 10 to 																																																								
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25 with the accession of newly independent states during the 15th General Assembly 
and in the Introduction to the Annual Report, published on 31 August 1960, 
Hammarskjöld’s focus was on Africa.699  The last section read like an election 
manifesto aimed at the Afro-Asians in which Hammarskjöld portrayed the UN and its 
Secretary-General as the defender of the small states: “The United Nations has 
increasingly become the main platform – and the main protector of the interests – of 
those many nations who feel themselves strong as members of the international 
family but who are weak in isolation. Thus, an increasing number of nations have 
come to look to the United Nations for leadership and support […] They look to the 
Organization as a spokesman and as an agent for principles which give them 
strength”.700 But with their growing power in the General Assembly, the Afro-Asians 
also grew more assertive. They were not looking to the UN for leadership. On the 
contrary, they were not very happy with the current leadership of the UN and they 
were not content to leave Hammarskjöld to his own devices.   
 
Despite the “vote of confidence” in the Secretary-General at the emergency special 
session, the confidence in Hammarskjöld was less than absolute among the Afro-
Asians. Dayal wrote that “Hammarskjold, however, hoped that in private talks with 
the visiting world statesmen he might be able to secure some degree of support for his 
policies in the Congo which might be denied him in their public utterances.”701 As it 
turned out, it would be the other way around. While Hammarskjöld received praise 
and support in public from many of the Afro-Asians, in private talks the leaders of the 
Third World criticised his Congo policies and demanded a change of course in 
exchange for their continued support.  
 
The first speaker at the General Assembly was Eisenhower, who praised the UN and 
its Secretary-General. In the present circumstances, Hammarskjöld felt embarrassed 
over the strong American support and complained to Dayal that Eisenhower’s strong 
endorsement of the UN was not helpful. 702  The day after the Soviet leader 
Khrushchev set the tone when he flew out in a harsh attack on “the colonialists” who 																																																								
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“have been doing their dirty work in the Congo through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations and his staff”. So far, the criticism of Hammarskjöld was somewhat 
measured and Khrushchev only asked the General Assembly to “call Mr. 
Hammarskjöld to order and ensure that he does not misuse the position of the 
Secretary-General but carries out his functions in strict accordance with the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter and the decisions of the Security Council”. 703 
Khrushchev then launched his famous troika proposal, aimed at the very mechanism 
that had allowed Hammarskjöld to direct the UN operation in the Congo so far – the 
wide margin of discretion of the Secretary-General in interpreting and implementing 
resolutions. The situation, Khrushchev explained, had reached “a point where the post 
of Secretary-General, who alone directs the staff and alone interprets and executes the 
decisions of the Security Council and the sessions of the General Assembly, should be 
abolished”. Instead, he suggested that the UN should be lead by an executive 
consisting of three persons, a troika, representing the Western powers, the Soviet 
Block and the neutralist states.  
 
The troika proposal would have given the Soviet Union the same kind of veto right 
over decisions made by the Secretariat as it had in the Security Council. Often 
portrayed as a ploy and a personal attack on Hammarskjöld after he had thwarted 
Soviet plans to infiltrate the Congo, the troika proposal made great sense from a 
Soviet perspective and variations of it were favoured by several Afro-Asian leaders 
for similar reasons. The veto right in the Security Council ensured the five permanent 
members that the UN would not follow policies contrary to their interests. With the 
rise of the political role of the Secretary-General, political decisions were now taken 
directly by the Secretary-General. When these decisions were taken against the 
interests of the Soviet Union – and Khrushchev was not aware of the extent to which 
Hammarskjöld’s policy in the Congo was directly aimed at keeping the Soviets out – 
there was no longer any way to oppose this. The Soviets had even tried to censure 
Hammarskjöld in the Security Council without success. “It is not our organization”, 
Khrushchev told his confidants on his way to New York. And the reason that the 
Soviets no longer felt that the UN was their organisation was the Secretary-General. 
Hammarskjöld – or “Ham” (“bore” in Russian) as Khrushchev referred to him – “is 																																																								
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sticking his nose in important affairs which are none of his business… He has seized 
authority that doesn’t belong to him. He must pay for that. We have got to get rid of 
him by any means. We’ll make it really hot for him” Khrushchev is reported to have 
said on his way to New York.704 Regardless of how Hammarskjöld’s actions in the 
Congo are viewed, Khrushchev was right on this – the UN was no longer an 
organisation where the Soviets were treated as equal members. The Secretary-General 
was actively pursuing an anti-Soviet goal as the very basis of his Congo policy. 
Whether one thinks that Hammarskjöld was right or not in pursuing his anti-Soviet 
policies is beside the point. Given that the UN as an organisation should serve all its 
members it cannot be correct to use it against some members, especially without 
informing them. Barco, the deputy US permanent representative sympathised with the 
Soviet position and thought the US would have acted in a similar manner if the UN 
had been in opposition to US policies.705 
 
Hammarskjöld took Khrushchev’s attack with ease and was in great spirits, revelling 
at the chance to cross swords with the Soviet leader.  He cabled Dayal that he “had 
great fun in preparing proper reply” to Khrushchev’s speech.706 Hammarskjöld replied 
to Khrushchev that “it is a question not of a man but of an institution” and 
immediately made it a Soviet-UN confrontation, rather than a Soviet-Hammarskjöld 
confrontation. “Time and again”, Hammarskjöld continued, “the United Nations has 
had to face situations in which a wrong move might have tended to throw the weight 
of the Organization over in favour of this or that specific party in a conflict of a 
primarily domestic character. To permit that to happen is indeed to intervene in 
domestic affairs contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Charter.” 707  The 
disingenuousness of this remark, when compared to how Hammarskjöld had thrown 
the weight of the UN in favour of the anti-Lumumba party, is striking. By his own 
definition, Hammarskjöld had clearly intervened in domestic affairs. Khrushchev 
renewed his attacks on the Secretary-General and on 3 October explicitly asked him 
to resign. In the afternoon of 3 October Hammarskjöld gave his reply in an eloquent 
idealistic appeal that also catered directly to the sensibilities of the Afro-Asians and 
portrayed the UN under attack as their organisation. “It is not the Soviet Union or 																																																								
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indeed any other Big Powers which need the United Nations for their protection. It is 
all the others. In this sense, the Organization is first of all their Organization and I 
deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to use it and guide it. I 
shall remain in my post during the term of office as a servant of the Organization in 
the interest of all those other nations as long as they wish me to do so”.708 After these 
words, a standing ovation broke out in the General Assembly.  
 
Most of the literature point to this exchange between Hammarskjöld and Khrushchev 
as the high point of Hammarskjöld’s career, where he stood up against the big powers 
for the small powers, and this was certainly how Hammarskjöld wanted to frame the 
debate. 709  The discussion that Khrushchev was seeking, however, was that 
Hammarskjöld had supported one big power (the USA) against another. In this 
Khrushchev was correct. It might have been for enlightened reasons, but 
Hammarskjöld’s policies had been parallel to US policies and constructed and 
implemented in close coordination with the Americans. Moreover, they had been 
expressly designed to be anti-Soviet. The fact that Hammarskjöld was now trying to 
portray it as if he stood up on behalf of the small states was part of his long-term 
strategy to position himself as a leader of the neutralist countries and increased by the 
tactical need to keep Afro-Asian support for the UN operation in the Congo, which 
had been crucial from the outset of the Congo crisis.  
 
Khrushchev’s attack on Hammarskjöld, especially coming so soon after the “vote of 
confidence” might have appeared headless. On the other hand, Khrushchev might not 
have had as his goal the actual adoption of the troika proposal or Hammarskjöld’s 
resignation, but rather to induce him to take a more careful approach in the Congo and 
curb his pro-Western policies. At least this was what the Americans thought that the 
goal of the Soviet tactic had been already in the Security Council.710 As Khrushchev 
pointed out, Hammarskjöld’s victory was a “pyrrhic victory”.711  
The support of the Afro-Asian bloc would only come at the price of a radical change 
in UN policy in the Congo. All of the leaders of the neutralist countries were present 
in New York. They now tried to push Hammarskjöld to change his Congo policy in a 																																																								
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direction more favourable to Lumumba, who, with all his flaws, they still regarded as 
the legitimate Prime Minister of the Congo, in return for their support against 
Khrushchev’s troika proposal. The new policy that most of the Afro-Asians 
demanded included “the ending of the vendetta against Lumumba, the refusal of any 
kind of recognition to Mobutu, and a real effort to encourage political reconciliation 
and to prevent Belgian military assistance from bolstering the Katanga regime”.712 In 
private discussions with Hammarskjöld they made it clear that their support was 
conditional on changing UN policy in this direction. Nasser organised a meeting 
between the nonaligned leaders and Hammarskjöld. Nasser summed up the feelings of 
the nonaligned countries when he told Hammarskjöld: “You are facing us with a very 
difficult problem… You have told me that various things happened without your 
knowledge. You are not able to control what is going on. That is why we criticize 
you. We know you. We trust you, yet we cannot approve of what you are doing. You 
are asking for a mandate from us, and we are going to back you against the troika 
idea, nevertheless we feel that you are undertaking something you cannot control and 
we can blame nobody but you.”713  
 
Hammarskjöld was growing increasingly worried and wrote to Dayal, in an obvious 
attempt to win the support of Nehru, that “The role of Nehru will now be decisive. If 
he sways, the public Afro-Asian front may break with very far reaching consequences 
for the Organization.”714 To the dismay of Hammarskjöld, Nehru did not think that 
the troika proposal was without merit; he had even planned to propose his own troika 
proposal as a compromise. Finally, on 3 October, Nehru spoke out against the troika 
proposal but he also criticised the UN and said that the Secretariat was too weighted 
in a pro-Western fashion. Both Nkrumah and Touré suggested that three assistant 
secretaries-general should be appointed to represent the three blocks and supervise the 
Secretary-General. Touré, as the only Afro-Asian leader, joined in Khrushchev’s 
attacks on Hammarskjöld.715 This would also lead to a dramatic change in UN policy 
in the Congo – where the restoration of democracy and a reconvening of parliament, 
as suggested by Nehru at the General Assembly, would become the new goal of the 																																																								
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713 Heikal, Mohamed, The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationships with 
World Leaders, Rebels and Statesmen (New York: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 183-184. 
714 Dayal, p. 100. 
715 Kalb, p. 122. 
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UN.  This change in UN policy was being implemented on the ground by another 
Indian, Hammarskjöld’s new man on the spot, Rajeshwar Dayal, who had replaced 
Bunche. 
 
B “The Search for Legality” 
B.1 The Change in Hammarskjöld’s Congo policy 
Dayal arrived in the Congo on the verge of Kasavubu’s coup and in his memoirs he 
describes how the Western ambassadors congratulated the UN on the “courageous 
initiative on the part of the United Nations” to support Kasavubu; and, he added 
“Some of them made it plain that since their countries paid a large contribution to 
United Nations funds they had a right to expect their notions of what ONUC should 
do to guide the Operation.”716 If this was indeed what they thought they were in for a 
disappointment. Dayal eventually rescinded Cordier’s decision to close the radio and 
the airports.717 The African ambassadors also paid their respects to Dayal, and, 
contrary to the Western ambassadors, their sympathies lay with Lumumba: “They 
appeared certain that Lumumba enjoyed the confidence of Parliament and would be 
able to regain his position. Some of them conceded that Lumumba was inclined to be 
erratic and unbalanced, but all agreed that he was a true patriot, working, according to 
the best of his lights, in the interests of his country.”718 Less exigent than their 
Western homologues, the African ambassadors only demanded “even-handed action” 
from the UN; “they did not doubt its purposes, although they questioned some of its 
decisions”.719 “Even-handed action” was what Dayal was determined to give them. 
From the outset, Dayal’s views were aligned with the general ideas of the neutralist 
countries, in particular Nehru’s emphasis on parliament and a return to democracy 
coupled with the non-recognition of Mobutu. As Dayal put it in his memoirs: “It was 
obvious that ONUC could have no truck with a régime whose only sanction was 
force.” All through September, Ghana, Guinea and the UAR had been trying hard to 
negotiate a reconciliation between Kasavubu and Lumumba, intent on a return to the 
status quo ante the dismissal of Lumumba, or at least his inclusion in government as a 																																																								
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minister.720 The American ambassador, Timberlake, instead urged Kasavubu to resist 
any attempts at reconciliation and to arrest Lumumba on 26 September. Kasavubu 
replied that he had already issued an arrest order, but the UN was making difficulties 
about the legality of such a move.721  
On 30 September, Hammarskjöld told the new British Permanent Representative to 
the UN, Sir Patrick Dean, who had replaced Dixon, that those who thought that a 
strong central government could be established in the Congo had no understanding of 
the real situation: “All the leaders were third-rate politicians, and the best that could 
be hoped for was the establishment of a weak government which would lean on the 
United Nations”. Hammarskjöld also “confessed for the first time that he did not see 
any clear line to follow”, but “felt that the Afro-Asians must be kept at arms length”. 
He would not suggest that any action was taken to achieve conciliation as paragraph 3 
of General Assembly resolution 1474 outlined. Dean thought that the “explanation of 
Hammarskjoeld’s passivity in the face of increasing chaos in the Congo is no doubt to 
be found in the divisions among the governments represented on the Advisory 
Committee and the need for him to preserve the utmost possible neutrality. He 
presumably considers it impossible for him to convene a round table conference 
without including Lumumba, and fears that the inclusion of Lumumba would mean 
either the latter’s return to power or the total breakdown of the effort”.722 The pressure 
of the Afro-Asian countries on Hammarskjöld in New York was starting to have an 
effect. Since Hammarskjöld did not want to take any positive action that might favour 
Lumumba, he resigned himself to a passivity that he hoped would pass as impartiality 
and neutrality – the passivity was motivated by the political situation, but was then 
raised to a principle that guided actions, while the causal effect was in fact the 
opposite.  
After several foiled attempts to arrest Lumumba Timberlake protested to Dayal on 11 
October. Dayal explained to Timberlake that the support of the Afro-Asians at the 
General Assembly had been “won by narrow margin” and that the Afro-Asians would 
strongly object to Lumumba’s arrest. The “eventual solution Congo depended on 
united support Afro-Asian group”, Dayal concluded. Timberlake asked if this meant 																																																								
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that Dayal supported a reconciliation with Lumumba to which Dayal replied simply 
that “he hoped democratic solution could be obtained”.723 Timberlake commented in a 
telegram to State Department that Dayal was looking for solution “which might be 
viable in civilized environment but not in Congo” and that Dayal would not change 
his view without specific instructions from Hammarskjöld.724   
The same day Herter paid a courtesy call on Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld started by 
saying that the situation continued to be “extremely messy”. “No one person there 
strong enough to depend upon for future. Kasavubu was doing absolutely nothing. 
Mobutu was weak reed. Lumumba very likely dope addict. Bomboko suspected of 
being imperialist stooge. In short there was no one on scene who could be really 
helpful in bringing order out of chaos.”725 In this situation Hammarskjöld could do 
nothing but steer a careful course and await developments. Hammarskjöld now also 
for the first time told the Americans that he was against the arrest of Lumumba. 
Instead Hammarskjöld proposed to build toward a leadership for the legislative body 
in the Congo – noting in passing that a problem with this was that “some members 
were ‘bought up’, some were in hiding and many of course could not be relied upon”. 
Hammarskjöld “seemed in excellent spirits despite severity of recent attacks upon 
him” and Herter told him that the US “stood back of him one-thousand per cent”.726 
After this discussion, the Americans resigned themselves to Hammarskjöld’s 
argument that Lumumba’s arrest would play “in hands extremists in UN”, and in any 
event, they noted, nothing could be done as long as Hammarskjöld was against the 
arrest. Instead, the Americans focused on getting Hammarskjöld to agree to move 
Lumumba from the Prime Minister’s residence as this was perceived as adding to his 
legitimacy. 727  When Wadsworth, who had replaced Lodge as permanent 
representative, went to see Hammarskjöld regarding this new proposal, 
Hammarskjöld first prevaricated and said that the Prime Minister’s residence was 
“merely one house in row of others along river”. But Wadsworth insisted that these 																																																								
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symbols should be taken from Lumumba. When Hammarskjöld told Wadsworth that 
he “still regarded Lumumba as being PM” the extent of the realignment of UN policy 
in the Congo really dawned on the Americans. In a strange argument for someone 
normally so concerned with legal decorum Hammarskjöld explained this volte-face 
by saying that he had always regarded Kasavubu’s sacking of Lumumba as legal, but 
“because of surrounding circumstances and general situation this act did not have 
intended legal consequences”. In other words, it had become opportune to consider 
Lumumba the Prime Minister. After exchanging some further legal arguments to no 
avail, Wadsworth said that recent UN actions had tended to strengthen Lumumba and 
weaken any alternative government and asked whether Hammarskjöld, if he could not 
move Lumumba from the Prime Minister’s residence, could take “other steps” to 
bolster Lumumba’s opponents. Hammarskjöld’s reply must have given Wadsworth a 
small shock. Hammarskjöld calmly told Wadsworth that “this was perfectly valid 
objective for Timberlake and U.S. but it could not be objective for UN; on this our 
views would simply have to differ”.728 Hammarskjöld added “that UN had to act on 
basis of principles; these principles had previously worked in favor of Kasavubu and 
others; they were now working in favor of Lumumba”. This oft repeated mantra of 
impartial principles must have seemed a bit rich to the Americans considering that 
Hammarskjöld had told them a month earlier that his aim was to “break Lumumba” 
and that his “actions were designed to support Kasavubu”.729 In his comment on the 
report of the meeting Wadsworth summed up Hammarskjöld’s new position as he 
perceived it730: 
“While we have no reason to believe [Hammarskjöld] has changed his views about 
Lumumba, it seems apparent that heavy Soviet attack against him coupled 
particularly with support of Lumumba and public or private criticisms by usual 
group of Afro-Asians, have resulted in SYG shifting toward position involving 
accommodation with Lumumba. […] Our estimate is that this is effort on his part to 
accommodate himself to what he feels are realities of political forces at play, that 
while he would be delighted to see Lumumba out of way he feels he can no longer 
take any hand in it but must leave it entirely to others, and that he must now play 
UN hand along indicated lines even if result is to bolster Lumumba.” 731 
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The British were less alarmed but thought that “the Secretariat have run out of ideas” 
and this would lead to “an obvious danger” that the Secretariat might cave in to 
pressure from “the more militant elements among the Africans”.732 The Foreign 
Office wrote to the British mission in New York that “the Secretariat must of course 
maintain their reputation for impartiality […] but if the problems of the Congo are 
approached in too legalistic a spirit we shall get nowhere”. Adding “I should feel 
happier if there were some evidence that Mr. Hammarskjold himself had some idea of 
where he was going”.733 After a long interview with Dayal in an effort to find out 
what the UN policy was for the future, the British ambassador in Leopoldville, Scott, 
reported that “The short answer is that they do not know”. The long answer seemed to 
be that “a legal government with new constitution to reign in Lumumba” was the 
goal, although this could only be envisaged after “a period of quiet and order had 
elapsed”. At the end of the talk, Dayal implied to Scott that “the United Nations was 
compelled by its own limitations and pressure of the fourteen nation Advisory Group 
in New York to seek a legalistic way forward”. Scott concluded that “the search for 
legality in fact is evidently the basis of the United Nations policy”.734  
 
B.2 “Who is the UN neutral against?”  
The State Department were “seriously concerned” by the conversation Wadsworth 
had had with Hammarskjöld.735 From Leopoldville, Timberlake reported that the UN 
policies on the ground ran on similar “or more neutralist lines”. Furthermore “Men in 
street, particularly opponents of Lumumba, are simply not convinced UN is impartial 
[…] Question now being asked is ‘who is the UN neutral against?’”. 736  The 
Commissioners were being rebuffed by Dayal who “considers members unimportant 
schoolboys”. Ironically, after first being criticised for his actions by the Lumumbists, 
Hammarskjöld was now being criticised for his inaction by the anti-Lumumbists. This 
was the problem of not intervening in internal affairs. As Timberlake put it: “I am 
first to agree that UN is in position where it has been and will be accused at times by 
both sides for partiality to opponents. However, it is also true that plain inaction or 																																																								
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simple interposition can and often does have direct bearing on outcome. It is in such 
position today.” 737  
 
The Americans concluded from the discussion with Hammarskjöld that there had 
been a “basic change” in his position. The fact that Hammarskjöld now said he 
regarded Lumumba as Prime Minister marked “a shift from SYG position both from 
legal as well as political point of view”. 738  Herter understood the pressures 
Hammarskjöld was under: “We appreciate fully pressure that SYG has been under 
from USSR. Moreover, we understand completely reasons for doing everything 
feasible for maintaining maximum support among Africans and Asians.” But if 
Hammarskjöld’s new policy was more than just a temporary measure to accommodate 
the Afro-Asians, then the US would have to reassess their support for ONUC.739 In a 
National Security Council meeting the next day, 20 October, Herter said that “the 
most disturbing aspect of the [Congo] situation was Hammarskjold’s apparent change 
of heart”. Especially as Cordier had told Herter that if Lumumba returned, that would 
spell the end of ONUC as he would be likely to ask the UN to leave.740 Herter decided 
to send the seasoned diplomat Charles E. “Chip” Bohlen to discuss “frankly” with 
Hammarskjöld and explain the American conclusions on his new policy.  
 
Bohlen met with Hammarskjöld on 22 October. Hammarskjöld expressed “complete” 
disagreement with the legal analysis of the Americans, although he had, as the 
Americans noted, previously been of the same opinion, even stating this on the record 
to the Security Council.741 Hammarskjöld now made a strange legal exposition to the 
Americans and claimed that since Ileo’s new government had not been sworn in, and 
after the closure of parliament, “whatever fragments of Prime Minister’s authority 																																																								
737 Ibid. 
738 Here, the Americans outlined some of the occasions when Hammarskjöld had said that he did not 
see Lumumba as PM: “On September 7 he told Wallner he would recognize, deal with and by 
implication, strongly support Kasavubu in his struggle with Lumumba. On September 10 he told 
USUN he still must break Lumumba and believed he will be able to do it, but that it was extremely 
difficult “to break Hitlers when alternatives were Hindenburgs.”  Moreover, SYG made statement in 
SC meeting of ____ to effect that he was dealing with Kasavubu.” Telegram State to USUN 19 
October 1960 FRUS 1958-60 Vol XIV.  
739 Telegram State to USUN 19 October 1960 FRUS 1958-60 Vol XIV. 
740 Memorandum of Discussion 20 October 1960 FRUS 1958-60 Vol XIV. 
741 Hammarskjöld also told the Americans that he refused to accept that Belgian constitutional practice 
should be accepted in the interpretation of the Loi Fondamentale, although he had himself interpreted 
the Loi Fondamentale in the light of Belgian precedents earlier, see Telegram from USUN to State 22 
October 1960 FRUS 1958-60 Vol XIV. 
	 195	
remain are, due largely to Kasavubu’s way of handling it, in Lumumba”; Lumumba 
“was ‘more PM’ than anyone else”. This meant that the UN could not deal with him 
as PM, yet could not disregard him completely. Hammarskjöld then explained that 
UN must “keep clean on the record, wherever it may lead”. He added that “What in 
past actions or behavior seemed to indicate an anti-Lumumba line by SYG now 
seemingly indicated opposite.” The Americans must have been astonished to hear this 
from the man who had spoken of “breaking Lumumba” and told them his actions 
were designed to support Kasavubu.742 In a thinly veiled threat of withdrawing US 
financial support for ONUC Bohlen made it “absolutely clear US regarded present 
application SYG’s rule of impartiality as inevitably operating in favor of Lumumba, 
and of consequences this might have for US policy”. The discussion then turned to a 
more positive note to discuss what could be done in the future. Hammarskjöld “felt 
UNGA’s inaction re seating rep of Congo made his impartial behavior as between 
different govt’l figures absolutely consistent with overall UN stand. Way to change it, 
he appeared to hint, would be by GA decision”.743 This “hint” would lead to a full-on 
American campaign to seat Kasavubu in the General Assembly. Bohlen’s comment to 
Herter after the two-hour conversation with Hammarskjöld was that “Our strongest 
impression is that he sees no clear course of action in Leopoldville to deal with the 
present situation and has fallen back on a completely do nothing ‘impartiality’, 
although he realizes that this may be working in Lumumba’s favor.” Regarding the 
harsh notes to the Belgians, Bohlen thought Hammarskjöld was “taking this attitude 
in order to do something and in particular to gain favor with African states”. Bohlen 
did, however, believe that they could change Hammarskjöld’s attitude if they came up 
with a serious plan for a caretaker government that would have at least the trappings 
of legality. The Americans also felt that Dayal was a “major factor in situation which 
SYG refused to face”. 744  
 
The Americans now launched two ambitious attempts, based on their discussions with 
Hammarskjöld, that were aimed at giving the de facto government in the Congo a 
cloak of legality in order for the UN to be able to cooperate with them. The first was 
an attempt to appoint a caretaker government that would get approval by parliament 																																																								
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and the second to seat Kasavubu’s delegation in the General Assembly.  In a follow 
up discussion on 29 October, Barco got Hammarskjöld to agree in vague terms to a 
US push to get Kasavubu to appoint a caretaker government that could be approved 
by parliament to escape the current constitutional limbo. Hammarskjöld immediately 
replied that it would be most useful if the Americans could “put some ‘fire’ into 
Kasavubu” so long as they did it “delicately” and not “visibly”, adding that they 
should “put nothing in his pocket” and “keep [their] skirts from showing”.745  
 
Hammarskjöld was also showing his Machiavellian traits in his handling of the 
Conciliation committee that had been decided on by the General Assembly resolution. 
Calling it “idiotic” from the outset, Hammarskjöld had been trying to stall it from ever 
getting on its way.746 According to the resolution, it was to be a sub-committee to the 
Advisory Committee, so Hammarskjöld could not prevent it by any open means as the 
Advisory Committee would decide on it. Instead, he had used what he referred to in 
discussions with the Americans as a “socratic” method: “he had asked questions 
designed to frighten them away from taking such step, so far with some success”.747 
Now, however, the group seemed to be preparing to go to the Congo despite 
Hammarskjöld’s best “socratic” efforts. Hammarskjöld then came up with another 
device to forestall the group’s departure to the Congo. Hammarskjöld suggested that 
they should obtain clear instructions on the terms of reference from their respective 
governments that they could all agree on before departing. To the Americans 




C Democracy and its Limits 
C.1 Winning Elections in the Congo and New York 
The American ambassador in Leopoldville, Timberlake, was tasked with preparing 
the ground for a parliamentary approval of a caretaker government. Timberlake 
thought that the prospects for a democratic government emerging in the Congo were 																																																								
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very bleak: “Idealistically, UN hopes for democratically approved, relatively stable 
government with which it can deal with some confidence and which has international 
respectability according to democratic standards. I do not, unfortunately, see such 
government emerging for very long time.”749 Timberlake also thought that Lumumba 
was the most likely person to get approval by parliament.  
By the end of October newspapers were full of reports of the return of Belgians. Dean 
reported from New York that this “could easily provoke an explosion of feeling”; 
anything that could be represented as “the restoration of Belgian influence in the 
Congo” would reunite the Afro-Asians on a harsher anti-colonialist line and “drive a 
wedge between the United Nations and the anti-Lumumba forces in the Congo”.750 To 
take some of the steam out of these attacks, Hammarskjöld asked Dayal to write a 
report on the situation in the Congo, which was made public on 2 November. The 
report was very critical of both Mobutu and the Belgians. It is striking that 
Hammarskjöld let the report be published in Dayal’s name. Hammarskjöld had 
written all previous reports on the Congo himself and it was well known that he 
drafted the reports himself with extreme consideration for the weight of every word. 
Now, all of a sudden the Special Representative wrote the report, which was ordered 
by Hammarskjöld who accepted it with minor adjustments. Hammarskjöld no doubt 
felt that there was a need for the UN to come out publicly against the Belgians and 
Mobutu to keep their credibility with the Afro-Asians. Leaving it to Dayal to write 
and publish the report in his name, Hammarskjöld could do so and still take cover 
behind Dayal. The Americans also thought that the report reflected more of Dayal 
than Hammarskjöld. Instead, the US decided to focus all its efforts on having 
Kasavubu’s delegation seated as the representative of the Congo to strengthen him 
and make him the preferred partner of the UN. 751 
On 11 November, Herter and Bohlen met with the Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny in 
New York. Wigny mentioned the difficulties the Belgians were having with 
Hammarskjöld and noted Hammarskjöld’s expressed desire to “crush Tshombe”. 
Wigny thought it would be a mistake to deal with Katanga before Leopoldville. Only 
after a moderate government had been securely installed in Leopoldville should 
Katanga reenter the fold of the central government in the Congo. Not wanting to 																																																								
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entrust the future of the Congo to anything as risky as a democratic election – and 
convinced that this would, like the first time the Belgians had tried this, lead to a 
Lumumba victory – Wigny told the Americans that they should first settle on “some 
satisfactory group of leaders” and only then convene Parliament to approve them: “to 
ask Parliament itself to select the leaders would almost inevitably lead to the return of 
Lumumba”.752 
 
For the Americans, the initial triumph over Soviet machinations in the Congo had, 
with the failure of Kasavubu to get parliamentary approval for his new government, 
led them into the awkward position of siding with the colonialists against the legal 
government of a newly independent state. The Americans realized the need to give an 
aura of legality to the whole project. The Americans were concerned not so much 
with elections as with the result of the elections. An election that would see Lumumba 
returned to power was never an option. The only problem was that even with cajoling 
and bribery it was an uphill climb to secure a vote for a new government that was not 
Lumumbist. The State Department also preferred to keep Mobutu in place (“maintain 
his strong-man role”) and “leaving Ileo as little more than figurehead”.753  
 
In the United Nations the question of whether to seat Kasavubu’s delegation as the 
representatives of the Congo in the General Assembly was coming to a head. Several 
countries were opposed to seating Kasavubu’s delegation as it would send a signal 
that Kasavubu was recognized and Lumumba was not. The Americans had already 
managed to get a clear vote in the Credentials Committee (a committee of the General 
Assembly in which questions of credentials are discussed and voted on before referral 
to the General Assembly for a normally routine vote).754 Wadsworth, asked the State 
Department to put additional pressure on the capitals of a list of countries in addition 
to the pressure from the US representatives in the corridors of the UN building.755 
Wadsworth had been right to make every effort to secure the necessary votes and it 
was only with a slim margin that the Americans managed to get Kasavubu’s 
delegation seated. The General Assembly met in plenum seven times to discuss the 																																																								
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seating of Kasavubu’s delegation between 18 and 22 November. 0n November 22, the 
Assembly first rejected a motion to adjourn discussions by Ghana by a vote of 50 to 
34, with 13 abstentions; a similar motion by Mali was then rejected by a vote of 47 to 
32, with 16 abstentions. After a third attempt, this time a Guinean proposal to 
postpone, was defeated by 50 votes to 32, with 14 abstentions a resolution to seat 
Kasavubu’s delegation was finally adopted by a vote of 53 to 24, with 19 
abstentions.756 Despite the divisive vote in the General Assembly, the Americans 
greeted the seating of the delegation as a triumph that would now be used to build 
momentum in the Congo. State Department hoped that “Hammarskjold will no longer 
give undue weight to views of Ghana, Guinea and others in implementing UN 
decisions and will now be prepared work forth-rightly with Kasavubu and his 
supporters.”757 The vote had been won with just a few votes. The Americans and their 
allies could still command a majority in the General Assembly, but the opponents had 
grown in number and importance, it was no longer the isolated votes of the Soviet 
Bloc.  
 
C.2 “Things fall apart” 
If the Americans were hoping for a fresh start in the Congo with cooperation between 
the UN and Kasavubu they were wrong. Kasavubu, who had triumphed over 
Lumumba in a coup abetted by the UN, was no longer interested in working with the 
UN. Dayal’s policy of not working with Mobutu and his commissioners had also 
included not recognising Kasavubu’s authority in any matter except the very limited 
function of a ceremonial head of state.758 On 23 November Hammarskjöld met with 
Kasavubu, who asked him to recall Dayal and start preparing for reducing UN troops. 
Two days later, when Hammarskjöld met with the Americans he complained about 
Kasavubu’s attitude, which he thought was caused by Belgian influences (Wigny had 
publicly celebrated Kasavubu’s seating as a victory, making it harder for 
Hammarskjöld to work with Kasavubu without being criticised by the Afro-Asians). 
Hammarskjöld agreed with the US assessment that the vote in the General Assembly 
had strengthened Kasavubu but added that he saw both advantages and disadvantages 
with the vote – without specifying what he meant – and that the latter outweighed the 																																																								
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former. Barco told Hammarskjöld that the US thought the UN “should cooperate with 
Kasavubu and not continue to put roadblocks in way of Congolese exercising their 
authority”.759  
 
After meeting with Hammarskjöld Barco saw Kasavubu who told him of his 
complaints to Hammarskjöld about the UN in general and Dayal in particular: 
“everything had been fine with Bunche but things started to go badly when Dayal 
came”. He also complained that “UN conciliation effort should be to help Congolese, 
not to try to impose solutions”. According to Kasavubu the “UN in Congo had not in 
past cooperated with Congolese enough but had attempted to take over.” “UN wants 
to do everything itself”, he exclaimed. To Kasavubu, “UN role was to help 
Congolese. There could not be two armies in Congo under separate commanders, for 
example. UN should help Congolese Army establish order.” In almost identical 
words, this was Lumumba’s complaint against Hammarskjöld. This was also what the 
invitation signed by both Lumumba and Kasavubu had asked the UN to provide – the 
invitation that was still the legal foundation for the UN mandate in the Congo – and 
what the three Security Council resolutions had said the UN should provide.  
 
On 2 December, Hammarskjöld told the Americans that anti-UN feelings in the 
Congo had increased after the seating of Kasavubu’s delegation. Hammarskjöld told 
Barco that the “Congolese [1 line of source text not declassified] were easily 
depressed and easily excitable. Recent successes had made them “cocky””. Bomboko 
had even told Dayal that “Congo at war with UN”. Barco replied diplomatically that: 
“Perhaps Congolese did need be handled with firmness but they must also be treated 
with sympathy.” Hammarskjöld agreed to this when it came to specific cases, but 
when the general attitude was concerned, he thought this was “harder to define but 
essentially UN must keep them “chastened””. Regarding the potential secession of 
Stanleyville, Hammarskjöld shared the American concerns, indicating that he thought 
as many as 20 states were likely to recognize a secessionist Orientale province, and 
that Lumumba would be able to get supplies, military equipment and possibly even 
some planes, and might raise 3,000 men.  But he differed on the strategy. While the 
Americans wanted the UN to try and restore order in advance of an attempt at 
secession, Hammarskjöld saw the UN as taking a passive role acting mainly by 																																																								
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“interposition” between Stanleyville troops and Mobutu’s troops to prevent fighting. 
To the Americans such action by the UN would be seen as a strong rebuff to 
Kasavubu.760 Although the conversation with Hammarskjöld was the “most cordial 
and constructive one we had with him for some time”, Barco was “not at all satisfied” 
that Hammarskjöld was pursuing the right line of action: “His attitude of keeping 
Congolese “chastened” seems to us be totally wrong psychological approach, for 
example, and Dayal’s pursuit such attitude in Leopoldville clearly causes sharp 
Congolese reactions. We tried convey to him our belief this wrong approach but are 
not sure to what extent we got across”.761 
 
With Lumumba’s capture on 2 December the political temperature in the Congo went 
down somewhat and the threat of a rival government under Lumumba in Stanleyville 
became less immediate. In New York, however, the political heat was on 
Hammarskjöld over the UN handling of Lumumba’s arrest. Again, UN inaction was 
criticized from all sides. Timberlake reported from the Congo that he thought this 
would lead to a renewed “neutralist” attack on the UN that would “take form of 
concentrated attack on UN and particularly UNOC for favoring “imperialist” policies 
and on inefficiency UNOC”. Dayal, however, in Timberlake’s words “views scene 
with Olympian detachment, unconcealed disdain and anxiously awaits day when he 
can get out of Congo mess […] He is man of principle but does not understand 
practical problems involved in translating them into action”.  
 
To add to Hammarskjöld’s woes the Soviet Union had declared that they would no 
longer finance the UN operation in the Congo and the French were about to do the 
same.762 This meant that Hammarskjöld would loose not only French financial 
support, but also the votes of the former French colonies in Africa, still in the sway of 
the metropole when it came to voting in the UN.763 When the Congo was next 
discussed in the General Assembly on 16 December, Ghana tabled a draft resolution 
that called for the full implementation of the UN mandate and “urged the immediate 
release of all political prisoners, the immediate convening of Parliament with U.N. 																																																								
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protection, and measures to prevent the Congolese Armed Forces from interfering in 
the country’s political life, demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian 
military and quasi-military personnel, and recommended that all necessary economic 
and technical assistance should be provided promptly through the United Nations so 
that it would not be used as an instrument for continuing foreign intervention”. The 
following day, the Americans and the British tabled a draft resolution in support of 
Hammarskjöld that requested the Secretary-General to “continue to discharge the 
mandate entrusted to him by the United Nations”. It soon became clear that the 
French African group in the UN was not going to vote for the Anglo-American 
resolution, and that without their support the resolution would not get the required 
two-thirds majority.764 After discussions, the two rival resolutions were taken to a 
vote on 20 December. The Ghanian resolution was rejected by 42 votes to 28, with 27 
abstentions. Only two African countries, the Congo represented by Kasavubu and 
South Africa, opposed the resolution. The Anglo-American resolution received 43 
votes in favor, 22 against, and 32 abstentions, failing to get the necessary two-third 
majority. Not one African nation voted for the resolution; Ghana, Guinea, Mali, 
Morocco, and the United Arab Republic voted against it and all the others, including 
the Congo, abstained. For the first time, the Americans had lost their control of the 
General Assembly. The Anglo-American resolution had also been an endorsement of 
Hammarskjöld and the fact that it was not adopted meant that Hammarskjöld had now 
also lost his support in the General Assembly. Hammarskjöld had been very confident 
of his ability to hold sway over the General Assembly and correctly predicted the 
outcome of the first vote in the emergency special session. He had, however, greatly 
miscalculated the sentiment of the neutralist countries and their demands on the 
Secretary-General and the UN. Despite his attempts to placate these, he had failed to 
get renewed confidence for his leadership of the UN operation in the Congo.  
 
After following an interventionist policy during the first phase of the Congo crisis, 
culminating with the consecutive coups by Kasavubu and Mobutu, the UN had tried a 
non-interventionist policy that had failed to address the situation in the Congo and to 
shore up Afro-Asian support in New York. As the British and the Americans noted, 
this phase of the crisis was characterized by a lack of ideas and executive action by 
the UN. In October, Hammarskjöld had said that they needed to wait and see how the 																																																								
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situation would develop. In December, the situation had become much worse. The 
Orientale Province was on the verge of secession and in Katanga Tshombe, with the 
backing of foreign mining interests, had used the time since the UN first entered 
Elisabethville in September to build up a mercenary force to create his “concept of a 
Shangri-la in Katanga”. Timberlake reported from a visit to Elisabethville that 
“Belgian colons, led principally by Union Miniere, obviously encouraged Tshombe in 
separatism”.765 The Congo was virtually split into three parts, although this, as well, is 
a simplification as none of these three parts held any real control of the full extent of 
its territory. It was clear that no new ideas would come from Hammarskjöld or Dayal 
who were now merely reacting to events, not proactively trying to steer them. But a 
young senator from Massachusetts, with a marked interest in Africa, was preparing to 
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Chapter 7: “Il faut faire de la politique”: The Congo Crisis from 
January to September 1961 
 
A An Old Policy with a New Mandate 
A.1 Hammarskjöld and the Kennedy Administration: A New Start with Old Friends 
The Kennedy administration provided Hammarskjöld with a much-needed 
opportunity for a new start in the Congo. The new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and 
the new permanent representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, were both regular 
guests of Hammarskjöld, often stopping by for luncheon or dinner in New York.766 
Cordier also regarded both as “close personal friends”.767 On 25 January Rusk 
initiated the process of drafting a new Congo policy. Rusk and his colleagues weighed 
all options, including action outside the UN.768 In the end, however, they found no 
realistic operational alternatives to a policy that was summed up as “continue to do 
what we are doing—only better”.769 
 
Aware that a new Congo policy was being drafted, Hammarskjöld weighed in already 
on 26 January with a memorandum to the State Department, via Stevenson. 
Hammarskjöld appealed for “a strenuous diplomatic effort” by the Americans and 
suggested a policy that would be more amenable to “neutralistic”, i.e. Afro-Asian 
sensibilities by putting more pressure on the Belgians and other Western European 
powers.770 A close cooperation developed between Stevenson and Hammarskjöld in 
these early days. It was not just a case of like-mindedness; Stevenson’s and 
Hammarskjöld’s cooperation was mutually beneficial as it increased the sway of both: 
Hammarskjöld got indirect access to the State Department drafting table via 
Stevenson, and Stevenson’s views carried more weight when given as in line with the 
thinking of the Secretary-General. As often, this would also prove hazardous as 
Hammarskjöld tended to mistake the ideas of the permanent representative for those 																																																								
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of the president, thinking that the US line was more UN friendly than what was 
warranted. Despite Stevenson’s great reputation – or, some might say, because of it – 
he was not one of Kennedy’s influential advisors.  
 
Stevenson informed Hammarskjöld on 31 January that “Dept's thinking was moving 
more or less parallel with that of SYG”. Hammarskjöld proposed that a “middle-of-
the-road” government should be sought with Ileo as Prime Minister (the result that 
Hammarskjöld had hoped would be the result of Kasavubu’s coup). When it came to 
Lumumbists, Hammarskjöld was opposed to including Gizenga or Kashamura. 
Hammarskjöld was also adamant that a government should be put together before 
Lumumba was released, to make sure that Lumumba could not be part of the 
government. At the end of the meeting, Hammarskjöld told Stevenson, “There had to 
be Congolese govt which was political cover at top, but UN should provide hard core 
of personnel who would make most of decisions. Situation should in reality be one 
where Congolese consulted UN rather than vice versa”.771 
 
Hammarskjöld had a great influence on the new US Congo policy. As Cordier wrote 
to a friend: “The new administration in Washington is engaged in a full reassessment 
of policy and is developing in brief a line which is much more in accord with our 
Secretariat line. We have had the advantage of having extensive talks with Dean Rusk 
and Adlai Stevenson, as well as the President and those talks are now bearing 
fruit.”772 The US could only hope to successfully implement a strategy that was 
centered on the UN if the Secretary-General was onboard. And Hammarskjöld needed 
not just the support of the US, but a more flexible US stance, more willing to pay 
heed to the concerns of the Afro-Asians and put pressure on the Belgians and their 
West-European backers, to enable Hammarskjöld to carry the majority of the General 
Assembly. This was also in line with Kennedy’s realisation that the real Cold War 
objective was to get the newly independent states to support the West as opposed to 
simply keeping the Soviets out of the Congo. In the final paper outlining the new 
policy that was submitted to Kennedy for approval one of the main problems with the 
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new policy was what would happen if Hammarskjöld were to resign as 
Hammarskjöld’s active cooperation was seen as key to US policy.773  
 
The outcome was a memorandum entitled Suggested New United States Policy for the 
Congo, which was submitted to Kennedy on 1 February and approved at an NSC 
meeting the same day. Point number three of the memorandum read “Establishment 
of United Nations Administration for Congo”. “Ideally”, it explained, the UN would 
“exercise all functions of government and administration” as this would be the 
“maximum safeguard against a Lumumba takeover”. This scenario was, however, 
probably “not politically feasible” as the Afro-Asians were likely to resent this as “a 
step backward to a United Nations trusteeship”. On the other hand any government 
would have to rely heavily on the UN for “administration and technical help”. This, 
coupled with the neutralization of the ANC – another of Hammarskjöld’s key points – 
meant that “the operational machinery of government would hopefully be largely in 
United Nations rather than Congolese hands”. This could come about for example if 
Kasavubu would ask the UN for additional personnel. In that way, “there would be no 
infringement of Congolese sovereignty, but the United Nations would be running the 
country on a de facto basis”. (If the people who had been drafting the new strategy 
had paid any attention to what Kasavubu actually thought, they would have been 
aware that he was more inclined to ask the UN to leave the country and would resent 
any attempt at strengthening the role of the UN, let alone a de facto trusteeship.) Lots 
of technical assistance would also be needed – and keeping Belgian advisors, but 
bringing them in under the UN umbrella – last but not least, all aid to the Congo 
would be channelled through the UN.774 In essence this was the same policy that 
Hammarskjöld had advocated and pursued during his period of “gamesmanship” up 
until the heavy criticism after the coup against Lumumba caused him to change tack. 
The main difference was a harsher line against the Belgians, although Hammarskjöld 
still thought that Belgian technicians were welcome, and indeed essential, as long as 
they were brought in under the UN umbrella.  
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A.2 Selling the New US-UN Policy 
The idea of a stronger mandate for the UN and the Secretary-General, let alone a 
carte blanche to institute a de facto UN trusteeship, was not going to be an easy sell 
to the rest of the UN membership or the Congolese. The memorandum that set out the 
new US policy in the Congo also outlined how to sell the new strategy: it was 
essential that “suitable Afro-Asians” and Hammarskjöld took the lead in advocating a 
stronger mandate for the UN. India and Nigeria had been identified as “suitable Afro-
Asians” and already on 2 February, the day after Kennedy had approved the new 
policy, instructions were sent to the ambassadors in New Delhi and Lagos. The same 
day London, Paris and Brussels were also informed of the new Congo policy. The 
Americans underlined that they were “particularly concerned” that a fiasco in the 
Congo would discredit and weaken the UN; it was “essential UN operation in Congo 
be made to succeed”.775 
 
The new US policy landed like a bomb in London, where the new policy looked like 
putting “the pro-Western elements in the Congo” (Kasavubu, Mobutu and Tshombe) 
“in the dock”.776 The Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Home, personally drafted a long 
telegram to Dean Rusk on 3 February with his “misgivings about the proposals”, that 
would turn the Congo into “a sort of protectorate”.777 In a meeting the next day with 
the British Ambassador, Sir Harold Caccia, Dean Rusk told him “With reference to 
Lord Home's point on ‘turning the Congo into a sort of protectorate’ we see little 
chance that below the Cabinet level the Congolese themselves can administer the 
country”. In order to make the point clearer to the British, Rusk explained, in terms 
that they would supposedly understand better, that “The foreign technicians would 
thus run the country in much the same way as the British ‘advisers’ to the Maharajas 
did in India.”778  
 
The British scepticism expressed in 1959 and the beginning of 1960 to 
Hammarskjöld’s new African ideas had hardened into a stance that came closer to the 
antagonistic French view towards the UN and its Secretary-General. The British could 																																																								
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not condone a “UN trusteeship”. Patrick Dean had made this clear in the General 
Assembly in December 1960: “we do not believe that the United Nations has the right 
to set up any sort of trusteeship over the Congo”.779 On 9 February 1961, the Foreign 
Secretary made the point very clearly in a debate in the House of Lords: the UN 
“cannot become a substitute for a colonial power”.780  
 
The view that the UN was led by a Secretary-General with delusions of grandeur with 
the secret wish to replace the old colonial powers with the UN had been the view in 
Paris since de Gaulle came to power in 1958 and the French reaction to the new US 
policy was predictable. Both the French and the Belgians were angry at not having 
been consulted by the Americans before they communicated the new policy to the 
Afro-Asians. And both the French and the Belgians protested to what they (correctly) 
termed a “sort [of] UN trusteeship”.781  
 
From the Congo, the US Embassy reported that Kasavubu and Bomboko “had lost 
faith in UN” and were opposed to giving the UN additional powers. The fact that no 
attempt had been made to exchange views with the Congolese on the new policy 
became a big stumbling block. Kasavubu stated that the Government of the Congo 
“would view extension UN mandate to include full responsibility for maintenance law 
and order as infringement on Congolese sovereignty and prelude to UN trusteeship”. 
Instead Kasavubu suggested that what was needed was a new man, not a new 
mandate: Dayal was still seen as the root of all problems. The reason for Kasavubu’s 
stance on the UN was that he “totally lacks confidence in UN ability to maintain 
neutral posture”. The assessment of the US Embassy was that it would be hard to go 
ahead with the new policy and a stronger UN mandate in the direct opposition of 
Kasavubu. The US embassy suggested that the ONUC leadership should be replaced 
to create a “climate of confidence” after which more vigorous UN action by 
Hammarskjöld could be achieved under the existing resolutions without the need to 
ask for a new mandate from the Security Council, something which would also 
inevitably bring with it the risk of a Soviet veto.782 
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On 6 February, Stevenson discussed the British and French objections with 
Hammarskjöld, who “scoffed” at them and added that Kasavubu “had no prestige”. 
Regarding the Afro-Asians, Hammarskjöld predicted that the radical Afro-Asians 
would only demand one thing: “Lumumba, Lumumba, Lumumba”. But 
Hammarskjöld hoped that the more moderate Afro-Asians could make the radicals 
understand that Lumumba had no role to play before order was restored. This would 
hopefully also take the heat out of any Soviet opposition, as the Soviets would not 
like to criticise a proposal endorsed by the radical Afro-Asians. Hammarskjöld also 
told Stevenson that rumours of ill treatment of Lumumba had a bad impact in this 
respect. Nonetheless, Hammarskjöld did not want the UN to take over the 
responsibility for Lumumba (the idea of the UN taking Lumumba into protective 
custody to safeguard his safety was being floated at the time). The reason was that “If 
UN got Lumumba they would have no choice but to release him”; obviously a 
scenario Hammarskjöld wished to avoid.783 Neither Hammarskjöld nor Stevenson 
knew that Lumumba had already been dead for several days.  
 
 
A.3 Lumumba’s Death and Resolution 161 
The detailed account of Lumumba’s last gruelling hours at the hands of his enemies 
did not come to light until the turn of the century, and are still not fully known.784 
When the rumours that Lumumba was dead first reached New York Hammarskjöld 
told Stevenson that the UN must, if Lumumba was indeed dead, temporarily take over 
the Congo. Hammarskjöld planned to take over all airports and transport facilities in 
the Congo to this end. Hammarskjöld also planned to call a new Security Council 
meeting to ask for a new mandate to cover this emergency situation, although he told 
Stevenson he was “way out on thin ice” in doing so. In a strange, pseudo-legal, 
argument, Hammarskjöld added that he thought this could be based on the precedent 
of the actions when the UN took over the airports and the radio station after Kasavubu 
deposed Lumumba in September 1960. 785  This shows the very fluid ideas of 
international law and precedents that Hammarskjöld had. Most countries protested 
against the UN action in taking over the airports and the radio station, yet 																																																								
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Hammarskjöld was happy to refer to it as an established precedent. True to his habit, 
Hammarskjöld was happy to refer to things he had barely managed to get away with 
as a well-established case law.  
 
Lumumba’s death was confirmed in the morning of 13 February and the next day the 
Soviets accused Hammarskjöld of direct responsibility for Lumumba’s death in a 
formal statement. “The vitriolic attack upon Dag knew no bounds”, Cordier wrote to a 
friend, describing the Soviet attack on Hammarskjöld at the UN.786 The Soviet 
delegate Zorin and his “satellite spokesmen” were “pulling all stops … Dag is a 
murderer, assassin, plotter, intriguer, etc. etc. etc.” 787  Zorin also called for 
Hammarskjöld’s dismissal and declared that the Soviet Union no longer recognized 
Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General.788 It appeared that Hammarskjöld had met the 
same fate as his predecessor Trygve Lie. But Hammarskjöld was undaunted by the 
Soviet non-recognition. Hammarskjöld hoped that he would now get Afro-Asian 
support for the new policy or at least to neutralize the ANC and have the UN take 
over safety in the whole country.789  
 
Cordier knew how hard Hammarskjöld had suffered under all the attacks during the 
General Assembly of 1960 and he now wrote a letter to Per Lind, who, together with 
Sture Linnér, had stayed with Hammarskjöld in his apartment in New York during the 
General Assembly in 1960. Cordier asked Lind if he could get his minister’s 
permission to appoint Lind to the Swedish UN delegation to the General Assembly so 
that Lind could stay with Hammarskjöld as his “house guest” again: “I know how 
much he valued the presence of you and Sture as house guests last fall and how really 
important it was to his mental and psychological well-being to be able to talk over the 
successive developments in the Khrushchev era with two trusted friends. Now the 
situation is far worse than it was last fall.”790 Contrary to the common picture of 
Hammarskjöld as a man who never got tired or emotionally shaken, he was severely 
strained by the Soviet attacks.  
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The Afro-Asians did not, like the Soviets, blame Hammarskjöld directly or openly for 
Lumumba’s murder, but many of them gave him some part of the blame as he had 
directed a UN policy that had led to the prime minister’s overthrow. As Nkrumah put 
it in a broadcast on 14 February, Lumumba died “because the United Nations, whom 
Mr Lumumba himself, as Prime Minister, had invited to the Congo to preserve law 
and order, not only failed to maintain law and order but also denied to the lawful 
Government of the Congo all other means of self-protection”.791 Among the Afro-
Asian delegates, there was considerable acrimony towards Hammarskjöld: “In small 
private wakes for Patrice Lumumba, the Afro-Asian delegates at the United Nations 
swallow their drinks as if there were a bitter taste in their mouths. Even the wiser 
among them let this bitterness slur into their speech as they pronounce the name of 
Hammarskjöld.”792 Gone were the days when Hammarskjöld was the darling of the 
Afro-Asians.  
 
By 15 February the UAR and Ghana had recognized the Stanleyville regime and it 
seemed likely that the rest of the Casablanca powers and the Soviet bloc might soon 
follow suit. This would create a Cold War split in the UN over the Congo that would 
make it exceedingly difficult to continue the UN intervention in the Congo. In order 
to prevent this Nehru urged the Afro-Asians to continue to work through the UN and 
to accept a stronger resolution. Hammarskjöld and the Americans now found 
themselves in a delicate situation. While it seemed that they might now get Afro-
Asian support for a stronger mandate for the UN, the Afro-Asians were likely to only 
accept a resolution which was even stronger than what Hammarskjöld and his 
American allies actually wanted including a strong operational edge against Katanga 
and the Belgians.  
 
On 17 February Charles Yost, Stevenson’s deputy, produced a memorandum entitled 
“The Stakes in the Congo”, which assessed the role of the Congo in the Cold War. 
Yost doubted that the primary Soviet objective was to establish a Communist or 
Communist-leaning regime in all or part of Congo. Yost argued that the Soviets 
lacked the capacity to provide arms and equipment to support a Communist regime in 
the Congo, that the Soviets were aware that the US could and would block such an 																																																								
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event, and, more importantly, that even the radical Afro-Asians did not want to see 
the Congo turned into a Communist state. Yost wrote that the Soviets “are well aware 
that isolated they are helpless in Africa; only in association with African states are 
they formidable”. The important Cold War dimension, according to Yost’s analysis, 
was the battle for the Afro-Asian states in New York rather than between the different 
factions on the ground in the Congo. The Soviets, Yost argued, were out to exploit 
anti-colonial feelings to further “much broader and more serious objectives”. Namely, 
to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the West in all of Africa and to weaken African 
support for the UN in order to either reform or “otherwise destroy the usefulness of 
that organization” (for American purposes). There was hope, however. Yost thought 
that strong UN action would keep the Soviets out and would be supported by the 
Africans, but there was an important catch: “The price is that this action be applied to 
our friends as well as to the Communists”. Yost admitted that this involved risks but 
foresaw that if it was rejected it “may set flowing an anti-Western, anti-UN, pro-
Soviet current in Africa which cannot be reversed for many years if at all”.793 It was 
the old American dilemma of choosing between the Afro-Asians and their Western 
colonial allies. So far, the Americans had tried to have it both ways, using UN 
resolutions only against the Soviets and not against the Belgians. But, as Yost 
underlined, this might lead to dire consequences. The battle was not for Orientale 
province or even the whole of the Congo, it was for the whole Third-World and the 
future of the UN. Yost’s memorandum also caught much of the spirit of the new 
frontiersmen who had entered the White House and State Department with Kennedy. 
This was also the direction that Hammarskjöld had been moving in after the coup in 
September 1960 when he veered off in a much more anti-Belgian direction under 
pressure from the Afro-Asians.  
 
When the Security Council met on 17 February the Afro-Asian members of the 
Council submitted a draft resolution in two parts. Part B urged the convening of 
parliament and a reorganization of the army to eliminate its ability to interfere in 
politics. This was broadly in line with the new US/UN policy. Part A of the 
resolution, however, was hard to accept for the Americans, not to mention for the 
British and the French. The first operative paragraph A(1) urged “that the United 
Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil 																																																								
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war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military 
operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last 
resort”. This was the first reference to the use of force other than in self-defence. This 
would give the UN the mandate Hammarskjöld and the Americans had wanted, but 
the edge of the resolution was pointing in the wrong direction. The second operative 
paragraph A(2) urged “that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and 
evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary 
personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and 
mercenaries”. Except for the explicit mentioning of Belgians, this was clearly targeted 
at Katanga, while it would not necessarily apply to Stanleyville since it did not 
mention arms or equipment (the difference between Katanga and Stanleyville in this 
respect was that Katanga had a large presence of Belgian and Western personnel and 
mercenaries, whereas most of the support Stanleyville was likely to receive from the 
Eastern bloc was arms and equipment). The first thing that the Americans objected to 
in the draft was not the words that were in it, but rather the words that were not; and 
the words that were most conspicuously lacking were “Secretary-General”. 
 
The Afro-Asian drafters of the resolution had omitted any reference to 
Hammarskjöld, in stark contrast to all previous resolutions, partly to show their 
displeasure with how previous resolutions had been implemented and partly to avoid 
a Soviet veto, which seemed likely if reference was made to Hammarskjöld after the 
all-out Soviet campaign against him. The Americans also planned to push for 
amendments, the first of which was a reference to the Secretary-General. On 20 
February the American calculations again changed as news of murder again reached 
New York from the Congo. Kasavubu had sent six imprisoned Lumumba supporters 
to South Kasai where they had been killed. This caused an almost greater shock than 
the death of Lumumba and the Americans decided not to insist on their amendments. 
At the debate Stevenson therefore mentioned his reservations, but added that he 
would not fight for them. As far as the reference to Hammarskjöld was concerned, 
Stevenson simply said that he assumed that the Secretary-General would be 
responsible for the implementation of the resolution also in the absence of a specific 
reference to that effect. Regarding the use of force, Stevenson added that “in the last 
resort” in the American interpretation meant that “every effort will be made to 
accomplish the purposes of this paragraph by agreement among the contending 
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elements  […] Clearly, this resolution means that force cannot be used until 
agreement has been sought by negotiation, conciliation and all other peaceful 
measures”.794 After the Americans gave up on their amendments the British felt they 
had to follow suit.795 Before voting Patrick Dean added the British interpretation for 
the record stating that the reference to “the use of force” could only be used to prevent 
clashes between hostile Congolese troops: “There can be no question of empowering 
the United Nations to use its forces to impose a political settlement.”796 
 
The draft Afro-Asian resolution was adopted as Security Council resolution 161 on 21 
February 1961 with a vote of nine to zero with the Soviet Union and France 
abstaining. The Americans had voted for a resolution they did not like, and that their 
European allies liked even less, and now they wanted to make sure it was 
implemented in a way that was acceptable to their European allies. The instrument to 
secure this was the Secretary-General. Cordier commented that “the resolution itself 
was so broad and vague in its phraseology as to provide many and varied 
interpretations”. 797  Hammarskjöld’s first action was to hold a series of intense 
meetings with the Advisory Committee on the Congo in which he managed to get 
them to acknowledge that although the resolution referred to “the UN” and not the 
“Secretary-General” it was the Secretary-General who was responsible for 
implementing the resolution, this way “the lost gun of the Security Council was 
retrieved by the debate in the Advisory Committee” in Cordier’s words.798  
 
 
B Creating a Victory in the Congo 
B.1 “The International Civil Servant in Law and Fact”  
Hammarskjöld was greatly disturbed by the lack of support from the Afro-Asians in 
the face of the Soviet attacks. “We have been grievously disappointed by the 
cowardice, the spinelessness, the weakness, the obvious personal ambitions and the 
confusion of thinking in a number of Afro-Asian states”, Cordier wrote to a friend.799 																																																								
794 SCOR 16th year, 941st meeting, 20 February 1961, para. 83. 
795 Telegram UKUN to FO 21 February 1961, JB 2281/43, FO371/155103. 
796 SCOR 16th year, 942nd meeting, 20 February 1961, para. 21. 
797 Letter from Cordier to Schwalm 25 February 1961, Cordier Papers Box 47. 
798 Oral History Cordier, p. 83. 
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But it was not simply cowardice and spinelessness that had stopped the Afro-Asians 
from lining up to defend Hammarskjöld. Their defence of Hammarskjöld at the 
General Assembly in 1960 in reaction to Khrushchev’s attack had only come at the 
price of a radical change in Hammarskjöld’s policy in the Congo. The Afro-Asians 
were still critical of the way Hammarskjöld was running not just the Congo operation 
but the Secretariat in general. Hammarskjöld would have a very difficult time 
repeating his victory against Soviet criticism in the next General Assembly in 
September 1961 unless he could show progress in the Congo.  
 
Hammarskjöld wrote a series of letters to his former chief, the Swedish Foreign 
Minister Östen Undén, to explain the difficult situation that would confront him at the 
General Assembly. To explain his motives, Hammarskjöld wrote: “Naturally, I am 
guided solely – and I really mean solely – by what is in the best interest of the UN, 
and the world community through the UN”. “But”, Hammarskjöld added, “the 
judgment on where this criterion leads must primarily be mine.” The last word on 
what was or was not in the “best interest of the UN, and the world community through 
the UN” rested with Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld went on to explain to Undén that 
the Soviet line calling for Hammarskjöld’s resignation only claimed a weak minority 
in the General Assembly. But Hammarskjöld worried that the Russians might be able 
to squeeze out many abstentions if it came to a vote. Hammarskjöld added that he 
would personally regard abstentions as negative votes if it were a quasi vote of 
confidence. And with the special weight that Hammarskjöld had himself given to the 
Afro-Asians by his own stratagem of claiming to lead the UN for the smaller states 
there might well be an outcome where Hammarskjöld would feel compelled to resign 
if not enough of the Afro-Asians supported him actively.800  
 
On 18 March Hammarskjöld thought that the Soviets were going to try and remove 
him by having an item concerning the Secretary-General inscribed on the agenda of 
the General Assembly and at the same time let “four or five Afro-Asian names of 
candidates be known as perfectly acceptable to the Soviet Union”.801 This way 
Hammarskjöld thought that the Soviets might be able to get enough Afro-Asians to at 
least abstain. In this case, Hammarskjöld felt, he must speak his mind to the General 																																																								
800 Letter from Hammarskjöld to Undén, 26 February 1961, Dag Hammarskjöld Papers L179:141. 
801 Letter from Hammarskjöld to Undén, 18 March 1961, Dag Hammarskjöld Papers L179:141. 
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Assembly. The day after, Hammarskjöld sent a follow-up letter to Undén in which he 
outlined an alternative development. Hammarskjöld thought that Khrushchev might 
try to strike a deal with Kennedy by which the Soviets agreed to shelve the troika 
proposal on the understanding that the United States would agree with the Russians 
on an Afro-Asian Secretary-General, so as to “render the Organisation effective 
again”. Hammarskjöld was convinced that the Soviets would at least try this and 
thought that Kennedy would at least consider it: “[Kennedy] is not likely to give too 
much weight to its implications by way of an implicit endorsement of the attempt at 
character assassination”. If such a deal was made behind the scenes, Hammarskjöld 
felt that he would have to speak up: “If this development were to come about, I 
believe that the future interests of the United Nations require that, in some form, the 
elements of the bargain be on the General Assembly record, so that there is no 
misunderstanding about what the deal involves in more general political terms.”802 
Hammarskjöld was worried not just for his position but also for his historical legacy. 
 
Hammarskjöld also addressed Khrushchev’s critique head on in a speech in Oxford 
on 30 May 1961. Entitled “The International Civil Servant in Law and Fact” this 
speech represents Hammarskjöld’s most developed view of the political role of the 
Secretary-General and his political testament.803 In the speech, Hammarskjöld first 
described the role of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and concluded 
that the Secretary-General of the League had played a self-restraining role: “For him 
to have entered into political tasks which involved in any substantial degree the taking 
of a position was regarded as compromising the very basis of the impartiality essential 
for the Secretariat.” Nonetheless, Hammarskjöld observed, this did not mean that 
political matters were entirely excluded. Sir Eric Drummond, the first Secretary-
General of the League, had “played a role behind the scenes, acting as a confidential 
channel of communication to Governments engaged in controversy or dispute, but 
this behind-the-scenes role was never extended to taking action in a politically 
controversial case that was deemed objectionable by one of the sides concerned.” 
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Hammarskjöld next discussed how the Charter of the UN, in particular articles 98 and 
99, “together open the door to the problem of neutrality in a sense unknown in the 
history of the League of Nations”. Article 98 states that the Security Council and the 
General Assembly may entrust the Secretary-General with tasks involving the 
execution of political decisions. (Article 97 says that the Secretary-General is the 
“chief administrative officer” and article 98 adds that he also “shall perform such 
other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs”; that these are political 
functions Hammarskjöld deduces e contrario from the fact that article 97 concerns 
administrative functions). But it was article 99 that more than anything else gave the 
Secretary-General a political role according to Hammarskjöld (article 99 states that 
“The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security”). Hammarskjöld then discussed the fact that an American proposal that the 
UN should be headed by a “President” as well as a Secretary-General had been made 
at Dumbarton Oaks. In the end, it was decided to only have a Secretary-General, “but 
one in whom there would be combined both the political and executive functions of a 
President with the internal administrative functions that were previously accorded to a 
Secretary-General”, something which Hammarskjöld called “a reflection, in some 
measure, of the American political system”. Hammarskjöld’s presidential view of the 
Secretary-General is, however, mistaken and he fails to appreciate the fact that it was 
decided not to have a President at Dumbarton Oaks. A presidential solution was 
discussed and dropped, article 97 is pretty clear in stating that the Secretary-General 
is the “chief administrative officer”; it is quite far-fetched to derive the presidential 
interpretation from articles 98 and 99.  
 
Hammarskjöld then stressed that the development of a political role for the Secretary-
General that springs from articles 98 and 99 is based on “the basic concept of 
“neutrality”” as expressed in article 100. Hammarskjöld here paused to conclude that 
if the Secretary-General should be neutral in the sense that he could not take a stand 
on political issues, this would in fact be against the Charter, since the Charter had 
made it possible for the Security Council and the General Assembly to entrust the 
Secretary-General with such issues. What neutrality really meant, Hammarskjöld 
explained, was that the international civil servant must “remain wholly uninfluenced 
by national or group interests or ideologies”. The criticism of the political role of the 
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Secretary-General therefore could be understood as a criticism of the Charter, and 
“imply a demand for a reduction of the functions of the Secretariat to the role 
assigned to it in the League” and article 97. But this, to Hammarskjöld, would be “a 
retrograde development” with regards to how the political role of the Secretary-
General had developed.   
 
Hammarskjöld then described how the political role of the Secretary-General had 
grown under his tenure. This was mainly due to the fact that the Security Council and 
the General Assembly had entrusted the implementation of controversial political 
decisions to Hammarskjöld. “In some cases implementation was largely 
administrative; the political organs stated their objectives and the measures to be 
taken in reasonably specific terms, leaving only a narrow area for executive 
discretion”, Hammarskjöld said. “But in other cases… the Secretary-General was 
confronted with mandates of a highly general character, expressing the bare minimum 
of agreement attainable in the organs.” Hammarskjöld failed to mention that he had 
often been the driving force behind the adoption of “mandates of a highly general 
character”. Hammarskjöld then mentioned how he had cautiously referred back to the 
Security Council in the Congo crisis so the Council could “express themselves on the 
interpretation by the Secretary-General to the mandate”. Hammarskjöld did not 
mention that when he could not get support for his interpretation from the Council he 
deliberately pushed through his interpretation in the face of a Soviet veto and happily 
interpreted the Council’s non-adoption of his measures (precisely because the 
members of the Security Council did not agree) as a go-ahead. Hammarskjöld then 
lamented the “disintegration of the Central Government” as it was the “party in 
consultation with which the United Nations activities had to be developed”. 
Hammarskjöld failed to mention that he had treated the Central Government as a non-
entity from the outset and then supported the disintegration of the central government, 
even backing a coup against the Prime Minister Lumumba exactly because Lumumba 
disagreed with the Secretary-General about the implementation of the Security 
Council resolution. Hammarskjöld had his policies clear from the beginning. He did 
not seek guidance, but only confirmation, from the Security Council and intrigued to 
cajole the Council and then to back a coup against the Congolese Prime Minister 
when he did not agree with him. Contrary to Hammarskjöld’s presentation, 
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Hammarskjöld had not been forced by events into taking a large political role; he had 
actively sought it and had schemed to achieve it.  
 
Hammarskjöld then discussed the fact that the Secretary-General ought perhaps to 
refuse a mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly when “specific 
cases involving a clash of interests and positions, the required majority in the Security 
Council or General Assembly may not be available for any particular solution”. This 
was tempting, Hammarskjöld said, but the Secretary-General was not allowed to do 
so if he had been mandated according to Article 98: “The Secretary-General remains 
under the obligation to carry out the policies as adopted by the organs; the essential 
requirement is that he does this on the basis of his exclusively international 
responsibility and not in the interest of any particular State or groups of States”.  
 
This led to “ the crucial issue”:  “is it possible for the Secretary-General to resolve 
controversial questions on a truly international basis without obtaining the formal 
decision of the organs?” Hammarskjöld answered in the affirmative, although “[t]his 
is not to say that the Secretary-General is a kind of delphic oracle who alone speaks 
for the international community”. As Hammarskjöld’s correspondence with Undén 
shows, however, Hammarskjöld did see it as the Secretary-General’s prerogative to 
do so. The Secretary-General had several resources at his hand. First, there were the 
“principles and purposes of the Charter”. Secondly, these were “supplemented by the 
body of legal doctrine and precepts that have been accepted by States generally”. As 
Hammarskjöld remarked “principles and law” did not suffice, “problems of political 
judgment still remain”. It would be hard to deduce any of Hammarskjöld’s policies as 
flowing from an interpretation of the Charter, a document that can, and has, been used 
to support the most varied policies. To this end, Hammarskjöld had “found several 
arrangements” by which to “obtain what might be regarded as the representative 
opinion of the Organization in respect of the political issues faced him”. He 
mentioned two, the permanent missions and the advisory committees. In this way the 
Secretary-General could “take steps to reduce the sphere within which he has to take 
stands on politically controversial issues”. As far as the first is concerned it is clear 
that Hammarskjöld consulted much more with some, especially the Americans and 
the British, than others, and as far as the advisory committees are concerned, he only 
instituted these under pressure and did not ask for their advice. On several occasions 
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he even tried to undermine their decisions. Hammarskjöld did not try to “reduce the 
sphere within which he has to take stands on politically controversial issues” – he 
took steps to increase that sphere.  
 
There remained, Hammarskjöld said, “a serious intellectual and moral problem” as we 
moved into the area where “personal judgment must come into play”. The problem 
was all the more serious as Hammarskjöld had worked to enlarge the area where 
personal judgment came into play. Hammarskjöld set out the standards to which the 
Secretary-General must adhere in this sphere of personal judgment in the following 
terms: “The international civil servant must keep himself under the strictest 
observation. He is not requested to be a neuter in the sense that he has to have no 
sympathies or antipathies, that there are to be no interests which are close to him in 
his personal capacity or that he is to have no ideas or ideals that matter for him. 
However, he is requested to be fully aware of those human reactions and meticulously 
check himself so that they are not permitted to influence his actions. This is nothing 
unique. Is not every judge professionally under the same obligation?” The reference 
to the impartiality demanded of a judge is halting. No judge ever came near the 
political role that Hammarskjöld played as Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld’s words 
might have held some guidance for a limited mandate, not for the ambitious political 
role he had built up in Congo.  
 
Hammarskjöld agreed with this proposition to some extent in a press conference 
arising from the Oxford lecture. When asked by a journalist, who referred to “a theory 
of international relations” which went back to Hobbes, that held that “objectivity and 
neutrality is irreconcilable with the human mind and that there is not a single neutral 
person on this globe”, Hammarskjöld replied, in an elaboration of his ideas expressed 
in the Oxford lecture that “there is no neutral man, but there is, if you have integrity, 
neutral action by the right kind of man”. What was meant was “neutrality in relation 
to interests” “and there I do claim that there is no insurmountable difficulty for 
anybody with the proper kind of guiding principles in carrying through such neutrality 
one hundred per cent.” But Hammarskjöld was not neutral as to Communist interests.  
 
It was not just the Soviets who attacked Hammarskjöld. On 11 April 1961 de Gaulle 
declared that France would cease to contribute financially to ONUC. In July 1961 the 
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crisis in Hammarskjöld’s relations with France reached its apogee with the Secretary-
General’s failed mediation attempt in the Bizerte crisis. Rebuffed by de Gaulle, 
Hammarskjöld’s car was stopped and searched by French paratroopers. Neither 
France, nor the African states, who still voted in line with Paris, would support 
Hammarskjöld at the General Assembly.804  
 
There had long been criticism of how Hammarskjöld ran the Secretariat. To the 
critique of an overly centralized Secretariat the old problem of the geographical 
distribution of posts had grown in relation to the large number of newly admitted 
members. Already during the General Assembly in the fall of 1958 the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), which presents 
suggestions to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, voiced criticism of the 
way the Secretariat was run. Hammarskjöld replied that he thought the new 
arrangements he had adopted worked very well and with self-assuredness told the 
Fifth Committee “I do not myself see the slightest justification for proposing any 
changes”.805 This was in 1958, Hammarskjöld had just been reelected and was at his 
apogee and could afford to dismiss the criticism. Nevertheless, in 1959 the General 
Assembly decided to call for an overall review of the Secretariat by a committee of 
outside experts to be appointed by Hammarskjöld. Final recommendations were to be 
given to the General Assembly in 1961. 
 
To a great extent the criticism focused on the high number of American and Western 
officials in the Secretariat. Not only were all of Hammarskjöld’s closest advisers 
Americans, of a grand total of 79 Under-Secretaries, officials of equivalent rank and 
directors (D-2 level) in the Secretariat (including Geneva, Regional Economic 
Commissions, Special Missions etc.) 22 were American and 33 from Western Europe, 
Australia, Canada or New Zeeland. In comparison only two were from the Soviet 
Union and only one from Black Africa (Nigeria). The only Afro-Asian country with a 
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strong representation was India with seven. 806  As the criticism increased, 
Hammarskjöld felt more and more besieged in New York. First, he had hoped to 
solve the question by simply adding a number of new under-secretaries general, and 
keeping all of his current ones. During the spring of 1961 it became clear that this 
would not be enough.  
 
For some time Cordier’s central position in the Secretariat had been criticised. On 17 
May 1961, Hammarskjöld formally proposed to Cordier that he would split his office 
in two and make Cordier under-secretary general for General Assembly affairs and 
appoint the Indian C.V. Narasimhan to the new position of chef de cabinet, effectively 
replacing Cordier as Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General. Cordier had for 
some time been looking for a position outside the UN, as he assumed he would retire 
from the UN together with Hammarskjöld when his mandate ran out in 1963. Cordier 
had just turned 60 and had received several interesting offers and was worried that he 
might not receive the same offers two years later. Cordier therefore replied to 
Hammarskjöld that he would hand in his resignation. Hammarskjöld was “deeply 
agitated” by what he perceived to be an “ultimatum” from Cordier’s side. 
Hammarskjöld seemed oblivious to the fact that he was demoting Cordier, who was 
no doubt hurt by the suggestion. Hammarskjöld said “Andy, you don’t know how 
much I have suffered this winter”. Cordier replied that he was suffering with 
Hammarskjöld. As Cordier correctly deduced, Hammarskjöld was torn between a will 
to keep Cordier with him to the end and a need to reorganize in a way that effectively 
meant demoting Cordier. After this meeting Cordier went on a trip and, after an 
exchange of letters – where Hammarskjöld replied “Dear Mr. Cordier” to Cordier’s 
“Dear Dag” – Hammarskjöld invited Cordier to dinner at his home on his return to 
discuss the matter again. On this evening Hammarskjöld “elaborated very much upon 
the spiritual and moral crisis […] to which he had been subjected by the Russians 
during the winter. He described in detail […] the Soviet technique of breaking the 
moral fiber of a man. He said that they had succeeded in building up a vacuum around 
him and that many of his friends shied away from him out of the cowardly hope of 
avoiding involvement in the issue”. Cordier said that he had himself sensed this and 
seen evidences of it “in the corridors, in the dining room and in meetings”. Cordier 																																																								
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also at this point mentioned his arrangements to have Per Lind come and stay with 
Hammarskjöld during the General Assembly of 1961. Hammarskjöld’s hoped to keep 
Cordier as his “personal confidant and aide” while changing his title.807 In the end, 
Cordier agreed to a compromise where he would stay on as under-secretary-general 
for General Assembly affairs until the end of 1961 (although Hammarskjöld hoped 
that he would stay on throughout 1962). Cordier also kept his office next to 
Hammarskjöld’s. Hammarskjöld then drafted a letter for Cordier to sign with the 
reasons for his resignation. This letter, together with Hammarskjöld’s reply, was 
published as a press release. Commenting on Cordier’s change of position and 
eventual resignation, the New York Times called it the “end of an era in the life of the 
organization”.808 Under siege in the Secretariat, ostracised by the French and fearful 
of a renewed Soviet attack when the General Assembly started in September, 
Hammarskjöld desperately needed a victory in the Congo. 
 
 
B.2 Getting Rid of Dayal 
When the news of the Security Council resolution reached Léopoldville the first 
reaction was one of direct hostility to the UN and a resolution, which was interpreted 
as preparing the way for the UN to impose a political solution by force and install a 
UN trusteeship. Kasavubu appealed in a radio broadcast for a general mobilization 
against an imminent UN takeover and in Elisabethville Tshombe announced a “total 
mobilization”.809  
 
The resolution also led to a temporary rapprochement between Léopoldville and 
Elizabethville. By getting together they hoped to be able to resist both the UN and the 
Gizenga-regime in Stanleyville. Additionally, if they could come to an agreement, 
there would be no need for a UN intervention under the new Security Council 
resolution. On 28 February a military alliance directed against the UN and 
Stanleyville was signed by Tshombe, Ileo and Kalonji. This was followed up by a 
conference in Tananarive on Madagascar, a country known to favour Katangese 																																																								
807 The story of Cordier’s resignation as described above is given in a letter from Cordier to his friend 
David Blickenstaff at the United Nations Information Centre, New Delhi, 8 July 1961, Cordier Papers 
Box 50. 
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809 Kalb, p. 242. 
	 224	
independence. By 12 March five resolutions had been signed at Tananarive. They 
stated that the Congo would now be a “confederation of states”, as Tshombe had 
always wanted. One of the resolutions addressed the UN specifically and stated that 
the resolutions of the Security Council violated both the Charter of the UN and the 
sovereignty of the Congo, although it also added that the new confederate Congo 
would be willing to work with the UN as long as it respected the sovereignty of the 
country. In Belgium news of the outcome of the Tananarive conference were 
celebrated and shares in both Congolese and Katangan companies rose on the stock 
market.810  
 
The rest of the world reacted in a less jubilant way at the newfound friendship 
between Léopoldville and Elizabethville. Both the Soviet Bloc and most of the Afro-
Asians protested the outcome of the Tananarive conference and called it 
unrepresentative and undemocratic since it was taken outside the parliament. The 
Americans, with a cautious eye on world opinion, were worried about this 
development. Something had to be done to improve the disastrous relations between 
the UN and the Congo. Kasavubu repeated that he “could and would” work with the 
UN, but not with Dayal. The recommendation of the US embassy in Leopoldville was 
clear: “Dayal must go if the UN is to assist the Congo to move with any sureness or 
speed toward stability”.811 On 20 March, Stevenson met with Hammarskjöld and 
explained that it was President Kennedy’s personal conviction that Dayal should be 
relieved of his post.812  
 
The greatest difficulty in getting rid of Dayal was the strong support he had from 
Nehru. Rusk summarised his fears of the Indian influence in the Congo: “the big 
problem was that Nehru seemed to be pursuing a separate Indian policy rather than 
merging his effort with the United Nations effort.”813 To some extent this was 
certainly true, as the UN policy had changed drastically with Dayal’s arrival to a 
policy that was more or less identical to that advocated by Nehru. Partly from fear of 
Nehru, partly to appease the Afro-Asians Hammarskjöld had gone along with this.  
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The American efforts to replace Dayal appeared to be paying off when Hammarskjöld 
showed the first sign of yielding on 22 April. After Dayal left the Congo for 
consultations in New York UN-Congo relations were also better than in a long 
while.814 By 26 April Hammarskjöld had made up his mind to replace Dayal. Instead 
of appointing a new Special Representative to lead UNOC, Hammarskjöld would 
substitute Dayal for a number of high officials on the level of Linnér, who would in 
practice become the new leader of UNOC. Hammarskjöld told Stevenson that the fact 
that Nehru “had foolishly committed himself in public to Dayal remaining” as the 
main reason that he had kept Dayal on for so long and now found it hard to get rid of 
him.815 On 25 May Hammarskjöld announced that Dayal was returning, on his own 
request, to his former post as Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. Although not 
happy with the way the Congolese treated his special representative, Hammarskjöld 
was relieved to see the issue resolved with Nehru putting the blame squarely on the 
Congolese and not on Hammarskjöld.816 
 
 
B.3 “throwing all semblance of non-intervention to the wind” 
With the Dayal era at an end, a new period of cooperation in UN-US and UN-Congo 
relations began. The men who took over after Dayal interpreted the mission of the UN 
more along the lines of Hammarskjöld’s “gamesmanship” period. Actively working 
behind the scenes to achieve the desired political outcomes that the UN wanted. This 
attitude was summed up by Linnér’s deputy Khiari in the sentence “il faut faire de la 
politique”. 817  Sture Linnér has often been described as concerned mainly with 
technical assistance and delegating political responsibilities to Khiari.818 As is evident 
from the following, this view is not supported by the available documents. On the 
contrary, Linnér played a decisive political role, and was lauded for doing so by the 
Americans.  																																																								
814 Telegram from USUN to State 22 April 1961 FRUS 1961-63 Vol XX. 
815 Telegram USUN to State 26 April 1961 FRUS 1961-63 Vol XX. 
816 Telegram from USUN to State 22 May 1961 FRUS 1961-63 Vol XX. 
817 O’Brien, p. 189. 
818 Khiari has later been depicted in a very negative way and given much of the blame for the UN 
operations in Katanga. As an example, Urquhart said ”Khiari was an extremely Machiavellian and 
dishonest man who had a very firm view of his own about how things ought to be done in the 
Congo…”. No such views were, however, recorded at the time of the events; on the contrary, after 
Hammarskjöld’s death it was Khiari who was entrusted with the sensitive mission of going to negotiate 
with Tshombe in Hammarskjöld’s place, see Coded cable from Linnér to Bunche 18 September 1961, 
A-2201, UN Archives Series 217 Box 9 File 8. 
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On 20 June the American permanent mission in New York received a long instruction 
that said that the moment was now propitious to have a general review of the Congo 
with Hammarskjöld. The main point of the instruction was to urge Hammarskjöld to 
use his influence towards creating a “government of moderate character in which 
members of Lumumba-Gizenga group would be represented, if the parliamentary 
majority so desires, without being able to exert overriding influence on basic policies 
of country”.819 After meeting with Hammarskjöld, Yost reported back that on the 
whole Hammarskjöld was “thinking along same lines as we are, maneuvering 
effectively to produce as sound and moderate government as is possible under 
circumstances”.820 By 21 June Kennedy had also approved a substantial fund for a 
covert political action program, devised by the CIA and recommended by the State 
Department, to elect a pro-US government.821  
 
As the Congolese politicians gathered for the reconvening of the parliament at 
Louvanium, the UN started playing a more and more active role to push for what they 
considered a moderate government, abetted by the Americans. 822  Godley, the 
American chargé d’affaires, who had replaced Timberlake, was given a great deal of 
latitude in dealing with the parliamentary assembly at Louvanium. The Americans 
considered it important to get Tshombe to attend the parliamentary session to 
guarantee a victory for Adoula and the “moderates”.823 Linnér shared this objective 
completely, not least because he thought that a Gizenga-led government might trigger 
a military coup and a return to the situation after Mobutu’s coup. Since Godley did 
not want to go and see Kasavubu himself, he got Linnér to carry American messages 
to Kasavubu to reinforce UN points made to him on the need for the president to work 
to get Adoula appointed to lead the new government.824 Dean Rusk also “expressed 
appreciations for the interventions of Linnér with Kasavubu” to Cordier.825 On July 
28 Godley reported “We should also of course continue work closely with Linner and 
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use him and his African advisers, Khiari and Gardiner, to disseminate our thoughts 
and arguments where they would do most good”.826  
 
According to O’Brien, Linnér’s deputies Khiari and Gardiner were “throwing all 
semblance of non-intervention to the winds”.  Ten days before the election, Khiari 
showed O’Brien a list of the government they wanted and that was the government 
which was also elected, correct except for one person.827 Hammarskjöld, as had been 
the case with Cordier’s actions earlier, did not mind that his lieutenants were 
interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo in a clear breach of his own statements 
and several Security Council resolutions. After Linnér had sent a cable relating one 
political discussion with Kasavubu without marking it “top secret” Hammarskjöld 
reproached him, remarking that since the discussion reported in the cable was “from 
your side ‘interference in Congolese affairs’” Linnér should have sent it as top secret. 
The fact that Linnér was interfering in Congolese affairs was, however, not 
reproached. Instead Hammarskjöld made a distinction between “what you may 
consider yourself morally entitled to say as a private person and ‘on a man to man 
basis’, and, on the other side, what can be said by you as officer-in-charge”. And 
Hammarskjöld added “Naturally it is impossible for the Secretary-General, even 
indirectly, to become party to personality questions in the internal Congolese 
manoeuvering and I must therefore stand completely aloof in relation to views 
expressed of that character”.828 With phrases, such as these,  similar to those he had 
used to encourage Cordier at the time of Kasavubu’s coup, Hammarskjöld now gave 
Linnér a free hand to interfere in Congolese politics when he felt that he was “morally 
entitled to” “as a private person”.  
 
On first August, Kasavubu tasked Adoula with forming the next government, and 
Adoula received a strong vote of confidence from parliament the day after. The 
outcome that the US and the UN had wanted and worked hard for was achieved 
although Gizenga complained about the frequent visits of UN officials to parliament. 
In a memorandum on the successful outcome of the Louvanium session to President 
Kennedy, Dean Rusk made a special mention of Linnér’s important role: “The UN 																																																								
826 Telegram from Leopoldville to State 28 July 1961 FRUS 1961-63 Vol XX. 
827 O’Brien, p. 189. 
828 Coded cable from Hammarskjöld to Linnér 19 July 1961, UN archives Series 217 Box 8 File 9. 
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representative, Linner, through his efforts had made a large contribution to this 
successful outcome”. 829 
 
After the successful political intervention of Linnér and his friends, a ray of hope 
seemed to come from the Congo. When Rusk met with the new Belgian foreign 
minister Spaak a couple of days later, on 8 August, in Paris, he started by telling him 
that “for first time there seems real hope in Congo picture” and again praised Linnér’s 
work. The two foreign ministers also agreed that the next big task in the Congo would 
be the reintegration of Katanga. Spaak informed Rusk that he had sent a message to 
Hammarskjöld that very morning stressing the need for “peaceful re-integration of 
Katanga and urging UN and new Congolese Government take no sudden or abrupt 
moves re Tshombe since this might cause him to react violently”.830  
 
 
C Intervening in Katanga 
C.1 Operation Rumpunch 
The dramatic UN “entry” into Katanga, led personally by Hammarskjöld on 12 
August 1960, had not changed anything in the secessionist status of Katanga. Instead, 
the token UN presence had allowed Katanga to build up the gendarmerie under the 
leadership of white officers, thus allowing Tshombe to create the appearance of a 
“shangri-la” in Katanga. After the UN entry on 12 August 1960 the number of white 
mercenaries in Katanga, known locally as les affreux, had increased significantly.831 
While the UN had been focusing almost exclusively first on the perceived Communist 
threat in the shape of Lumumba and then on a return to something that could pass as a 
legal central government in Leopoldville the original problem of Katanga’s secession 
and the continued presence of the Belgians – the reason that Lumumba and Kasavubu 
had asked the UN to come to the Congo in the first place, the focus of all the UN 
resolutions, and the reason Lumumba turned against the UN –remained unsolved. 
Katanga’s secessionist status had only grown more entrenched.  
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831 For background on the mercenaries in Katanga, see e.g. Pasteger, Romain, Le visage des affreux – 
les mercenaires du Katanga 1960-1964 (Brussels: Labor, 2005).  
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As part of implementing resolution 161 Hammarskjöld appointed the Irishman 
Connor Cruise O’Brien as the new UN representative to Elisabethville on 14 June. In 
the history and myth of the UN intervention in Katanga O’Brien came to play one of 
the most central roles and also gave his own account in his book “To Katanga and 
Back”. Hammarskjöld had read and greatly appreciated O’Brien’s book Maria Cross 
about a group of catholic writers and it has often been suggested that Hammarskjöld 
chose him more based on this than any other merit. Rikhye thought that the basic 
rationale for Hammarskjöld’s selection of O’Brien was that he was known – he had 
been the Irish representative in the fourth committee of the General Assembly – as a 
passionate anti-colonialist. Much as with Dayal, Hammarskjöld wanted an 
appointment that would go down well with the Afro-Asians, to sweeten the policies 
that sometimes did not.832  
 
At the same time as O’Brien arrived in Katanga the pressure was increasing on the 
UN to act to implement resolution 161. Three months had passed and Tshombe only 
seemed to be stalling. Adoula’s government was pressing the UN hard to act against 
Katanga and in a public statement on 6 August Adoula threatened to use force to end 
the secession of Katanga unless Tshombe returned to the fold of the central 
government in Leopoldville. There was also a significant risk that the Adoula 
government might split if nothing was done about the situation in Katanga. 
Meanwhile, in New York, the Afro-Asians and the Soviet Bloc, which had lessened 
their critique of Hammarskjöld after the formation of the Adoula government, 
complained about the lack of action to implement the resolution. Rumours started 
circulating that both the Afro-Asians and the Soviet Bloc were planning to censure 
Hammarskjöld for his failure to implement resolution 161 at the General Assembly 
which was due to begin on 19 September 1961.  
 
Hammarskjöld’s position and legacy as Secretary-General was intrinsically linked 
with the success or failure of the UN operation in Congo. The success that the 
formation of the Adoula government represented was now imperilled by Tshombe’s 
refusal to come to terms with Leopoldville. Hammarskjöld had so far stood up against 
the Soviet challenge of non-recognition and if he could ride out the storm in the 
Congo and successfully start winding down the UN operation there he would be 																																																								
832 UN Oral History Rikhye, p 6.  
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lauded by the Afro-Asians. This would make it hard for the Soviets to continue their 
boycott of the Secretary-General. But to this end drastic measures might be needed to 
subdue Katanga. The question of Katanga had now become a matter on which the 
future of Hammarskjöld depended.  
 
In the middle of August 1961 plans were made to act against the mercenaries in 
Katanga in order to diminish Tshombe’s strength and force him to go to Leopoldville 
and negotiate with Adoula. The plans resulted in an operation codenamed 
“Rumpunch”. The plan was drawn up in Katanga by O’Brien and Linnér’s deputy 
Khiari, who were to play a significant role in the events that unfolded.  
 
Operation Rumpunch was launched at 4 a.m. in the early morning of 28 August and 
came as a complete surprise. UN troops took control over key points and started 
rounding up the mercenaries. In the course of the same day, the consular corps (with 
the important exception of the American consul) met with O’Brien. The Belgian 
consul, Henri Crénier, requested that the arrests stop as there was no need for such 
humiliating procedures and offered instead to supervise the “voluntary repatriation” 
of all mercenaries. To his later regret, O’Brien agreed to this; he soon realized his 
mistake. The next day the Belgian consul told him that Brussels had informed him 
that he could only supervise the repatriation of Belgian officers, and could only 
guarantee the repatriation of former Force Publique officers, who were still under 
Belgian control, but not the mercenaries. The early halt of Rumpunch meant that only 
the mercenaries who had been arrested on 28 August or who later gave themselves up 
voluntarily were expelled. The rest of the mercenaries slipped out of the grip of the 
UN.  
 
When Godley chided Linnér for not notifying the Americans ahead of Rumpunch 
Linnér calmly replied that they would not do so in these kind of operations as the 
pressure on the UN in New York would then be so strong that nothing could be done. 
Linnér also added that “he had not informed Hammarskjöld extent of military 
operations for that would have bound his hands too tightly”. When Godley told 
Linnér that he had taken great risks with Operation Rumpunch Linnér replied that it 
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was his job “to take risks and assume that responsibility”.833 As with the activities of 
Linnér and his colleagues during the Louvanium session it appeared that 
Hammarskjöld was happy to condone an offensive strategy with a considerable 
amount of risk in Katanga and that Linnér and the people on the spot were expected to 
take the blame if anything went wrong. But for the time being, Hammarskjöld was 
jubilant and sent a congratulatory cable to Linnér: “Congo club, in congress 
assembled, passed unanimous vote of congratulations, gratification and sincere 
respect for an exceedingly sensitive operation carried through with skill and 
courage…”.834 O’Brien was also instructed to “press on vigorously in his previous 
direction”.835 
 
The Americans agreed with the general objective of Rumpunch – to get rid of the 
mercenaries – but feared that the UN action might trigger events that the UN could 
not control. Furthermore, the Americans still saw Tshombe as an important 
“moderate” force in the Congo that would have an important role to guarantee that the 
central government stayed “moderate” and resolutely pro-Western. Therefore they did 
not want to see him destroyed, only weakened to the point where he would be willing 
to start talks with Adoula.  
 
If the Americans were worried but supportive of Operation Rumpunch, the British 
were outraged and threatened to withdraw funds.836 There was a flurry of support for 
Katanga, not only from the conservative press in Britain and Belgium, but also from 
some American senators. The Western consuls, with the exception of the American, 
were also showing signs that were ambiguous at best. As O’Brien put it regarding 
British policy: “Her Majesty’s Government, we are told, never wavered for an instant 
in support of the United Nations but I doubt whether Mr Tshombe fully understood 
this”.837 The effect of this was that at the beginning of September “all signs of co-
operation and calm had vanished and hate and hostility between the United Nations 
and the Katangese were growing”.838  																																																								
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C.2 Operation Morthor 
The events in Katanga after Rumpunch are one of the most debated topics in the 
historiography of the Congo crisis, much like the events surrounding the coup against 
Lumumba on 5 September 1960. In the same way, the debate has focused on the 
extent to which Hammarskjöld knew about what his lieutenants in the Congo, then 
Cordier, now Linnér, Khiari and O’Brien were planning and whether he had given 
instructions to go ahead. O’Brien and Khiari have more often than not been depicted 
as acting out of turn and without instructions from Hammarskjöld. The documents 
now available paint a somewhat different picture. 
 
On 6 September, Hammarskjöld met with the Americans and the British in New York 
and “pointed out that coming week extremely critical”. If Tshombe could not be 
brought to Leopoldville for negotiations with Adoula Hammarskjöld was convinced 
that the ANC would initiate a major assault on Katanga, which in turn would lead to a 
civil war.839 The Americans, seconded by the British, told Hammarskjöld that while 
they appreciated the efforts to get rid of the mercenaries the key priority was to keep 
Tshombe as a moderate counterweight to Gizenga and his supporters. Hammarskjöld 
“expressed full agreement, said this exactly his intention”; Hammarskjöld was certain 
that Tshombe would come to an arrangement with Adoula if they could just eliminate 
the influence of his nefarious interior minister Munungo. The comment that was 
attached to the American report from the meeting reveals how the Americans 
understood Hammarskjöld’s plans:   
 
“Comment: We have impression that SYG is determined to eliminate bulk of remaining 
foreign military in Katanga by end this week and is also determined either neutralize or 
destroy Munongo whom he considers committed, for reasons of self-preservation, to 
Katanga separatism. If these objectives can be achieved he believes he can prevent ANC 
attack and bring Katanga peacefully into fold. Fact he called UK and ourselves in for this 
lengthy exposé indicates he believes next week or so very critical and he desires our 
understanding and cooperation.”840 
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On 8 September the newly arrived American ambassador Gullion met with Linnér in 
Leopoldville to try and learn more of UN plans for the “extremely critical” week 
ahead. Linnér then mentioned four scenarios: 
 
“1. Tshombe on his own adopts conciliatory attitude overcome Munongo opposition and 
enters into substantive discussions with Adoula for Katanga's incorporation in Congo 
Government on some basis which would be established during negotiation of national 
constitution. 
2. Drastic UN measures continuing pressure on Tshombe including possibly arrest 
Munongo and other extremists. This contrary general UN preferences and peaceful 
intentions and only being considered due unacceptable alternatives three and four below. 
3. Central Governments bows to nationalists here and undertakes military operations 
against Katanga. 
4. Conservative elements Léopoldville when faced with alternative three back down and 
country continues in its present divided state but with Katangese separatism reinforced by 
its successful resistance against UN pressure.” 
 
Linnér explained that while alternative 2 was “contrary general UN preferences and 
peaceful intentions” alternatives 3 and 4 were unacceptable. Hence, if alternative 1, 
which must by then have become increasingly unrealistic, would not materialise 
alternative 2 was the only alternative left. Linnér also told Gullion that an additional 
Indian battalion was being moved to Katanga in preparation of alternative 2. 
Furthermore, in Gullion’s opinion, Linnér would not bow down from drastic 
measures: “Linner who seems worthy of very considerable trust and respect fully 
appreciates dangers involved in drastic action but appears resolved to proceed for he 
is obviously concerned re possibility of civil war and chaos if some solution 
Katangese problem not arrived at.”841 Hammarskjöld sent a coded cable to Linnér on 
the same day, in which he explained the four alternatives as he had explained them to 
delegations in New York and added that “the organisation [is] being pushed further 
and further in direction of two, if no evolution according to one takes place, and three 
and four represent a realistic threat”.842 
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Linnér had submitted a plan to Hammarskjöld already on 6 September (probably 
drafted by Khiari as it was in French) that proposed to give an ultimatum to all 
mercenaries to give themselves up within 24 hours. If this did not succeed, paragraph 
9C of the cable outlined a plan to arrest all the Katangese leaders and neutralise the 
gendarmerie and the police. Reference was also made to the risk that Adoula would 
otherwise invade Katanga thereby triggering a civil war. This seems like a reference 
to paragraph A(1) of resolution 161 which allowed for the “use of force” in the last 
resort to prevent a civil war. But it seems a strange interpretation to stop a civil war 
by helping the central government subdue a province in order to prevent the central 
government from invading that province. It was of course also against resolution 146 
from 9 August 1960 which stated very clearly with regards to Katanga that “the 
United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or 
be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise”. 
 
On 7 September, Hammarskjöld also forwarded a memorandum drafted by his 
favourite legal advisor Oscar Schachter entitled “Observations on the legal aspects of 
the present Katanga situation”. Schachter made some important points with regard to 
how events were to develop in Katanga. Regarding the plans for closing the radio and 
other communication posts, Schachter wrote that this might be done “if circumstances 
clearly indicate that they are being used or may be presently used for civil war or 
unlawful purposes”. The reason for taking them according to 9C, however, was so as 
to prevent any organised resistance against the UN. According to Schachter, they 
could not be taken as a pre-emptive measure. Schachter was also adamant that 
arresting persons was allowed if they were caught “in military action or otherwise in 
flagrante delicto”. If this was not the case, however, it would, in Schachter’s carefully 
phrased words, “appear to involve a violation of the ban against intervention in 
domestic political affairs”. The fact that the Central Government had issued an arrest 
order did not change this according to Schachter. Nothing in Schachter’s 
memorandum condoned UN initiated attacks.843 
 
In a cable from Khiari to Hammarskjöld on 10 September Khiari explained that while 
the second part of paragraph 9C would only be implemented as a last resort “we have 																																																								
843 Memorandum by Oscar Schachter, transmitted with Coded cable from Hammarskjöld to Linnér, 7 
September 1961, UN Archives Series 217 Box 9 File 7.  
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no hesitation in applying it if the other measures do not have the hoped for result”. 
The cable then went on to detail how the implementation of 9C would lead to what 
Khiari colourfully described as a “psychose de choc” in the population which would 
diminish the risks of armed resistance.844 Khiari then wrote that “In conclusion, the 
development signaled in our cable A-2107 has now created the conditions that 
necessitate the implementation of paragraph 9C, the authorization for which we 
requested from you in the same cable”.845  
 
On 10 September Hammarskjöld sent his green light to go ahead with 9C in a reply to 
the cables asking for authorisation to proceed: 
 
“The speed of developments and the stage reached means that short of a change for the 
better in Katanga we are beyond point of no return as regards your plans under 9-C. You 
are therefore authorised to pursue the policy, outlined by you also to the central 
government, but we must impress on you the necessity in the course of its implementation to 
keep in mind the various views we have found necessary to express in the course of our 
exchange, views of principle of which we know from your own cables that you share.”846 
 
On 11 September, Linnér informed Hammarskjöld in a coded cable that Khiari and 
Fabry had gone to Elisabethville “to set up program of implementation on paragraph 
9C”.847 Based on these cables, it is clear, that Hammarskjöld was fully informed of 
the plans for the operation and that he authorised it.  
 
Linnér made a lightning visit to Brussels for discussions with Spaak. Spaak found 
Linnér “charmant et gentil” and appreciated the frankness with which he spoke; what 
he had to say, he appreciated less. Linnér did not tell Spaak the details of the UN 
plans, but from what he did tell him, Spaak concluded that the UN was 
“contemplating major moves”, which, at least to Spaak, went far beyond the mandate 
of the organization. What troubled Spaak most was that the “UN did not seem to have 
any definite plan for peaceful political reintegration of Katanga by GOC at 																																																								
844 Coded cable from Khiari to Hammarskjöld, A-2109, 10 September 1961, UN Archives Series 217 
Box 9 File 5. 
845 The access to cable A-2107 sent on 9 or 10 September is still restricted. I have made an official 
request to the Head of the United Nations Archives to see the cable but have so far not received a reply.  
846 Coded cable from Hammarskjöld to Linnér, 10 September 1961 (sent with reference to cables A-
2107 and A-2109) UN Archives Series 217 Box 9 File 7.  
847 Coded cable from Linnér to Hammarskjöld, 11 September 1961, A-2120, UN Archives Series 217 
Box 9 File 5.  
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Léopoldville and was groping, improvising and playing it by ear”. “This”, Spaak later 
told the American ambassador, “could be very dangerous and result in disaster”.848 
 
Linnér informed the Americans on 11 September that Adoula’s government had 
issued arrest warrants for Tshombe, Munungo and the leading ministers in Katanga. 
Linnér thought that “Katangans would not be taken by surprise he expects some 
shooting would take place”. A comment that shows, contrary to what the UN 
command both in New York and the Congo would later claim, that they had foreseen 
resistance and violence. Linnér ended the meeting by again stating that this week 
would “be decisive one for Katanga operation”.849  
 
Operation Morthor – a Hindi word meaning “smash”, the chosen codename for the 
operation described in paragraph 9C – was launched at 04.00 in the morning of 12 
September.850 It was planned as a re-run of operation Rumpunch. As UN troops 
moved into position it soon became clear that it would be nothing of the sort. The 
first, and arguably most important, thing that went wrong was the blockade of 
Tshombe’s villa; when the UN arrived Tshombe had already fled. Tshombe had gone 
to the house of the British Consul Denzil Dunnett, after which he left for Rhodesia.851 
In all only one minister was arrested. At the post office intense fighting broke out as 
the Indian UN troops tried to force their way in. Once the Indians had managed to 
fight their way in, “after heavy hand to hand fighting”852, they were soon counter-
attacked from the outside by armoured cars. In the ensuing chaos, the nervous Indians 
fired at an ambulance. The fierce battle was witnessed by a large group of journalists 
who were staying at a hotel in the same square. Soon stories of the brutality of the UN 
– with special mentioning of the shots fired at the ambulance – were coming out of 
Elisabethville. At the radio station, similar scenes of resistance and violence followed 
before the Indian UN troops could secure the building. Despite the resistance, 
O’Brien initially viewed the operation as a success and at 8 p.m. he held a press 
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conference where he declared that Katanga’s secession was ended and referred to the 
action as having been taken under paragraph A(1) of resolution 161. 
 
The first telegram sent from the American consulate in Elisabethville on Operation 
Morthor, in the evening of 13 September, reported that European-led Katangan forces 
had launched strong attacks against the UN. The next day the American consul in 
Elizabethville reported that the UN had committed “inexcusable blunders” which had 
led to what was quickly becoming a “’war of liberation’ against UN” in Katanga.853 In 
the following days sniping and shelling of UN positions increased and in Jadotville an 
isolated Irish company was cut off and besieged by Katangese forces. The Irish 
company in Jadotville had been surrounded already on 11 September but this ”was 
not taken as a positive indication of serious trouble but was considered at that stage to 
be just another typical Congolese incident” in a striking example of the poor 
intelligence and poor analysis of available intelligence in ONUC.854 
 
 
C.3 The Americans Say No 
When the American ambassador, Gullion, met with Hammarskjöld and Wieschhoff, 
who had just landed in Leopoldville, accompanied by Linnér Hammarskjöld and his 
colleagues were “unfailingly optimistic”. Hammarskjöld made it clear that UN troops 
would not pull back from the positions they now held after operation Morthor and 
Hammarskjöld seemed convinced that Tshombe would agree to a cease-fire that 
would effectively mean that the foreign mercenaries were expelled once and for all. 
O’Brien was preparing to meet Tshombe and discuss a cease-fire. Hammarskjöld 
dismissed the continuing attacks on UN troops in Katanga as “terroristic 
uncoordinated actions of desperadoes”. Hammarskjöld emphasized how the UN 
actions in Katanga were crucial to support Adoula’s government.855  
 
The same day, 15 September, Dean Rusk called Ralph Bunche to find out what was 
going on in Katanga and why the US had not been informed. Bunche explained that 
Morthor was only meant as a “follow-up” on Rumpunch, and that the UN had not 																																																								
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expected any resistance (which was clearly wrong as at least Linnér had foreseen 
some resistance and violence). To reassure Rusk, Bunche also said that “our people 
including especially Linner are acting under direct instructions from headquarters”. At 
the same time, Bunche said – and this was later often repeated to show that 
Hammarskjöld was not aware of the launch of Operation Morthor – that 
Hammarsköld first heard of the fighting from a Reuters report in Accra while on his 
way to Leopoldville. But the fact that he first “heard” that there had been fighting 
while en route to Congo does not mean that he had not given the order for the 
operation. The Americans also interpreted this in the same way and added within 
brackets in the report of the conversation between Rusk and Bunche “(Presumably 
reason SYG made this point was to deny assumption that he had gone out to Congo in 
order to direct a big new military operation.)”.856 And the Americans were not the 
only ones who suspected that the real reason Hammarskjöld had gone to the Congo 
was to facilitate a reconciliation between Adoula and Tshombe (by force if necessary) 
in order to return triumphant to the General Assembly that was to open in New York 
on 19 September. The Belgian ambassador to Washington told the Americans that he 
thought Hammarskjöld authorized Operation Morthor to have a clear record on Congo 
by September 19 when the General Assembly would start in New York.857  
 
But, while Hammarskjöld was “unfailingly optimistic”, time was working against 
him. One reason he had not informed any of the Western governments was that he 
knew how much they resented the sort of intervention Operation Morthor was. 
Hammarskjöld’s plan had been to present them with a fait accompli and quickly bring 
Tshombe to an agreement with Adoula, after which the critical voices regarding the 
methods would be drowned by the triumphant chorus of Afro-Asians, singing the 
praises of the Secretary-General and the UN for ending the Katanga secession and 
bringing stability to the Congo under a legal government. By 15 September the 
moment when such a scenario might have been possible had passed. Kennedy and 
Rusk were now “deeply concerned” with UN actions and dismayed that 
Hammarskjöld had not consulted them in advance of operation Morthor. They put 
strong pressure on Hammarskjöld to agree to an immediate cease-fire with Tshombe. 
Rusk sent instructions to Gullion to press Hammarskjöld “as strongly as is necessary 																																																								
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to make certain he accepts and follows through on this philosophy”. Regarding 
Hammarskjöld and the rest of the UN command, Gullion was also urged to do his best 
to make sure they “substitute statesmanship on their part for present emotions”.858  
 
The Americans were soon in a position to put severe pressure on Hammarskjöld, as 
ONUC had always been dependent on the Americans for logistics. As the situation in 
Katanga deteriorated Hammarskjöld sent two urgent requests regarding 
reinforcements in the night between the 15 and 16 September to Bunche, who was left 
in charge in New York. First Bunche received a request from Hammarskjöld for ”2 or 
3 jet fighters with personnel and equipment” to deal with the single Fuga jet that gave 
complete air superiority to the Katangese.859 A few minutes later Hammarskjöld also 
requested Bunche to contact Washington for help to airlift reinforcements to 
Katanga.860 Bunche called Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland to request 
American help with the air lift. In the morning of 16 September the Americans 
consulted with the British and together they came up with a response that Cleveland 
then communicated to Bunche. The main message was that they strongly believed UN 
should seek an “immediate cease-fire”. Regarding Hammarskjöld’s request, 
Cleveland answered:  
 
“While we are not at this time saying we will not provide the assistance requested, we could provide 
such assistance only if (a) we know clearly what SYG intends to do and what his plans are; and (b) that 
we agree with these plans.”861 
 
These two conditions had always been a sine qua non of Hammarskjöld’s political 
actions and he had been reckless to stray from them. The UN could not act without 
US agreement in the Congo. 
 
The same day, new instructions, more succinct than those of the day before were 
cabled to Gullion in Leopoldville to make sure that the UN stopped all military 
operations and work for a “prompt cease-fire, even if this means UN military 																																																								
858 Telegram from State to Leopoldville 15 September 1961 FRUS 1961-63 Vol XX. 
859 Coded cable from Hammarskjöld to Bunche, 15 September 1961 (sent at 00.11 a.m. on 16 
September), A-2150, UN Archives Series 217 Box 9 File 5. 
860 Coded cable from Hammarskjöld to Bunche, 16 September 1961, A-2154, UN Archives Series 217 
Box 9 File 5.  
861 Telegram from State to Brussels 16 September 1961 FRUS 1961-63 Vol XX. 
	 240	
operation falls short of achieving its full objective of rooting out by military means all 
mercenaries in Katanga”.862 From the UK, the pressure was even stronger and 
Macmillan called Kennedy and urged him to put pressure on Hammarskjöld.863 On 16 
September, the American ambassador in Leopoldville made a demarche to 
Hammarskjöld on behalf of Kennedy, Rusk and Lord Home requesting 
Hammarskjöld to stay in the Congo “as long as the hostilities in Katanga continue” as 
it was jeopardizing everything they had sought to accomplish. Hammarskjöld, still 
defending Morthor, replied that “the impact of the Katanga problem on reconciliation 
of the rest of the Congo and on the balance between leading personalities in the 
cabinet was such that what we did was indeed the minimum necessary in order to not 
repeat not ‘to jeopardize what it is sought to accomplish’”.864 Hammarskjöld was still 
defending operation Morthor and his first choice would have been to carry on, but 
with no reinforcements and strong pressure he had to cave in to Western demands for 
an immediate cease-fire.  
 
Hammarskjöld decided that he would go and see Tshombe himself to negotiate an 
immediate cease-fire and he was keen to report to Bunche that he had done so before 
meeting with the British ambassador and Lord Lansdowne, the British Under-
Secretary of State for the Foreign Office who had been flown in to Leopoldville.865 
But Hammarskjöld’s preferred first option had been to send in reinforcements and 
keep up the pressure on Tshombe. He changed his mind only after both the request for 
an airlift of reinforcements and the request for overflight permission for the Ethiopian 
fighter jets had been refused by the Americans and the British respectively. 
Hammarskjöld knew that Lansdowne and the British ambassador, and later the 
Americans, would pressure him hard to go and see Tshombe. As he did not want to be 
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seen as giving in to pressure, Hammarskjöld decided to do, by himself, what they 
wanted, before they forced him to.  
 
As Hammarskjöld’s plane took off into the dark African night on 17 September 
Operation Morthor had turned into a nightmare.866 During the day attacks had 
worsened, as UN headquarters in Elisabethville was “mortared and machine-gunned” 
for an hour followed by an attack that was repulsed. In Jadotville, the reinforcements 
that were trying to relieve the beleaguered Irish company met with heavy fighting at a 
bridge 29 kilometres east of Jadotville and were repulsed. The Fuga jet also harassed 
them.867 At noon on 17 September word got out that the Irish company in Jadotville 
had surrendered.868  
 
Hammarskjöld’s plane never arrived in Ndola. There have been several investigations 
into what caused the Secretary-General’s plane to crash and a new one has recently 
been launched.869 Previous investigations have not been able to establish clearly once 
and for all either that the crash was the result of an accident or that it was the result of 
some kind of outside interference or sabotage.870 
 
In pursuing the high stakes policies of Rumpunch and Morthor, Hammarskjöld not 
only went outside what the UN was mandated to do when it came to the use of force, 
but he also did so without consulting his main allies. This was reckless at best and can 
only be explained by the extreme pressure Hammarskjöld was under to deliver a 
success in the Congo in order to secure his position at the General Assembly in 
September 1961. The end justified the means. 
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One of the most important political concepts Hammarskjöld elaborated was the ideal 
of the civil servant who was not a party member but who still played a political role. 
Hammarskjöld described the ideal civil servant as someone who was capable of 
political action, but as “the servant of society”; his “moral loyalty in the first hand 
towards society, as it appears in the shape of the nation, but secondly towards the 
wider view of society that is represented by internationalism”. Key to 
Hammarskjöld’s concept was the idea that it would somehow be possible to 
determine objectively what was in the interest of society and the world community. 
But this was hardly something to build a policy on. Indeed, it sounds very close to the 
“Delphic oracle who alone speaks for the international community”, that 
Hammarskjöld had said that he was not. 
 
In Sweden, he had been the trusted advisor to his government; a role that he set out to 
reprise on the international level when he was elected Secretary-General. In reality, 
Hammarskjöld had been a political player with the role of a “grey eminence” in 
Sweden. Hammarskjöld’s ideas represented an old conservative view of civil servants 
as above party politics. Hammarskjöld thought that “impartial” civil servants had an 
important political role to play. Dag Hammarskjöld developed very close ties to some 
leading Social Democrats, the party that was almost constantly in power during his 
career in Sweden. Yet Hammarskjöld insisted on being sworn in by the King when he 
was made a minister (a ceremony no longer used by that time) and his views on social 
welfare were those of a Bismarck. As his brother Bo Hammarskjöld, who also served 
as State secretary under the Social Democrats, put it: “I am a conservative man, but 
the best thing a conservative man can do is to put forward welfare measures”. Dag 
Hammarskjöld’s work with the Marshall plan and the OEEC led him to espouse aid 
and economic development as a means to stave off revolutionary tendencies that he 
would later apply in the Third World.  
 
As deputy foreign minister, Hammarskjöld had supplemented the rigid neutrality of 
foreign minister Undén and made it possible for Sweden to align firmly with the West 
while remaining ostentatiously neutral. For this he was duly lauded as “the most pro-
Western of Swedish ministers” in Washington and London. Hammarskjöld played an 
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important role in ensuring that Sweden was the kind of neutral country that was 
palatable in Washington. This is the reason why Hammarskjöld was elected 
Secretary-General: he was the most pro-Western candidate that the Soviets would not 
veto. Real compromise candidates were rejected out of hand by the US 
administration.  
 
Hammarskjöld reorganized the UN Secretariat to centralise power in the person of the 
Secretary-General as the “only political officer in the UN”. Hammarskjöld chose his 
closest advisors regardless of UN hierarchies and bypassed UN practices on 
geographic diversity. Thus, he ended up working with a team of mainly Americans 
and Westerners, a few Afro-Asians and none from the Soviet Bloc. Since many of 
Hammarskjöld’s advisors owned their position only to Hammarskjöld’s favour and 
not to a secure position in the organization, they were unlikely to provide him with 
too much dissenting advice. There are several attested cases where one of 
Hammarskjöld’s former favourites had fallen from a high and influential position to 
be left completely in the cold.  
 
Hammarskjöld did not attain his political role because he was seen as “neutral and 
impartial”. “Leave-it-to-Dag” was only a phrase employed by journalists and never 
the basis for any decision. On the contrary, the permanent members of the Security 
Council were hesitant to leave anything to Dag unless he was restrained by a limited 
mandate. It was not appreciated when he overstepped his mandate as the Peking 
episode shows. In his mission to Peking in 1955, as well as his Middle East mission in 
early 1956, Hammarskjöld tried to play the role of mediator and trusted advisor to 
governments. In both cases reacted strongly against Hammarskjöld’s aspirations in 
the field of mediation. Nevertheless, Hammarskjöld used these cases to expand the 
role of the Secretary-General. While he had in fact a limited mandate as special envoy, 
he expanded his role by affirming that, in his capacity as Secretary-General, he was 
virtually without limits, free to discuss anything with his interlocutors. And so he did. 
From the records of his negotiations with Chou En-Lai in Peking it is clear that Chou 
thought that he had a mandate to discuss a much wider deal with the Americans than 
he had. When Hammarskjöld was given an audience with Dulles he spoke at length 
about the outlines and merits of a wider deal with the PRC. Dulles was less than 
impressed by Hammarskjöld’s venture into high international politics and found him 
	 244	
“naïve”. The eventual release of the prisoners was done as a confidence building 
measure by the PRC ahead of direct negotiations with the Americans in Geneva.  
 
The Suez crisis became the watershed in Hammarskjöld’s career and established him 
as a “force” in world politics. Hammarskjöld was less important to Suez than Suez 
was to Hammarskjöld. The modalities were fixed by Suez: a blocked Security Council 
that hands a question to the General Assembly according to the Uniting for Peace 
mechanism followed by a vague General Assembly resolution that leaves the 
Secretary-General free to implement it as he thinks fit. This formal way of giving all 
powers to the Secretary-General, adopted in the context of the Suez crisis for the first 
time, would later be used to great effect by Hammarskjöld. At Suez it was used with 
moderation. Hammarskjöld and the American administration viewed Suez through a 
Cold War lens and Hammarskjöld presented the Western permanent members of the 
Security Council with a face-saving device to allow them to gloss over their 
differences to the outside world when in fact the Americans had bluntly pressured the 
British and their French brothers-in-arms into a humiliating defeat. Without the strong 
American backing for all his efforts, Hammarskjöld would not have been able to play 
the role he did.  
 
Hammarskjöld could develop the political role of the Secretary-General because he 
managed to offer a solution to the American dilemma of how to balance the Cold War 
with the problems of decolonisation. In the wake of Suez Hammarskjöld elaborated 
his “vacuum theory” that said that it was the role of the Secretary-General to fill any 
vacuum that was created when the Security Council and the General Assembly were 
unable to act. When he added a geographic dimension to the vacuum theory – the idea 
that the UN should impose itself in newly decolonized countries so as to fill the 
political vacuum left by the old metropolitan powers, before it became drawn into the 
Cold War by Western/Soviet competition – Hammarskjöld created a potential 
solution to the great dilemma that the mix of decolonisation and Cold War created for 
the Americans, as illustrated by the Suez crisis. The US wanted to support their 
colonial NATO allies in Western Europe, but helping them in the Third-World meant 
allowing the Soviets to pose as the anti-colonialist heroes and alienating the new 
states. It was also a matter of keeping the Third-World firmly aligned with the First 
World, as far as capitalist economic models were concerned and avoiding radical 
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regimes tempted to introduce socialist or even communist models and nationalize the 
use of resources. Hammarskjöld offered the solution to both problems: the UN could 
step in instead of the US and the West could count on Hammarskjöld to produce 
policies that would be friendly to Western capitalist concerns.  
 
Hammarskjöld was close to the strand of American economists, led by Paul Hoffman, 
who advocated technical and economic assistance to the Third World to keep it from 
falling into the Soviet orbit. Much like the Marshall Plan had saved parts of Western 
Europe from falling to the Soviet temptation this was seen as part of “winning the 
Cold War”. Hammarskjöld recruited Hoffman to head the new UN Special Fund 
which was to lead the charge in Hammarskjöld’s plans for an increased UN technical 
assistance program. Hammarskjöld argued that all aid and assistance to the newly 
independent countries in Africa should be multilateral and go via the UN.  
 
Hammarskjöld’s idea was to use the UN and multilateral aid to stave off revolutionary 
tendencies in the Third-World and save it from Communism and Soviet expansionism 
as well as radical nationalism. Special Envoys of the Secretary-General would assist 
the new leaders in the economic planning and progress of their countries as well as 
with political advice. The solution he offered appealed mainly to the Americans as it 
addressed their dilemma of choosing between their Western allies in NATO and the 
emerging countries in the Third-World. The British and the French were too confident 
in their own ability to handle the problems arising from the decolonization, although 
the British could see some merit for Hammarskjöld’s African ideas when it came to 
French and other non-British territories.  
 
The justification for Hammarskjöld’s new vision of an enlarged political role of the 
Secretary-General – that the Secretary-General could take political action if based on 
“neutrality and impartiality” – remained the same despite the dramatical increase in 
scope of the role. Before Suez Hammarskjöld had limited his role to mediation and 
had been mindful of Soviet concerns. Now he was arguing for special political 
representatives and advisors to new African states that would report directly to the 
Secretary-General coupled with multilateral assistance on a massive scale. Countering 
perceived Soviet expansionism was also an explicit goal of Hammarskjöld’s policies. 
The British criticized Hammarskjöld’s African plans for being too political as 
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decisions on, for example, economic development models could never be apolitical, 
not to mention the goal of keeping the Soviets out of Africa. Democratic governance 
did not necessarily enter into Hammarskjöld’s plans and he readily admitted that “the 
Westminster model was not suitable for automatic export to independent African 
countries” and happily dealt with African “strongmen”.  
 
Hammarskjöld based his political role on support from the West and the Afro-Asians. 
Hammarskjöld translated his idea for a UN role in the Third-World into a political 
deal with the Americans and the British to support him in this venture in exchange for 
Hammarskjöld’s aid in controlling and securing the backing of the Afro-Asians in the 
UN. Hammarskjöld’s influence, especially among Afro-Asians, had been carefully 
built up to the extent that the British spoke of the “mystic significance” of the UN in 
the eyes of many African countries. (Although the British were also sceptical of “the 
magical personality Mr. Hammarskjoeld tends to give the United Nations 
Organisation as a projection of himself”). What he now offered the Americans and the 
British was to give them the support of the UN, not just its Secretary-General, but also 
“the House” (as he referred to the General Assembly), confident in his ability to 
deliver a majority of the General Assembly. This was a tempting offer at a time when 
the new influx of newly independent countries meant that the US could no longer 
control a majority in the General Assembly with the help of its Western European and 
Latin American allies. What Hammarskjöld offered was a prolongation of the 
American moment at the United Nations.  
 
 
For Hammarskjöld’s “African ambitions” Congo became the perfect storm. As the 
head of an intervention numbering 20.000 soldiers in addition to technical assistants – 
never before and never after has the Secretary-General played a more direct political 
role – he was keen to use his new powers. Hammarskjöld’s two main, and interlinked, 
objectives were to keep the Soviets out and institute a system of exclusive multilateral 
assistance so that all assistance to the Congo would go via the UN. He referred to this 
policy publicly as “keeping the Cold War out of the Congo” but in private he made 
clear that this meant keeping the Soviets out.  
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Hammarskjöld treated the Congolese government as a non-entity from the outset. 
When the Congolese prime minister Lumumba objected to Hammarskjöld’s plans for 
exclusive multilateral aid because he thought they “smacked of trusteeship” and 
undermined Congolese sovereignty, Hammarskjöld started to actively undercut him. 
When Lumumba threatened to ask the UN to leave the Congo unless they got the 
Belgians to leave, the reason why the Congolese government had asked for UN 
assistance, Hammarskjöld tried to “break” him and encouraged and supported 
Kasavubu’s coup against Lumumba.  
 
The procedural basis that enabled Hammarskjöld to wield such influence in the 
Congo was the Security Council resolutions that gave the Secretary-General a wide 
margin to implement a resolution that was sufficiently ambitious. This was made 
possible due to support from moderate Afro-Asians on the Security Council like 
Tunisia and the Western permanent members. A moderate Afro-Asian on the Council 
would present a resolution largely drafted by Hammarskjöld. This way a Soviet veto 
was avoided as the Soviets did not want to veto Afro-Asian resolutions. The 
formulations of the resolutions were deliberately left vague and referred to the 
Secretary-General for their implementation. Although vague about the 
implementation, the resolutions were still clear enough on the basic need for the 
Belgians to get out, a sine qua non of both Afro-Asian and Soviet support. As my 
research shows, the Americans and the British, as well as the Belgians and the French, 
supported these resolutions because Hammarskjöld consulted closely with them and 
they were reassured that Hammarskjöld would implement the resolutions in a manner 
favourable to them and their interests. Hammarskjöld’s policy during the period until 
the coup against Lumumba was also strongly pro-American and pro-Western.  
 
This resulted in the phase of “gamesmanship” or “how to win without actually 
cheating” as Hammarskjöld himself referred to it, which culminated in the UN backed 
coup against Lumumba. It was a policy driven by political calculations that were 
afterwards explained in terms of principles of neutrality and impartiality. It was, 
however, not a policy based on these principles as Hammarskjöld portrayed it; politics 
came first, principles were added as an afterthought.  
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Hammarskjöld strongly believed that his policies were in the interest of the UN and 
the international community. It is important to keep these two apart as what is in the 
interest of the international community is not necessarily in the interest of the UN and 
vice versa. Even more to the point, what was in the interest of the UN was not 
necessarily in the interest of the Congo and its government. Hammarskjöld rejected 
Communism what he perceived as Soviet expansionism. Based on this assumption, 
shared by most in the West, Hammarskjöld did what he thought best to counter Soviet 
influence in the Congo. Whether this was a “good” or a “bad” policy depends on the 
subjective outlook of the observer. In Washington, it was perceived as a “good” 
policy whereas in Moscow it was obviously considered “bad”. Hammarskjöld, 
however, justified that this policy on the grounds that it was neutral and impartial and 
it is against this claim that we must evaluate it.  
 
The question of neutrality is of central importance to the political role of the UN and 
its Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld based the very idea of a political role for the 
Secretary-General and the UN on the fact that the Secretary-General could be 
impartial and neutral while taking political action as he had explained in the Oxford 
speech: 
 
“one of the essential points on which these experiments in international cooperation 
represent an advance beyond traditional ‘conference diplomacy’ is the introduction on 
the international arena of joint permanent organs, employing a neutral civil service, 
and the use of such organs for executive purposes on behalf of all members of the 
organizations. Were it to be considered that the experience shows that this radical 
innovation in international life rests on a false assumption, because ‘no man can be 
neutral’, then we would be thrown back to 1919, and a searching re-appraisal would 
become necessary.” 
 
Hammarskjöld’s philosophy of the “neutral” intervention can only be true if it is 
possible to deduce what is, in a given situation, in the interest of the world community. 
Hammarskjöld claimed that this was indeed his prerogative as Secretary-General. He 
said as much in a letter to the Swedish foreign minister Undén:  
 
“Naturally, I am guided solely – and I really mean solely – by what is in the best 
interest of the UN, and the world community through the UN. But the judgment on 
where this criterion leads must primarily be mine.”  
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The argument is circular. The definition becomes subjective in the extreme: impartial 
is whatever Hammarskjöld decides is impartial. Ergo, Hammarskjöld’s actions are per 
definition impartial.  
 
Hammarskjöld was a firm believer in the rule of the expert as we have seen. But there 
was also a mystical inspiration for his ideas. Among the Christian mystics that 
Hammarskjöld was inspired by there was a potentially darker strain, if their words are 
pushed to their logical ends. As Robert Musil put it with a reference to Eckehart, one 
of Hammarskjöld’s main inspirations in Markings, “They were all, in a bourgeois 
sense, immoralists. They made a distinction between the sins and the soul, which 
despite sins could stay pure, almost like Machiavelli makes a distinction between the 
end and the means”. Like Machiavelli distinguishes between the end and the means, 
they distinguish between the soul and the sins; the former can be pure even if the 
latter are not. This goes a long way towards explaining Hammarskjöld’s actions in the 
Congo that he himself referred to as “gamesmanship”. In this sense Hammarskjöld 
really was, as one of his lieutenants described him, a “Machiavelli of peace” – using 
immoral means for a perceived moral end. It appears that Hammarskjöld struggled 
with these thoughts in Markings, where he wrote:  
 
“The most dangerous of all moral dilemmas: when we are obliged to conceal truth in 
order to help the truth to be victorious. If this should at any time become our duty in 
the role assigned us by fate, how strait must be our path at all times if we are not to 
perish.”  
 
Hammarskjöld’s closest advisors further illustrate the problem. Hammarskjöld saw 
his closest American advisors as neutral and impartial civil servants. Hammarskjöld’s 
closest advisor, Andrew Cordier, has given an interesting testimony to how he viewed 
this: “I feel that you can be pursuing the interests of all of humanity while at the same 
time you are giving full and complete and loyal support to the proper and positive and 
constructive interests of your own people and your own country. The two are not 
incompatible. They supplement each other.” This was, however, not possible for the 
Soviets as their national interest had global aspirations in that it advocated world 
revolution according to Cordier. Cordier saw no conflict in American interest and UN 
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interest as they were one and the same. Now logically, if US interests and Soviet 
interests are not the same, then UN interests cannot at the same be in line with both 
US and Soviet interests. What Cordier failed to realise was that the American national 
interest had the same global aspiration as the Soviet national interest as it sought a 
world that was safe for American interests.   
 
The core members of the so called “Congo Club” – the small group of advisors that 
met on the 38th floor of the UN building to lead the UN operation in the Congo – 
were all Americans who had worked for the OSS (predecessor of the CIA) during the 
war and then State Department. No one from the Soviet bloc ever came close to the 
Congo Club. Hammarskjöld’s defence was that they were international civil servants 
that fulfilled his criteria of being impartial. It is strange to see how the Soviets and 
others could accept this. How would the Americans have viewed it if Hammarskjöld’s 
three closest advisors had been Soviets with a background in the KGB?  
 
The problem was not so much the fact that Hammarskjöld’s inner circle of advisors 
worked closely with Washington and shared many top secret reports with the 
American administration; this is to some extent normal procedure as the UN is there 
to serve its members who should have insight. The problem was that no Soviet 
diplomats were given insight. Hammarskjöld’s motivation for this was that the Soviet 
UN employees did not fulfil the criteria of impartiality as they were still working for 
Soviet interests. As we have seen, Cordier and Bunche, although they could differ 
with specific US policies, felt that their UN work was in line with US interests. The 
difference was that Hammarskjöld considered it perfectly natural for Americans to 
liaise closely with their government. The reason for this was that Hammarskjöld was 
pursuing a pro-American and outspoken anti-Soviet policy in the Congo. This was the 
reason why American UN employees could work for UN interests and sleep well at 
night whereas the same was impossible for their Soviet counterparts.  
 
Apart from the problem of “neutrality and impartiality”, the Congo crisis highlighted 
a second problem with the political role of the Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld’s 
policy was dictated to a large extent by the need to keep the support of the West and 
the Afro-Asians that he had based his political role on. Policy was driven more by 
what was possible to get support for in New York and actions were taken to ensure 
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that support. Hammarskjöld’s anti-Lumumba policies led to a wave of criticism from 
the Soviet Bloc and many Afro-Asians.  At same time the Congo crisis moved from 
the Security Council to the General Assembly after the Americans used the Uniting-
for-Peace-mechanism to circumvent a Soviet veto. This increased Hammarskjöld’s 
reliance on the Afro-Asians, and not just the moderate Afro-Asians on the Security 
Council. Consequently Hammarskjöld changed his Congo policy 180-degrees to 
accommodate the Afro-Asians. The “completely do nothing impartiality” was the 
antithesis of the interventionist and partial policies of the Gamesmanship-period. But 
as the reactions of the opponents of this policy showed this was no more neutral than 
the previous policy of gamesmanship. (Timberlake summarised it well when he asked 
“who is the UN neutral against?”.) This clearly explains how Hammarskjöld was no 
longer driving policy but rather adapting policy to be able to sustain his position as 
Secretary-General. Developing an independent political role for the Secretary-General 
had become an end rather than a mean.  
 
In this mix of Cold War and decolonization that caused frequent headaches to 
Western policy makers, Hammarskjöld focused on the East-West aspect rather than 
the North-South aspect. In the Congo this led him to pursue a policy in the first phase 
that had as its main goal to keep the Soviets out. Once this was achieved, however, 
Hammarskjöld realized that he was about to loose the crucial support of the Afro-
Asians, who cared little for the East-West aspect and saw the Congo crisis from a 
North-South, or decolonization, angle. This led him to completely change his policy 
in the second phase (from September 1960 to the arrival of the Kennedy 
administration) where the UN policy of zero intervention was the direct antithesis of 
the UN policy in the first phase. This was followed by a third policy, which was a 
synthesis of the two as the incoming Kennedy administration understood better the 
need to win the hearts and minds of the Afro-Asians in order to win in the Cold War. 
This allowed Hammarskjöld to again argue for a “de facto UN trusteeship” in the 
Congo, but paired with strong words and actions against the Belgians and the 
secessionist regime in Katanga.  
 
Hammarskjöld was in desperate need to present a victory in the Congo to survive the 
General Assembly in September 1961. This led Hammarskjöld to the great gamble of 
Operation Morthor and the fateful events in Katanga in September 1961. 
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Hammarskjöld had built up this pressure by playing to the small countries in the 
General Assembly in his attempts to build a majority. In 1961 Hammarskjöld had 
ended up in the same situation as his predecessor Trygve Lie, whom the Soviets 
refused to recognise after his pro-Western actions in the Korean crisis. When the 
Soviets declared that they no longer recognised Hammarskjöld as Secrertary-General 
after the murder of Lumumba, Hammarskjöld stated that if he had lost the support of 
a permanent member of the Security Council he would nonetheless stay in his post as 
long as he had the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly. Although he had 
neither a mandate nor a legal justification for the use of force against the Katanga 
regime Hammarskjöld gambled on Operation Morthor to achieve the end of 
Katanga’s secession and that it would be accepted as a fait accompli. Operation 
Morthor failed and the Americans showed that without their approval the Secretary-
General could not achieve anything. Hammarskjöld had no option but to agree to 
direct negotiations for a cease-fire with Tshombe. Hammarskjöld had overestimated 
his own powers to sway the General Assembly and in particular the Afro-Asians. To 
keep their support, he had to go against American and Western interests, which meant 
that he could not keep up his part of the deal. In the end, the Kennedy administration 
came down on Hammarskjöld in full force, easily bringing him back to order by 
refusing the logistical support to continue Operation Morthor and thereby showing 
that the Americans had the means to control the UN operation in the Congo when 
they chose to. 
 
 
Hammarskjöld followed his vision and transformed an office without power into a 
key political actor, turning the UN into an independent political stakeholder 
implementing its own policies. The political grounds for doing so were, however, 
deeply flawed. He based his right to political action on the impartiality of his office, 
drawing its inspiration “solely from the Charter”. The “ideology of the Charter”, 
however, was whatever its high priest the Secretary-General decided it to be, as the 
sole interpreter of the Charter. As an example, the Charter was used to argue against 
intervening in Katanga in 1960, and later, in 1961, in favour of an intervention.  
 
Despite Hammarskjöld’s claims to have built up firm legal precedents for the political 
role of the Secretary-General the political role of the Secretary-General was, as one 
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British diplomat had put it, based on what he could “get away with”. This also shows 
the limits to the claim of “neutrality and impartiality” in the exercise of the political 
role of the Secretary-General. The political role of the Secretary-General was 
inherently dependent on the good-will of Hammarskjöld’s Western backers in the 
Security Council and actually lacked a real legal base (which it could be argued is a 
prerequisite for any impartial exercise of power). He had managed to build his 
political role for the Secretary-General because the Americans and the British thought 
that this was in their interest. When he acted against their interest, their support, and 
with it the foundation for his political role, disappeared. Hammarskjöld’s aspirations 
for the political role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations perished together 
with Hammarskjöld in the chaos of the Congo crisis.  
 
Hammarskjöld allowed the Americans to use the UN as a tool for American foreign 
policy in the Cold War for a little bit longer than they would otherwise have. After 
Hammarskjöld, it was clear that the UN had lost its usefulness as an instrument of 
American foreign policy as it was dominated by the Afro-Asians with no one to rally 
them in support of a pro-Western line. The Uniting for Peace resolution was used 
much more sparingly, and not on the initiative of the US; the General Assembly was 
seen as too fickle a body to trust. This is evidenced by the statistics of the use of the 
veto power in the Security Council. Until the beginning of the sixties, the Soviets 
stood for the vast majority of vetoes, with the British-French vetoes during the Suez 
crisis as the main exception. After 1961 the Americans became the major users of the 
veto.  
 
After Hammarskjöld, the UN largely became an uninteresting organisation to the 
Americans. The Kennedy administration focused on USAID instead of UN technical 
assistance, although some interest remained in the newly created UNDP, headed by 
Paul Hoffman. U Thant did not attempt to play the political role that Hammarskjöld 
had. He stayed at mediation, more in the manner of Sir Eric Drummond or 
Hammarskjöld’s early conception of his role. The US discarded Thant’s efforts in the 
Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam the same way they had discarded Hammarskjöld’s 
first mediation attempt in Peking. Several steps were also taken to make sure that the 
Secretary-General would never again amass the kind of powers that Hammarskjöld 
had. All peacekeeping missions after the UN Operation in the Congo have also been 
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given detailed and time limited mandates to ensure that permanent members of the 
Security Council could veto their continuation every six months or so.  
 
Hammarskjöld’s arguably most lasting legacy was the focus on the African continent, 
peace keeping and development aid. These three key features of the UN of today were 
the result of Hammarskjöld’s ideas. In terms of a genealogy of the UN this thesis 
argues that these, as well as many of the guiding principles and concepts of the UN – 
especially concerning neutrality and impartiality, such as not having permanent 
members of the Security Council contribute with troops to peacekeeping forces – 
were created to serve specific Cold War objectives and counter Soviet influence. In 
the Congo, Hammarskjöld on several occasions tried to get American and British 
backing for instituting a UN trusteeship over the Congo in everything but name, 
where UN advisors would rule behind the scenes. In many ways, this model is not far 
from what the UN is doing today in many parts of the world. It is interesting to see 
how this model of the UN “administration of experts” and “technocratic governments” 
was actually devised as a very political solution to counter revolutionary influence. 
Today as well, the UN is ruling several territories through its “experts” and many call 
for the UN to do much more. Before we do so, however, we should think about what 
the UN is actually doing. The UN does not act in a neutral and impartial way, indeed, 
it could not from a philosophical perspective and the example of Hammarskjöld 
shows that it does not. When the UN seeks to promote a liberal agenda, which it often 
does, it does so against an alternative. We might prefer the liberal agenda, but then we 
should say so, and not pretend that it is a neutral and impartial policy.  
 
 
If Hammarskjöld’s political role died together with Hammarskjöld in Ndola it also 
saw an apotheosis in the form of Hammarskjöld’s elevation to a symbol for a more 
potent UN with a political role based on ethics and principles. While it is outside the 
scope of this thesis to trace this development in detail the outlines can be sketched. 
Urquhart’s biography and the five volumes of Hammarskjöld’s public papers and 
speeches edited by Cordier and Foote were both published in 1972. Cordier and 
Hammarskjöld’s legal advisor Oscar Schachter, who helped draft the Oxford speech, 
both played an important role in promoting the role of an active and executive UN in 
academia. Cordier as dean of the School of International Affairs at Columbia 
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University, and later as dean of Columbia, and Schachter at Columbia Law School. 
Cordier raised the interest in the UN and Hammarskjöld’s role and was supervisor for 
several studies of Hammarskjöld and the UN. Schachter became a leading light in the 
“New York school”, a strand in international public law that argued for UN 
peacekeeping interventions often referred to Hammarskjöld as an ideal. After the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the renewed interest in UN peacekeeping missions there have 
been a plethora of studies that have turned to Hammarskjöld as a model. 
 
If we agree that there can be no really neutral and impartial political action – as 
opposed to what Hammarskjöld argued – then we should try and limit the area where 
the Secretary-General has to take political decisions of his own. This would also limit 
the problem of policy being driven by UN interests. It could be argued that 
Hammarskjöld’s actions undercut the Charter to the extent that it went around a 
Security Council that was blocked because there was no solution agreed by all its 
permanent members. When the Security Council is blocked it means that the UN 
should not take action. Hammarskjöld argued that the Secretary-General should do so 
anyway and in doing so threw the organisation squarely on the side of the West 
against the Soviet Bloc. Any Secretary-General who acts without the backing of the 
Security Council is bound to be on very thin ice. To the extent that the Secretary-
General should play a political role, it seems appropriate that it should be more in the 
manner of Sir Eric Drummond who, to quote Hammarskjöld, “played a role behind 
the scenes, acting as a confidential channel of communication to Governments 
engaged in controversy or dispute, but this behind-the-scenes role was never extended 
to taking action in a politically controversial case that was deemed objectionable by 
one of the sides concerned.” This is also in line with Hammarskjöld’s early thoughts 
on the role of the Secretary-General before the Suez crisis.  
 
To answer the question Hammarskjöld put in his Oxford lecture, we are perhaps not 
back in 1919, but “a searching re-appraisal” of the political role of the UN and its 
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